EXAMINING THE RACE EFFECTS OF STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS AND RELATED ISSUES

titution of the United States of America.

et, until an ei reof: or abridges

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Washington, DC 20425 Official Business Penalty for Private Use \$300

Visit us on the Web: www.usccr.gov



U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is an independent, bipartisan agency established by Congress in 1957. It is directed to:

- Investigate complaints alleging that citizens are being deprived of their right to vote by reason of their race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin, or by reason of fraudulent practices.
- Study and collect information relating to discrimination or a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution because of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin, or in the administration of justice.
- Appraise federal laws and policies with respect to discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin, or in the administration of justice.
- Serve as a national clearinghouse for information in respect to discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin.
- Submit reports, findings, and recommendations to the President and Congress.
- Issue public service announcements to discourage discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws.¹

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

Catherine E. Lhamon, *Chairperson* Patricia Timmons-Goodson, *Vice Chairperson** Debo P. Adegbile Gail L. Heriot Peter N. Kirsanow David Kladney Karen Narasaki** Michael Yaki

Mauro Morales, Staff Director

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20425 (202) 376-8128 voice

TTY Relay: 711

www.usccr.gov

¹ 42 U.S.C. §1975a.

* Term ended 12/05/2019. ** Term ended 11/29/2019.

Examining the Race Effects of Stand Your Ground Laws

Briefing before The United States Commission on Civil Rights Held in Orlando, FL

Briefing Report

[This page intentionally left blank]



UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

1331 Pennsylvania Ave., NW • Suite 1150 • Washington, DC 20425 www.usccr.gov

Letter of Transmittal

February, 2020

President Donald J. Trump Vice President Mike Pence Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi

On behalf of the United States Commission on Civil Rights ("the Commission"), I am pleased to transmit our materials from our briefing on Stand Your Ground laws. These materials are also available in full on the Commission's website at <u>www.usccr.gov</u>.

The purpose of the Commission's briefing was to determine whether there is a possible racial bias in the assertion, investigation, or enforcement of justifiable homicide laws in states with Stand Your Ground provisions. In the transcript of our briefing, you will find expert testimony from state legislators, academic researchers, and advocates, as well as testimony on the personal impact of these laws.

We at the Commission are pleased to share these materials to help ensure that all Americans enjoy civil rights protections to which we are entitled.

For the Commission,

ple

Catherine E. Lhamon Chair

[This page intentionally left blank]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents	i
Commissioners' Statements	l
Statement of Commissioner Michael Yaki	l
Statement of Commissioner Gail Heriot)
Statement of Commissioner Peter N. Kirsanow	5
Stand Your Ground Public Briefing Transcript (Oct. 17, 2014)7	l

[This page intentionally left blank]

COMMISSIONERS' STATEMENTS

Statement of Commissioner Michael Yaki

INTRODUCTION

The shooting death of Trayvon Martin on February 26, 2012, and later that year, on November 12th, the shooting and killing of Jordan Davis triggered a national controversy over the legislated criminal defense called "stand your ground." These laws expanded the self-defense principles of the castle doctrine to situations and areas outside the curtilage of a home. It also expanded the principle of self-defense to a lesser justification standard than that of justifiable homicide.

The United States Commission on Civil Rights opened its own inquiry on the subject in May 2013, and in October 2014, held a hearing in, Florida. The transcript of that hearing forms the main body of that report. Unlike other hearings or briefings, the work of the Commission was conceived as an investigation, on a bipartisan vote made possible by the vote of then-Vice-Chair Abigail Thernstrom.¹

We are here presented with only the testimony heard in Florida five years ago, as well as research and public information subsequent, but that does not prevent members of this Commission to state their observations on an issue that continues to trouble our nation to this day. And so my statement begins.

The question we asked then, and we ask now, continues to be: do Stand Your Ground laws² have an unacceptable racial bias in their application in the criminal justice system. What we do know, and what we cannot ignore, is that the same racial biases that have permeated our criminal justice system cannot be separated from this issue. When you consider the racial disparities in selective prosecution and sentencing that have been amply documented in the literature³ is it any wonder

¹ Through no fault of the Commission and its staff, the lack of resources – both fiscal and personnel – hampered the ability of the Commission to engage in the type of fact-finding this matter deserved. Because of the way that data is recorded in Stand Your Ground shootings – or, more accurately, was not recorded, as will be discussed later – the intensive investigative resources that would have been required to be dedicated proved to be beyond the reach of the Commission. However, I want to acknowledge the immense contributions of Commission staff in providing the research enabling this Statement. In particular, I want to acknowledge their major contributions in Sections I, IV, and V.

² Throughout the text of this Statement, Stand Your Ground and its abbreviation, SYG will be used interchangeably.

³ See, e.g., Marc Mauer (2010) "Justice for All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System," Human Rights, Volume 37, Number 4, Fall 2010.

that a law like Stand Your Ground, which in effect grants both powers to an individual under the guise of self-defense would suffer similar maladies?

First, though, it is important to understand the background of Stand Your Ground laws.

I. THE RISE AND EVOLUTION OF STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS

A. The inception of Stand Your Ground

Florida passed the first "Stand Your Ground" law in 2005. The law extended the common-law "castle doctrine," embedded in most state laws, to go beyond the confines of one's home and into any area where a person "has a right to be" in defense of their person or property.⁴

Under the common law, the use of deadly force in the exercise of self-defense was justified in the case of a person defending their home.⁵ Until then, the "rule of retreat" dictated that a person had a duty to remove themselves from perceived harm. This was modified under early American jurisprudence to include any situation in which the defendant was in reasonable fear of imminent death or severe bodily harm.⁶

⁴ Fl. Statutes 771.012: (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force.

⁽²⁾ A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.

Fl. Statutes 776.031: (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with, either real property other than a dwelling or personal property, lawfully in his or her possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his or her immediate family or household or of a person whose property he or she has a legal duty to protect. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force.

⁽²⁾ A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.

⁵ See Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida's Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 504.

Florida's law removed the duty to retreat and extended the right of deadly force to protect other persons⁷, property outside the home⁸, as well as reduced the threshold in both statutes from "reasonable fear of imminent death or severe bodily injury" to the broader "imminent commission of a forcible felony."⁹ In essence, the Florida law created innumerable and moving "castles" that allowed the use of deadly force wherever a person had "a right to be," effectively abrogating the duty to retreat in any place or circumstance.¹⁰

The National Rifle Association, in crafting the Florida legislation,¹¹ wanted the legal equivalent of carte blanche for the exerciser of a Stand Your Ground right. First, under the original version of the statute¹² the person making the claim that they acted in accordance with the Stand Your Ground law was *immune* to criminal and civil prosecution if they are deemed justified in their use of deadly force.¹³ In addition, and most confusing to law enforcement,¹⁴ the police "may not arrest the person for using or threatening to use force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used or threatened was unlawful."¹⁵ In 2017, the statute was amended¹⁶ to shift the burden to the prosecution to overcome a Stand Your Ground claim by clear and convincing evidence¹⁷, which has further confused prosecutors.¹⁸

¹⁰ See Catalfamo, supra note 5, at 526.

¹¹ See Mike Spies (2018) "The N.R.A. Lobbyist Behind Florida's Pro-Gun Policies," The New Yorker, March 5, 2018, at <u>https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/05/the-nra-lobbyist-behind-floridas-pro-gun-policies</u>.

¹² The statute has since been changed to make it even more difficult to charge someone using a Stand Your Ground defense, as will be discussed, infra. However, this section remains in the law.

¹³ FL. Statutes 776.032(1).

