The other side of the coin follows logically. Just as |
Subsection (a) defines the retention of continuing, exclusive |
jurisdiction, by clear implication the subsection also |
identifies how jurisdiction to modify may be lost. That is, if |
all the relevant persons--the obligor, the individual obligee, |
and the child--have permanently left the issuing State, the |
issuing State no longer has an appropriate nexus with the |
parties or child to justify the exercise of jurisdiction to |
modify its child-support order. See In re Marriage of |
Erickson, Wash. App. Div. 3 2000, 991 P.2d 123, 98 (Wash. App. |
2000); Groseth v. Groseth, 600 N.W.2d 159 (Neb. 1999). |
Further, the issuing tribunal has no current information about |
the factual circumstances of anyone involved, and the |
taxpayers of that State have no reason to expend public funds |
on the process. Note, however, that the original order of the |
issuing tribunal remains valid and enforceable. That order is |
in effect not only in the issuing State but also in those |
States in which the order has been registered. It also may be |
registered and enforced in additional States even after the |
issuing State has lost its power to modify its order, see |
Sections 601-604, infra. The original order remains in effect |
until it is properly modified in accordance with the narrow |
terms of Sections 609-612, infra. |