¹⁴ See Susan Taylor Martin, Tampa Bay Times, *Florida 'stand your ground' law yields some shocking outcomes depending on how law is applied*, <u>http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/florida-stand-your-ground-law-yields-some-shocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133</u> (hereafter "Tampa Bay Times").

¹⁵ Fl. Statutes 776.032(2).

¹⁶ The Florida Supreme Court in 2015, after years of watching courts wrestle with interpreting the statute, created a court rule that required a defendant to establish at a pre-trial hearing their claim under the SYG statute by a preponderance of the evidence. See <u>https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article142992234.html</u> The National Rifle Association then worked to pass the change in the legislature, finally succeeding in 2017. *See* Spies, *supra*.

¹⁷ FL. Statutes 776.032(4).

¹⁸ <u>https://www.wtsp.com/article/news/local/pascocounty/trial-of-curtis-reeves-postponed-due-to-confusion-about-stand-your-ground-law/67-587350524</u>.

⁷ FL. Statutes 776.012(1).

⁸ FL. Statutes 776.031(1).

⁹ "Forcible felony" means treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery; aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual." FL. Statutes 776.08

The Florida "Stand Your Ground" law has been emulated, in one form or another, in over two dozen states, ¹⁹ the most recent in 2018.²⁰ As Table 1 illustrates, 2006 was a watershed year for SYG expansion as 14 states followed Florida by enacting similar legislation—AL, AK, AZ, GA, ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, MI, MS, OK, SC, and SD (see Table 1).




FIGURE 1. Number of SYG cases in Florida by SYG expansion nationwide, 2005–2011.

Source: USCCR analyses of SYG statutes for each state and SYG cases in Florida between 2005 and 2011.

The number of states reported as SYG states ranges between 22 and 33, depending on the criteria considered by a particular organization. For instance, considering only states that "allow a person to use deadly force where the shooter has a right to be, even when there is a clear and safe opportunity to avoid a dangerous situation," the Mayors Against Illegal Guns reported 22 SYG states in their study.²¹ The Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (APA) reported 31 states in their report based on the following criteria: (1) whether states expanded the Castle doctrine to

¹⁹ The states that adopted a Florida-style law that removes the duty to retreat include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.

²⁰ NRA-backed Stand Your Ground Bill Becomes Law in Wyoming, March 15, 2018, at <u>https://www.nraila.org/articles/20180315/nra-backed-stand-your-ground-bill-becomes-law-in-wyoming</u>. In addition, a good summary of Stand Your Ground laws can be found on the Rand Corporation website, The Effects of Stand-Your-Ground Laws, at <u>https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/stand-your-ground.html</u>.

²¹ Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2013, "Shoot First: 'Stand Your Ground' laws and their effect on violent crime and the criminal justice system" (hereafter Mayors).

areas outside the home; (2) diminished or eliminated the "duty to retreat;" (3) changed the burden of proving reasonableness to a presumption; and (4) providing blanket civil and criminal immunity.²² The American Bar Association (ABA) counted 33 states based on their analysis of statutory law and case law (including California and Illinois).

One state is one state too many. But Florida, the so-called Sunshine state²³, is the incubator for National Rifle Association laws²⁴ that have brought darkness into the homes of Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis, and countless others. Yet proponents continue to claim that SYG is doing what it is intended to do. That, too, is called into question.

B. Stand Your Ground Laws Impact on Crime Reduction/Deterrence

Since the passage of the Florida statute and its progeny, there has been controversy over its efficacy and collateral consequences. The NRA has consistently trumpeted Stand Your Ground laws as expanding the "constitutional right to self protection.²⁵ In contrast, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, dubbed it the "Shoot First" law, and noted that the "sensible requirements" of self-defense law to "minimize conflict and protect life" were undermined by Stand Your Ground laws.²⁶ However, it seems that the legislative history of the Florida law is rooted more in curbing "overzealous states attorneys" rather than any genuine concern rooted in safety.²⁷ Even then, however, there was scant evidence supporting that claim.²⁸ Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on the perceived benefits – deterrence and crime reduction.

1. National Studies – Increase in Homicides in States with Stand Your Ground Laws

A study by Cheng & Hoekstra examined state-level crime data from 2000 to 2010 from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports to analyze the effects of Stand Your Ground laws nationally on two types

²² Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, *available at <u>http://www.apainc.org/self-defense-policy/</u>.*

²³ Because of its role in being a leader in new gun laws, Florida has picked up another moniker. See, e.g. Tess Owens (2018) How Gov. Rick Scott helped make Florida the "Gunshine State" Vice News, Aug. 28 2018, at https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/j5nzd3/how-gov-rick-scott-helped-make-florida-the-gunshine-state.

²⁴ "Florida is often the first place the N.R.A. pursues specific gun rights protections . . . to set a precedent that can then be exported to other states," quoting David Cole in Spies, supra. See also Adam Weinstein, *How the NRA and Its Allies Helped Spread a Radical Gun Law Nationwide*, Mother Jones, June 12, 2012 https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/nra-alec-stand-your-ground/.

²⁵ <u>https://www.nraila.org/articles/20180315/nra-backed-stand-your-ground-bill-becomes-law-in-wyoming.</u>

²⁶ SYG Briefing, Testimony of Elizabeth Burke, Vol. 3, page 5.

²⁷ Spies, *supra*, characterizing the NRA as stating that innocent people were "being arrested, prosecuted, and punished for exercising self-defense that was lawful under the Constitution and Florida law."

of outcomes – crime deterrence and homicide reduction. ²⁹ Contrary to proponent's predictions, the study instead found "no evidence of deterrence effects on burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault" but did find significant evidence that the laws lead to more homicides" and estimated that "the laws increase homicides by a statistically significant 8 percent" or "an additional 600 homicides per year" in states that adopted "Stand Your Ground" laws.³⁰ Indeed, the study found that the Stand Your Ground law enactments across the country resulted in the largest divergence between SYG and non-SYG states in 40 years in terms of the rate of homicide increase in SYG states.³¹ The study concluded that it found "compelling evidence that by lowering the expected costs associated with using lethal force, [SYG] laws induce more of it."³²

Another study by McClellan and Tekin used the U.S. Vital Statistics database to conduct a similar examination of the impact of Stand Your Ground laws.³³ The researchers raised "serious doubts about the claim that SYG laws make America safer."³⁴ Indeed, this study also tracked the Cheng & Hoekstra study by showing that having a SYG law is associated with a 6.8 percent increase in the firearms-related homicide rate.³⁵ In contrast, states with self-defense provisions but retaining the duty to retreat (as contrasted with SYG's removal of the duty as long as someone has a "right to be" in the location) showed no statistical increase.³⁶ Thus, the study concluded that the removal of the duty to retreat caused the increase in homicides. They stated that their findings seemed to undermine argument that the stand your ground laws serve as a deterrent for crime.³⁷

Under both the increased deterrence and decrease in homicide policy rationales, Stand Your Ground in practice appears to fail miserably on the national level.

2. Florida Study – Increase in Homicides Associated with Stand Your Ground

Due to Florida's status as the leader in Stand Your Ground legislation, a group of doctors published a paper in 2017 in the Journal of the American Medical Association – Internal Medicine analyzing

³² *Id*.

³⁴ *Id*.

³⁵ *Id.* at p. 20.

³⁷ *Id.* at 32.

²⁹ Cheng Cheng, Mark Hoekstra, *Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime Or Escalate Violence? Evidence From Castle Doctrine*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 18134, <u>http://www.nber.org/papers/w18134</u>.

³⁰ Id.

³¹ *Id.* at p.4.

³³ Chandler B. McClellan, Erdal Terkin, *Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and Injuries*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 18187 at p. 7, <u>https://www.nber.org/papers/w18187.pdf</u>.

³⁶ *Id.* at p. 22. The study also showed a correlation between states that adopted Stand Your Ground and higher emergency room visits and hospitalizations due to firearms-related injuries.

the impact of Florida's SYG law by studying homicide rates between 1999 and 2014. It found that the implementation of Florida's SYG law was associated with "an abrupt and sustained increases in homicides, showing a 24.4% increase in homicide and a 31.6% increase in firearm-related homicide.³⁸ The study also found further evidence that Florida's stand your ground law has been associated with increases in both unlawful and justifiable homicides, including a 75% increase in determined justifiable homicides since the law passed.³⁹

A different 2014 study by Albert McCormick buttressed many of these findings.⁴⁰ In examining over 300 SYG cases in Florida, despite the claims by the NRA that Stand Your Ground was to protect law-abiding citizens,⁴¹ the study found that over 50% of the claimants (those asserting the defense) had criminal records, and almost one-third had criminal backgrounds involving at least one violent offense.

Indeed, the McCormick study showed that the "triggering event" precipitating the incident for which SYG was claimed was not, as proponents argued, a fear of violence.⁴² Instead, in 69% of the cases, the most likely incident trigger was an argument or dispute that then escalated to threat or violence. Defense against forcible felonies only comprised 27% of the triggering events.⁴³ In other words, SYG laws have been used to protect the use of violence or deadly force for nearly 70% of confrontations that did not begin as a forcible felony or threatening act. Rather, they help escalate a dispute into an incident with deadly consequences.⁴⁴

C. Other Stand Your Ground Concerns

³⁹ David K. Humphreys, PhD., Antonio Gasparrini, PhD., and Douglas J. Wiebe, PhD, *Association Between Enactment of a "Stand Your Ground" Self-defense Law and Unlawful Homicides in Florida*, August 2017 at <u>https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2648742</u>. See also <u>https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-homicides-standyourground/murders-surge-in-florida-in-decade-after-stand-your-ground-law-idUSKCN1AU1QL</u>

³⁸ David K. Humphreys, PhD., Antonio Gasparrini, PhD., and Douglas J. Wiebe, PhD, *Evaluating the Impact of Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Self-defense Law on Homicide and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted Time Series Study*, January 2017, at <u>https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2582988</u>

⁴⁰ Albert E. McCormick Jr., *The Enforcement of Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Law: Preliminary Findings*, The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology, Volume 6, Issue 1, Article 1, February 2014.

⁴¹ *NRA-Backed Stand Your Ground Becomes Law in Wyoming*, NRA Institute for Legislative Action, March 15, 2018, <u>https://www.nraila.org/articles/20180315/nra-backed-stand-your-ground-bill-becomes-law-in-wyoming</u>.

⁴² Among the precipitating events were arguments or disputes over money or property, relationships (e.g., jealousy or love triangles), domestic disputes, complaints (e.g., speeding through a neighborhood, barking dog), situations where the claimant intervened between two other disputing parties, road rage incidents, and revenge-motivated incidents. *See* McCormick, *supra*, at p. 12.

⁴³ *Id*.

⁴⁴ SYG Briefing, Testimony of Senator Chris Smith, *supra*, at p. 11

There are also concerns expressed by critics over the broad application of SYG laws on law enforcement, the courts, and, most disturbingly of all, who should "benefit" from the law.

In 2013, the American Bar Association convened a Task Force to examine and report on the potential effects Stand Your Ground laws "may have on public safety, individual liberties, and the criminal justice system."⁴⁵ Of particular concern are provisions in many of the SYG laws that do not allow law enforcement to arrest an individual asserting SYG unless "probable cause" exists to overcome that assertion. As stated in the report:

Police officers report varying degrees of confusion regarding how to properly apply Stand Your Ground laws. Most Florida police officers now defer decisions to arrest on Stand Your Ground cases to the prosecutor's office to make. This may be an unintended consequence of the law, as some Stand Your Ground statutes explicitly state in their language that the police should not vary from normal investigation procedures in Stand Your Ground cases. However, in jurisdictions with immunity from prosecution statutes, "criminal prosecution" is defined to include "detention, arrest, and charging." This broad definition leaves police officers unsure about when they can and should arrest suspects.⁴⁶

The confusion was also documented by the Tampa Bay Times in a study of nearly 200 cases in Florida where Stand Your Ground defenses were documented. The paper noted that the "law has allowed drug dealers to avoid murder charges and gang members to walk free. It has stymied prosecutors and confused judges."⁴⁷

"In Daytona Beach, for example, police Chief Mike Chitwood used the 'stand your ground' law as the rationale for not filing charges in two drug deals that ended in deaths. He said he was prevented from going forward because the accused shooters had permits to carry concealed weapons and they claimed they were defending themselves at the time. 'We're seeing a good law that's being abused,' Chitwood told a local paper."⁴⁸

The inanity of the legislation is legend. In 2006, a Miami man avoided prosecution after spraying a car filled with gang members with 14 bullets. In 2008, a 15-year-old Tallahassee boy was killed in a shoot-out between rival gangs; two of the gang members successfully used Stand Your Ground to protect themselves from prosecution.⁴⁹ As one law enforcement official stated, "Stand your ground" laws provide safe harbors for criminals and prevent prosecutors from bringing cases

⁴⁵ American Bar Association, p. iii.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at p. 27.

⁴⁷ See Tampa Bay Times, supra.

⁴⁸ Id.

⁴⁹ See Weinstein, supra.

against those who claim self-defense after unnecessarily killing others.⁵⁰ The Tampa Bay Times analysis is replete with further examples of this "safe harbor" consequence:

One man killed two unarmed people and walked out of jail. Another shot a man as he lay on the ground. Others went free after shooting their victims in the back. In nearly a third of the cases the *Times* analyzed, defendants initiated the fight, shot an unarmed person or pursued their victim — and still went free... During an argument at a 2009 party in Fort Myers, Omar Bonilla fired his gun into the ground and beat Demarro Battle, then went inside and gave the gun to a friend. If Battle feared for his life, he had time to flee. Instead, he got a gun from his car and returned to shoot Bonilla three times, including once in the back. Battle was not charged in the slaying.⁵¹

The 2017 amendments to the Florida law, opposed by prosecutors, have not resulted in any clarity.⁵² The Tampa Bay Times has noted that "confusion" has resulted in two different appeals courts rendering two different opinions on the application of the law to cases pending at the time the law was enacted.⁵³ One of these cases involved a 75-year old retired police captain shooting a man in a movie theater after popcorn was thrown at him.⁵⁴

In addition, the Tampa Bay Times article noted:

Critics contend the shift in the law will have its biggest impact before stand your ground hearings even occur. They say the amendment could have a "chilling effect" on authorities, who will think twice before bringing cases that should reasonably go before a judge. The immunity offered by stand your ground is broad, said University of Miami law professor Mary Anne Franks, and "the statute suggests the person ... would actually be able to sue everybody" if a judge dismisses the charge. Stand your ground does not mention the specific process for filing a civil suit. But it does state that defendants are immune from an arrest, language that could later bolster a claim of wrongful arrest or imprisonment. "You have basically cowed law

⁵⁰ David LaBahn, (2013) "Stand Your Ground Laws: Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the Expanded Use of Deadly Force," October 29, 2013. Testimony before the Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the United States Senate, Serial No. J–113–35, p. 15.

⁵¹ Id.

⁵² "In the summer of 2015, the Florida Supreme Court addressed one of Stand Your Ground's core provisions, which provides a path to immunity from the legal proceedings that typically follow a charge of murder or assault. Under the law, a defendant is entitled to a special pretrial hearing, during which a judge can dismiss the case. The court ruled that in these hearings the burden of proof was on the person claiming the statute's protections. To shift the onus in the other direction, the court said, would essentially require prosecutors to prove a case twice." *See* Spies, *supra*.

⁵³ Kathryn Varn and Zachary T. Sampson, *Think you know stand your ground? The recent Clearwater case tells us you're probably wrong*, Tampa Bay Times, August 17, 2018.

⁵⁴ Aaron Mesmer, *Deputy who witnessed theater shooting takes stand*, FoxNews13, March 1, 2017, at http://www.fox13news.com/news/local-news/deputy-who-witnessed-theater-shooting-takes-stand

enforcement in saying you need to be very careful proceeding in these cases," Franks said. "They're being asked to adjudicate something that should be brought out during the trial. It's cart before horse.⁵⁵

The "bewildering" rules governing the presumption of justified use of deadly force, especially the roles of the police and prosecutors, resulting in attempts to repeal or weaken the law in Florida – all of which failed.⁵⁶

D. Has Stand Your Ground Increased Safety

The principle rationale propelling Stand Your Ground is that it makes us safer. Our safety is increased. Is that true?

In a study of the Florida SYG cases collected by the Tampa Bay Times, the answer would be no. If safety is defined as loss of life, SYG encounters have a mortality rate of 60%. If increases in the homicide rate, as documented above, means decreased safety, the answer would be no. If a fight breaks out between two people, are you – as a bystander – safer if neither are armed, one is armed, or both are armed?

David LaBahn, the President of the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, expanded on this theme:

By expanding the realm in which violent acts can be committed with the justification of self-defense, Stand Your Ground laws have negatively affected public health and undermined prosecutorial and law enforcement efforts to keep communities safe.⁵⁷

Proponents of Stand Your Ground continue to argue that possibility that someone is armed will increase the fear in a criminal and deter crime. Based on the testimony and examples in the literature, it is difficult to believe anything other than the fear of law-abiding citizens that untrained, unqualified people with concealed handguns are walking the streets will increase.

And for African Americans and other minorities, do they feel safer and experience less fear knowing that a wrong look, an honest dispute, or even an issue that rises to an argument can end with their life being taken? A recent killing in Florida reinforces that rather than protecting the innocent, Stand Your Ground continues to resonate in tragedy.

⁵⁵ Id.

⁵⁶ SYG Briefing, Testimony of Senator Chris Smith, Vol. 1, pp. 13-15.

⁵⁷ David LaBahn, (2013) "Stand Your Ground Laws: Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the Expanded Use of Deadly Force," October 29, 2013. Prepared Statement for the Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the United States Senate, Serial No. J–113–35, p. 66.

E. The Killing of Markeis McGlockton

On July 19, 2018, a dispute over a parking space at a convenience store in Clearwater, Florida turned deadly. Michael Drejka, after being shoved to the ground, pulled his weapon and fired once into the chest and killed Markeis McGlockton, who had pushed Drejka but started to back off, according to video surveillance.⁵⁸ The Sheriff for the jurisdiction – Pinellas County -- refused to prosecute, citing his interpretation of Florida's SYG law. In statements to the press, the Sheriff reiterated that the "Florida Legislature had created a 'subjective standard' for determining whether the person who used force was in fear of bodily harm, but suggested that his hands were tied because his department could be sued if it failed to follow the law's requirements."⁵⁹

In later statements, the Sheriff doubled down on his statement, saying "The law has taken away law enforcement discretion to arrest unless there is no 'stand your ground' as a matter of law ... it must be so clear that as a matter of law 'stand your ground' does not apply in any way to the facts and circumstances that you're presented with. That is not the situation here. The facts are not so clear that this is absolutely outside the boundaries of 'stand your ground."⁶⁰

Three weeks later, the Pinellas-Pasco State Attorney filed manslaughter charges against Drejka.⁶¹

Many critics have described the push for "Stand Your Ground" laws as a solution in search of a problem.⁶² Others have noted that the law pours accelerant on seemingly minor incidents as above – a shove, a look – and converts them into something much more serious – deadly serious.⁶³ As noted above, studies do not bear out any deterrent impact of the law, and in fact shows a strong correlation in the rise of the firearms-related deaths. Law enforcement is uncertain how to investigate and prosecute these cases. And, of most interest to the Commission, this last act involved a white shooter – Drejka – and an African American victim – McGlockton.

⁵⁸ Gina Martinez (2018) A Fatal Shooting Is Sparking New Debate About Florida's Stand Your Ground Law. It Could Be Even Harder to Prosecute This Time, Time Magazine, July 25, 2018, at <u>https://time.com/5346981/florida-stand-your-ground-markeis-mcglockton/</u>.

⁵⁹ Julia Jacobs (2018) *Stand Your Ground' Cited by Florida Sheriff Who Declined to Arrest Suspect in Killing*, New York Times, July 21, 2018, at <u>https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/us/florida-stand-your-ground.html</u>.

⁶⁰ Bill Hutchinson (2018) *Sheriff says he made 'correct' decision in Florida 'stand your ground' shooting of unarmed*, Jul 31, 2018, ABC News at <u>https://abcnews.go.com/US/sheriff-made-correct-decision-florida-stand-ground-shooting/story?id=56937230</u>.

⁶¹ Kathryn Varn and Zachary T. Sampson (2018) *Shooter charged with manslaughter in Clearwater stand your ground case*, Tampa Bay Times, August 13, 2018, at <u>http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/Shooter-charged-with-manslaughter-in-Clearwater-stand-your-ground-case_170853729</u>.

⁶² See, e.g., American Bar Association at p. ; Arkadi Gerney and Chelsea Parsons (2013) License to Kill, How Lax Concealed Carry Laws Can Combine with Stand Your Ground Laws to Produce Deadly Results, Center for American Progress, September 2013, p. 6, at <u>https://cdn.amgt wouldericanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/StandYrGround.pdf</u>.

⁶³ SYG Briefing, Testimony of Senator Chris Smith, *supra*.

The recent shooting of Markeis McGlockton brings us full circle to the crux of the hearing, and of this Statement – the role that racial bias plays in the deadly manner in which Stand Your Ground laws play out. And it begins with two young African Americans – Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis. And, as you will see, the confluence of all the issues raised heretofore are represented, in full, in the deaths of these two young men.

II. TRAYVON MARTIN AND JORDAN DAVIS

A. Trayvon Martin

Trayvon Martin was born in February 1995. He lived with his mother, Sybrina Fulton, in Miami Gardens, but was visiting his father, Tracy Martin, in nearby Sanford on February 27, 2012. During a break in a televised basketball game, he left his father's home to buy some Skittles and iced tea at a nearby convenience store. On his way back, he was followed by George Zimmerman, who belonged to a neighborhood watch program, ironically, for the neighborhood where Trayvon's father lived.

Zimmerman was a part-time student, and carried a concealed semi-automatic for which he had a permit. From the previous August to February, he had called the police several times to report on "suspicious" persons, all of whom were black.

Zimmerman called the police while following Trayvon in his car, reporting that there was a suspicious person in his neighborhood. The dispatcher at the time instructed Zimmerman to remain in his car and await the arrival of the police. Zimmerman disregarded this, and continued his pursuit of Trayvon.⁶⁴

At some point, Trayvon called his girlfriend and told her he was being followed, and he began to run.

What happened next has been the crux of examination and a trial. Witnesses heard shouts of help. Shots were fired. When police arrived on the scene minutes later, they found Trayvon face down, shot in the chest, dead. Zimmerman was at the scene, bleeding from the head.

Police took Zimmerman into custody, but released him from the station without any charges. Among the reasons later given by the Police Chief was language taken from the Stand Your

⁶⁴ See <u>https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article135413214.html</u>.

Ground statute⁶⁵ stating that he was prohibited from arresting Zimmerman and that it could have held the city liable.⁶⁶

It was only after Trayvon's parents began questioning his release and contacted attorney Benjamin Crump, that the Florida criminal justice began to pay attention.

On March 12 – 2 weeks after Trayvon's death – the local Police Chief who had refused to charge Zimmerman turned over the investigation to the State's Attorney office. Zimmerman was charged with second-degree murder on April 11, 2012. The trial began on June 24, 2013, after the selection of an all-female jury. The following month, on July 13, 2013, the six-member jury acquitted Zimmerman of murder.

Throughout the murder trial, some commentators sought to distance the trial from the Stand Your Ground law.⁶⁷ That flies in the face of the jury instructions and the plain law. Stand Your Ground is not a separate section of the law. It was part of the self-defense instructions sought by the Zimmerman team and read by the judge.⁶⁸

Perhaps the best summation of the application of Stand Your Ground in the Zimmerman trial was made by Arkadi Gerney and Chelsea Parsons:

The Stand Your Ground provision of Florida's self-defense law cannot be severed from the other elements of that body of law; it has become part of the overall conception of what constitutes justifiable use of force in that state. Stand Your Ground expands upon the traditional concept of selfdefense by allowing the use of deadly force in self-defense, even when lesser means of force would suffice or safe escape is possible. All the elements of Florida's expansive body of self-defense law come into play when a person claims their use of deadly force was justified, even if the

⁶⁵ The relevant sections of FL. Statutes 776.031: (2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use or threatened use of force as described in subsection (1), but the *agency may not arrest* the person for using or threatening to use force *unless it determines that there is probable cause* that the force that was used or threatened was unlawful. (3)The *court shall award* reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any civil action brought by a *plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant is immune from prosecution* as provided in subsection (1). (emphasis added).

⁶⁶ Trymaine Lee (2012) Trayvon Martin Case: Police Chief Bill Lee Under Fire With 'No Confidence' Vote, Huffington Post, Mar 22, 2012, at <u>https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trayvon-martin-case-george-zimmerman-bill-lee_n_1371635</u>.

⁶⁷ Jacob Sullum (2013) Sorry, the Zimmerman Case Still Has Nothing to Do With 'Stand Your Ground'" Reason, July 14, 2013, at <u>https://reason.com/2013/07/14/sorry-the-zimmerman-case-still-has-nothi</u>.

⁶⁸ Ta-Nehisi Coates (2013) How Stand Your Ground Relates To George Zimmerman, The Atlantic, July 16, 2013, at <u>https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/how-stand-your-ground-relates-to-george-</u> zimmerman/277829/.

defendant does not seek to use Stand Your Ground to avoid arrest or prosecution or directly invoke it as part of their formal defense.

The Zimmerman trial provides an example of this. Although Zimmerman did not seek a Stand Your Ground hearing and his attorneys did not directly invoke this law as part of the formal defense, the expanded notion of one's right to use lethal force in self-defense was part of the judge's instructions to the jury. The judge instructed the Zimmerman jury on all aspects of the state's expansive self-defense laws, which include a person's right to use deadly force even when safe retreat is an option. It is in the context of this entire body of law that the jury was asked to evaluate Zimmerman's conduct and ultimately found his conduct to be justified. In fact, both of the jurors who have spoken out since the trial indicated that the Stand Your Ground law played a role in their deliberations.⁶⁹

Interestly, it was brought out at trial that Zimmerman knew exactly how Stand Your Ground worked.⁷⁰

Sybrina Fulton and Tracy Martin established the Trayvon Martin Foundation after Trayvon's death. In 2018, *Rest in Power: The Trayvon Martin Story*, aired on BET and the Paramount Network. It traced the life of Trayvon Martin and the legacy from his death, which included giving rise to the Black Lives Matter movement.⁷¹

B. Jordan Davis

Jordan Davis was also a 17-year old high school student on November 23, 2012. He liked roller skating and playing video games. His mom, Lucy McBath, lived in Atlanta, and his dad, Ron Davis lived in Jacksonville, Florida. Just 18 months previously he had moved to Jacksonville to live with his dad.⁷²

The day after Thanksgiving, he and three friends pulled up to a convenience store, and one of his friends went into the store. Michael Dunn and his girlfriend parked in the adjacent space, and

⁶⁹ Arkadi Gerney and Chelsea Parsons (September 2013) "License to Kill: How Lax Concealed Carry Laws Can Combine with Stand Your Ground Laws to Produce Deadly Results", Center for American Progress, p. 5.

⁷⁰ Barbara Liston (2013) Zimmerman studied Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' law: witness, Reuters, July 3, 2013, at <u>https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-florida-shooting/zimmerman-studied-floridas-stand-your-ground-law-witness-idUSBRE9620RL20130703</u>.

⁷¹ Jessica Guyn (2015) "Meet the Woman Who Coined #BlackLivesMatter," USA Today, March 4, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/03/04/alicia-garza-black-lives-matter/24341593/.

⁷² Mike Hayes (2014) "The Life And Last Days Of Jordan Davis," BuzzFeed News, March 31, 2014, at <u>https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikehayes/the-life-and-last-days-of-jordan-davis</u>.

Dunn began complaining about the loud rap music coming from Davis' car while his girlfriend went into the store.

At some point, an argument erupted between the Dunn and the occupants of the other car, and then Dunn, who had a concealed weapons permit, took out a gun from his glove compartment and began shooting into the other car, and continued shooting as the car backed out and pulled away.⁷³ Jordan Davis, hit several times, was dead. Dunn, after the shooting, drove to a hotel and ordered pizza. He never contacted the police until he was arrested.⁷⁴

Dunn was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in 2014, and is serving a life sentence.⁷⁵ During the trial proceedings, his lawyers argued that he was acting in self-defense, both in jury arguments, instructions, and in their appeal arguing that the prosecution had not overcome the presumption that he had acted in self-defense. Throughout, they referenced the Stand Your Ground statute.⁷⁶

Jordan's mother, Lucy McBath, became an anti-gun advocate, as well as an advocate against Stand Your Ground laws. In November 2018, she was elected to the United States Congress.⁷⁷ Unlike the Trayvon Martin killing, there were plenty of witnesses, including Davis' friends and Dunn's girlfriend. There was no dispute that both parties were in their cars at the time the shooting started, that Davis and his friends had no weapons, and that Dunn had left his car to continue shooting even after the teenagers' fled the scene.

Both Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis deserved to be living full lives at the time of our hearing and of this statement. Trayvon had dreams of being a pilot. Jordan was just a lively, "mouthy" kid hanging out with his new friends. Neither had a chance to see where their lives would take them.

⁷³ The Guardian (2014) "Michael Dunn sentenced to life without parole for killing of Florida teenager" <u>https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/17/michael-dunn-sentenced-life-without-parole-florida</u>.

⁷⁴ Katie McDonough (2014) *Jordan Davis' father on Michael Dunn verdict: We do not accept a law that views our children as "collateral damage"*, Salon, February 16, 2014, https://www.salon.com/2014/02/16/jordan_davis_father_on_michael_dunn_verdict_we_do_not_accept_a_law_that_

views our children as collateral damage/.

⁷⁵ Jasper Scherer, Fla. (2016) 'Loud Music' murder: Firing into car full of teens playing rap music not 'self-defense,' court rules, Washington Post, November 18, 2016, at <u>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/18/fla-loud-music-murder-firing-into-car-full-of-teens-playing-rap-music-not-self-defense-court-rules/?utm_term=.c73782e9068c.</u>

⁷⁶ Nicole Flatow (2014) "Juror: Some On Panel Thought The Killing Of Unarmed Teen Jordan Davis Was 'Justified'" ThinkProgress, February 20, 2014, at <u>https://thinkprogress.org/juror-some-on-panel-thought-the-killing-of-unarmed-teen-jordan-davis-was-justified-33df7991e1f3/</u>.

⁷⁷ <u>https://mcbath.house.gov/</u>.

III. DISPROPORTIONALITY IN APPLICATION OF STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS

The studies that found that SYG laws were associated with higher homicide rates and, to the ability that they were able, to identify the broad ethnicities of the people involved in SYG incidents. First, the McClellan and Terkin's national studies that the greatest increase in homicide rates was for or white males (17.1%). For firearms-related homicides, the increase in white males was 11.6%. They found no statistically significant increase for black males or the African-American population.⁷⁸

The Humphries et al. study found similar in homicide rates when just studying Florida. When differentiating for firearms-related homicides, their findings "suggested a statistically significant increase in homicide by firearm" for whites (45.1%) ; African Americans (22.9%); those 20 to 34 years (35.8%); those 35 years and older (21.5%); and males (31.8%).⁷⁹

These studies, therefore, do not show a disproportionate increase in the deaths of protected classes as a result of SYG laws. The vast majority of concealed weapon permit holders are white,⁸⁰ the largest increases in firearms-related homicides are white. As a matter of impact on death rates, there does not appear to be any statistically significant disparity that would imply that Stand Your Ground results in more deaths of African Americans.

However, that does not begin to end the analysis. It is here that all the issues relating to the fairness of the American justice system on black Americans come to the fore, for in studying the parties to an SYG confrontation, this pattern emerged:

In homicides where the shooter is black and the victim is white, those are ruled to be justified 1.2 percent of the time. In cases where the shooter is white and the victim is black those are ruled to be justified 11.2 percent of the time. Ten times more likely if the shooter is white and the victim is black, than if the shooter is black and the victim is white.⁸¹

In fact, despite the fact that a racial disparity already existed in justified shootings, i.e., if the shooter was white and victim black it was ruled to be justified 9.5% of the time, and the inverse was 1.1%., the *disparity grows when Stand Your Ground is enacted*.⁸²

⁷⁸ McClellan and Terkin, supra, pp. 21-23.

⁷⁹ Humphries et al, *supra*.

⁸⁰ John Lott, Concealed Carry Permit Holders Across the United States: 2018, August 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3233904.

⁸¹ SYG briefing, Testimony of John Roman, Vol. 1, p. 25.

⁸² *Id.* (emphasis added).

In other words, if you are a black American, the chances of your death being ruled "justified" and, therefore, immune to prosecution increases if you die in a Stand Your Ground state.⁸³ The chance of your family being able to seek justice goes down if you are killed in a Stand Your Ground state. That chance that your killer gets off scot-free increases if you are black and your killer is white in a Stand Your Ground state.

In an especially telling summation, Professor John Roman – who testified at our hearing – also wrote an article that describes the statistical probabilities of the outcome of an individual fitting the profiles of the Trayvon Martin proceeding. In relevant part:

Table 3 describes the likelihood a homicide is ruled justified when there is a single victim and single shooter, they are both male, they are strangers, and a firearm is used. In the six years of FBI data, this fact pattern occurred in 2,631 cases.

Table 3. Percentage of Homicides Ruled Justified, Martin Case Attributes, 2005-2010

		Non-Stand	YourStand Your Ground
	Total	Ground states	states
White on white	16.28	12.95	23.58**
White on black	42.31	41.14***	<mark>44.71***</mark>
Black on white	8.57	7.69**	11.10
Black on black	10.14	10.24***	9.94***
Total	14.90	2.15***	3.67

Source: 2005-10 FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports. * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 ***; p < 0.001

Overall, the rate of justifiable homicides is almost six times higher in case with attributes that match the Martin case. Racial disparities are much larger, as white-on-black homicides have justifiable findings 33 percentage points more often than black-on-white homicides. Stand Your Ground laws appear to exacerbate those differences, as cases overall are significantly

⁸³ The racial disparity in treatment of "justified" killings is not new. The Marshall Project conducted a study of FBI datasets and came to this conclusion: "When a white person kills a black man in America, the killer often faces no legal consequences. In one in six of these killings, there is no criminal sanction, according to a new Marshall Project examination of 400,000 homicides committed by civilians between 1980 and 2014. That rate is far higher than the one for homicides involving other combinations of races. In almost 17 percent of cases when a black man was killed by a non-Hispanic white civilian over the last three decades, the killing was categorized as justifiable, which is the term used when a police officer or a civilian kills someone committing a crime or in self-defense. Overall, the police classify fewer than 2 percent of homicides committed by civilians as justifiable. The disparity persists across different cities, different ages, different weapons and different relationships between killer and victim." *See* https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/14/killings-of-black-men-by-whites-are-far-more-likely-to-be-ruled-justifiable.

more likely to be ruled justified in SYG states than in non-SYG states (p = 0.02).⁸⁴

The data used by Professor Roman in both his oral and written testimony, as well as his research, came from the Federal Bureau of Investigations Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR), the only dataset that includes information about the disposition of a proceeding, including whether a homicide was deemed justified.⁸⁵ This information showed that, the, controlling for variables, the odds a white-on-black homicide being found justified is *281 percent greater* than the odds a white-on-white homicide is found justified.⁸⁶ This is an extremely sobering, and powerful, statistic. Ironically, Professor Roman's data does not include the state of Florida because Florida does not participate in the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Report database.⁸⁷ However, a team of health scientists studied the Tampa Bay Times data of 237 cases from 2012-2013 and updated all the unresolved case statuses for their analysis in 2015.⁸⁸ They then applied traditional and accepted social scientist analytical techniques to the data and their conclusion was no less startling than that of Roman: "SYG legislation in Florida has a quantifiable racial bias that reveals a leniency in convictions if the victim is non-White, which provides evidence towards unequal treatment under the law."⁸⁹

Their examination of the data also confirmed that a suspect was twice as likely to be convicted if the victim were white, versus non-white, where an SYG defense was asserted. This confirms the shift that Roman saw in the national data. It means that if you are an African America asserting an SYG defense where a white person was killed, under their analysis you have double the chances of being convicted as opposed if the victim were black. If the victim were African American, and the alleged killer asserting the SYG defense were white, he also better than double the odds of being let go.

The combination of these two social scientists' studies – one nationally, one focused on Florida – provide a compelling case that there is racial bias in the application of SYG laws that tilt against justice for African American victims, and bias in the application of justice depending on whether you are an African American or white person accused of shooting another white person. Stand Your Ground, in other words, is a perfect illustration of the disparity in the administration of justice

⁸⁴ John K. Roman, Ph.D. (2013) Race, Justifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws: Analysis of FBI Supplementary Homicide Report Data, The Urban Institute, July 2013, at p. 9 (emphasis in blue added to Table).

⁸⁵ *Id.* at p.2.

⁸⁶ Id. at p. 9.

⁸⁷ <u>https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr/asp/off_display.asp.</u>

⁸⁸ Nicole Ackermann, Melody S. Goodman, Keon Gilbert, Cassandra Arroyo-Johnson, Marcello Pagano, *Race, law, and health: Examination of 'Stand Your Ground' and defendant convictions in Florida*, Social Science & Medicine 142 (2015) 194-201.

if you are an African American – whether a victim, or unable to assert a successful Stand Your Grand challenge.

IV. THE IMPACT OF CONCEALED CARRY LAWS

The confluence of Stand Your Ground and concealed-carry laws⁹⁰ is, to even the casual observer, an invitation to use deadly force. Seven years after Stand Your Ground passed in Florida, the number of concealed carry permits tripled.⁹¹ In 2019, Florida leads the country by far with nearly 2 million permits issued for a state population of nearly 22 million – nearly 1 in 10 Floridians carry concealed weapons. Florida is, to no one's surprise a state that is a "shall issue" state with regard to concealed carry weapon permits. Indeed, of the states associated with Stand Your Ground laws, almost all are "shall issue" or permitless states. According to one pro-gun website, there are over 17 million concealed carry permits issued across the country.⁹²

Civil immunity and concealed carry laws in the context of SYG were addressed a number of times during the Commission's briefing. Panelists expressed concern about the "very dangerous" and often lethal circumstances created by the combined effects of concealed carry laws and "shifting" civil immunity.⁹³ Most SYG states have provisions that protect SYG claimants from civil law suits with varying degrees.⁹⁴ Over half of these SYG states provide what is considered "blanket" immunity, which prohibits anyone from bringing law suits against SYG claimants—including injured bystanders and their dependents (AL, AZ, FL, KS, KY, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, and TX).⁹⁵ Other states offer partial immunity that prohibits only the aggressor or related party from bringing a civil suit (AK, GA, MI, MT, NH, PA, TN, and WV).⁹⁶

⁹⁰ "Concealed-Carry" laws refers to Of the 35 states that generally require a CCW permit in order to carry concealed weapons in public, eight states and the District of Columbia have "may issue" laws, which grant the issuing authority wide discretion to deny a CCW permit to an applicant if, for example, the authority believes the applicant lacks good character or lacks a good reason for carrying a weapon in public. 14 "shall issue" states provide the issuing authority a limited amount of discretion, and 13 "shall issue" states provide no discretion to the issuing authority. Nearly every state places some restrictions on where concealed firearms may be carried, such as restrictions on carrying in bars, schools, and hospitals, and at public sporting events.

⁹¹ Tampa Bay Times, *supra*.

⁹² https://crimeresearch.org/2018/08/new-study-17-25-million-concealed-handgun-permits-biggest-increases-for-women-and-minorities/.

⁹³ See SYG Briefing. Elizabeth Burke, p. 86. She discusses in detail consequences presented by the intersection of conceal carry laws and civil immunity.

⁹⁴ Civil immunity, in the context of SYG, shields a person who invokes SYG from liability in a civil law suit. Generally, when a person is tried on a criminal matter, the aggrieved party also seeks to sue the defendant in civil court to recover monetary damages.

⁹⁵ Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2013, "Shoot First: 'Stand Your Ground' laws and their effect on violent crime and the criminal justice system" (hereafter Mayors).

⁹⁶ *Id.* However, in these states, injured bystanders or their family members can bring civil suits.

The deadly cocktail of Stand Your Ground and concealed-carry is a license to kill. As one advocate stated, "[i] encourages vigilante law... So one of the critical problems with the Stand Your Ground law is that before, that person would have had the impetus to leave, to go away.... But the Stand Your Ground laws allow people to stand, shoot, and murder with no consequences."⁹⁷

It cannot be understated that concealed-carry makes it possible for Stand Your Ground to be deadly. Over two-third of the cases in the Tampa Bay Times studies involved guns.⁹⁸ But of those cases, in 60% of the cases the person claiming the benefit of SYG was armed with a gun, whereas over 60% of the victims were unarmed.⁹⁹ And it is not surprising that nearly 60% of the persons who were the "assailant" in an SYG situation died.¹⁰⁰

It is no coincidence that the intersection between "shall issue" and "no permit required" states and states with Florida-style SYG laws is almost a 1:1 match. And, therefore, it should come to no one's surprise that states with Florida-style "shall issue" permit laws were significantly associated with increases in their homicide rates, with 6.5% higher total homicide rates, 8.6% higher firearm homicide rates, and 10.6% higher handgun homicide rates.¹⁰¹ It was entirely expected that Florida experienced the surge in homicide rates after the adoption of Stand Your Ground, as documented in Section I of this statement.

As the study of Stand Your Ground, weapon availability, and race continues, it would be a critical area of study to understand whether there is any racial bias in the granting or rescinding of concealed carry gun permits. It would be a critical area of study to determine the application of conditions, even in "shall issue" states like Florida, that would enable a state to deny someone with a clear history of disturbing behavior to be denied the right to carry a gun. It has been a source of continual puzzlement that George Zimmerman even had a concealed weapons permit, given his history of assaulting a police officer and history of domestic violence. In 25 other states, this could have resulted in the denial of his application for a carry permit.¹⁰² In Florida, no such bar existed. In fact, years later, and numerous other run-ins with the law, Zimmerman has yet to lose his permit.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Arkadi Gerney and Chelsea Parsons, supra, at p. 15. According to the authors, Florida would have required to have been convicted of a violent crime within the last 3 years to have been denied a permit. *Id*.

¹⁰³ George Zimmerman's Stalking Victim Demands His Concealed Weapon License be Revoked (November 2018) <u>https://theblast.com/george-zimmerman-stalking-victim-demands-his-concealed-weapon-license-be-revoked/</u>

⁹⁷ ABA Report, p. 26 (quoting Eva Jefferson Patterson).

⁹⁸ Tampa Bay Times, *supra*.

⁹⁹ McCormick, *supra*, at pp. 14-16.

¹⁰⁰ *Id.* at 17.

¹⁰¹ Michael Siegel et al. "Easiness of Legal Access to Concealed Firearm Permits and Homicide Rates in the United States", American Journal of Public Health 107, no. 12 (December 1, 2017): pp. 1923-1929.

V. IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE "REASONABLE BELIEF" STANDARD

A thread that continues throughout any analysis of Stand Your Ground is the presence within its legislative language that a person using deadly force must *reasonably believe* that that using "such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm . . . or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony."¹⁰⁴

What constitutes reasonable belief? We have seen that law enforcement officials in Florida have used an extremely broad, subjective standard. This is due, in no small part, to the deliberate omission of any criteria for what constitutes a reasonable belief, either from the Legislature or the courts.¹⁰⁵ According to one commentator, the statute instead created a "presumption of fear"¹⁰⁶ that moves with the individual, creating an arena of lethal force that is already presumed to be legal, notwithstanding whether the force was really proportional to the apparent threat.¹⁰⁷

(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used:

- (A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;
- (B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or

(C) was committing or attempting to commit an offense described by Subsection (a)(2)(B);

(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and

(3) *was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity*, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.

(c) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this section.

¹⁰⁶ Katheryn Russell-Brown, 2014, "Go Ahead and Shoot, The Law Might Have Your Back: History, Race, Implicit Bias, and Justice in Florida's Stand Your Ground Law," *in* D. Johnson, Y.P. Warren, and A. Farell, eds., *Deadly Injustice: Trayvon Martin, Race, and the Criminal Justice System*, (New York University Press 2015).

¹⁰⁷ Ronald Sullivan, (2013) "Stand Your Ground Laws: Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the Expanded Use of Deadly Force," October 29, 2013. Testimony prepared for the Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the United States Senate.

Zimmerman received a one-year probation sentence for stalking, and the person stalked has requested that Florida revoke his license. It is unknown whether any action has been taken or reported.

¹⁰⁴ FL. Statutes 776.012(2).

¹⁰⁵ See Texas Penal Code Sec. 9.32.(b) The actor's belief under Subsection (a)(2)(B) [to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery] that the deadly force was immediately necessary as described by that subdivision is *presumed to be reasonable if the actor*:

In the absence of an objective reasonable person standard, the person inserting themselves into a situation where they will eventually claim a Stand Your Ground defense is allowed to import their own biases to color the lens through which they view a situation. It is what they believe. In other words, Stand Your Ground legitimizes a person's implicit bias. The challenge is that the data is implied – it relies on social science into the type of racism that is not overt, but which taints the entire criminal justice ecosystem.

This Commission and many social science researchers, along with racial crime statistics reported by state and federal agencies, allows an understanding of how negative perceptions of racial minorities' criminality lead to uneven racial treatment in the criminal justice system, which in turn implicitly drives feelings of racial bias and discrimination.

David Harris, in his testimony to the Commission, talked about this at length. In shorthand, he called it, in essence, a mental rule of thumb. In psychological terms, he credited that rule of thumb as a "heuristic."¹⁰⁸ Both Harris, in his written testimony, and Katheryn Russell-Brown, in an article we were provided, refer to what to the "suspicion heuristic"—which describes the psychological process through which many people link blackness with criminality.¹⁰⁹ Mr. Harris stated how this suspicion heuristic works:

You have a negative view of blacks for the most part, implicit. This leads to beliefs that blacks are prone to criminality. That they are violent. And there is a lot of other research besides Mr. Goff's that goes in this same direction. So what you get is an automatic very rapid association between blacks, that is not just about negativeness, but also about violence and criminality [I]n the specific context of stand your ground laws what this will mean is that more people will think of black people they meet as dangerous, as criminal, and as violent. And that is going to result in more blacks being the victims in stand your ground shootings. It has the other effect of when a white person or somebody goes to court and says, "I stood my ground," and the victim is black, the jury harboring those very same biases will be more inclined to acquit when the victim is black.¹¹⁰

In other words, implicit bias, including a suspicion heuristic about African-Americans, becomes a means of justifying killing them.

Ms. Russell-Brown has written of the importance of examining the historical roots of the association of race with certain criminal laws and criminal justice polices that exist today. She explains:

¹⁰⁸ SYG Briefing, Testimony of David Harris, Vol. 2, pp. 9-10.

¹⁰⁹ Ms. Russell-Brown specifically attributed the "suspicion heuristic" to the work of L. Song Richardson & Phillip Goff, 2012, *Self Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic*, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 295.

¹¹⁰ Harris testimony, *supra*, at pp. 10-11.

We must examine the historical relationship between the law and African Americans and how the law has been utilized to respond to racialized threats. These images drive our perceptions of which groups are to be feared, who is fearful, the appropriate responses to fear, and whether that fear is justified under the law....¹¹¹

She further states:

For decades, scholars have identified laws and legal practices that have created stark racial disproportionality within the justice system, including the war on drugs, racial profiling by law enforcement, mandatory-minimum sentences, felony disenfranchisement, and mass incarceration.¹¹²

Similarly, Khalil Gibran Muhammad has developed a discussion of how the perception of criminality in the black community began in early nineteenth century practices of using racial crime statistics to support discriminatory public policies. This manifested in the "negro criminal" discussed in his book, *Condemnation of Blackness*, where he argues:

Beginning in the late nineteenth, statistical rhetoric of the "Negro criminal" became a tool to shield white Americans from the charge of racism when they used black crime statistics to support discriminatory public polices and social welfare.¹¹³

Harris, Russell-Brown, Goff, Richardson and Muhammad did not develop their positions in a vacuum. Beginning in the 1990s, it became apparent that racial crime statistics reported by some state and federal officials showed an uneven criminal justice response to racial minorities' criminality. Traffic stop data shows that blacks are stopped considerably more often than whites, yet are less likely to be found with contraband.¹¹⁴ "Driving while black" became a staple of conversation and debate that continues to this day.¹¹⁵ The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency (OJJPD) Relative Rate Index (RRI) shows that minorities are disproportionately over-represented at each stage of case processing (e.g., arrests, sentencing, placement in secure facilities, etc.), except for diversion programs.¹¹⁶

¹¹² *Id*.

¹¹¹ Russell-Brown, *supra*.

¹¹³ K.G. Muhammad, 2010, *Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹¹⁴ 2013 Missouri Vehicle Stops Executive Summary, *available at* <u>https://ago.mo.gov/divisions/litigation/vehicle-stops-report/vehicle-stops-report--2013-executive-summary</u>.

¹¹⁵ Excellent discussions of the "driving while black" phenomenon can be found in David A. Harris (1997) "Driving While Black' and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops," 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544; David Harris (1999) "The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why 'Driving While Black' Matters," 84 Minnesota I. Rev. 365.

¹¹⁶ Relative Rate Index (RRI), DOJ OJJDP.

Pretextual traffic stops and other manifestations of racial profiling essentially treat race as evidence of crime, targeting certain segments of the population as potential criminal offenders solely by virtue of their race. Thus, through racial profiling, American's law enforcement officials not only "racialize" crime by assuming most crimes are committed by minorities, they also "criminalize" race. In so doing, they place the primary burden of law enforcement on the backs of innocent minorities who are the victims of racial and ethnic stereotyping. Innocent minorities are harassed more than innocent white Americans, and wrongdoing by minorities is punished more harshly than wrongdoing by whites.¹¹⁷

A number of prominent research studies also demonstrate that the negative portrayal of minorities in the criminal justice system creates and perpetuate the "suspicion heuristic" that trigger racial disparities.¹¹⁸ In perhaps the most extreme and chilling example, a research study analyzed bias on perceived weapon holders by police officers. In the test, black and white subjects were holding harmless objects. The analysis revealed race effects that led to (1) black subjects being incorrectly shot at more than Whites: (2) a perceptual sensitivity effect (when held by black subjects guns were less distinguishable from harmless objects) and (3) a response bias effect (objects held by the black subjects were more likely to be treated as guns).¹¹⁹

The above shows how the passage and institutionalization of SYG law are inevitably influenced by mainstream narratives of race and crime. For these reasons, as David Harris pointed out to the Commission¹²⁰:

The combined potential impact of implicit bias against blacks and the suspicion heuristic on the use of SYG laws is potentially catastrophic. SYG laws lower the potential cost of engaging in deadly violence; one can use deadly force in any public place, even when avoiding violence is possible, and still use the SYG defense to argue that the jury should not convict. Implicit bias against blacks, especially seeing blacks as likely to be violent or dangerous, increases the likelihood that people with weapons will shoot them; armed people are more likely to feel fear, and therefore to shoot. And when the victim is black, members of juries—also infected with the same implicit bias—are more likely to sympathize with the shooter.

¹¹⁷ Ronald H Weich, Carlos T Angulo, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights & the Leadership Conference Education Fund (200) Justice on Trial: Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System (Collingwood Press), p. 7.

¹¹⁸ From Ackerman, et. al, supra, at p. 199: "Whites still have limited social cues to tell differences among Black men's professional status (e.g., criminal, janitor, teacher, physician) in the 21st century and often assume the worse. Feagin states, "Many Whites have fearful reactions to a Black man encountered on streets, in public transport, and in elevators" (Feagin, 2010, p.108). There are also many negative perceptions about the character and behaviors of Black men, such as Whites' perceptions that Black men as more violent, unpleasant, promiscuous, unintelligent, and less ambitious and nurturing (McConnaughy and White, 2008).

¹¹⁹ Anthony G. Greenwald, Mark A.Oakes, Hunter G.Hoffman (2003) "Targets of discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Volume 39, Issue 4, July 2003, Pages 399-405.

¹²⁰ See page 64.

Or as Ronald Sullivan said before the United States Senate:

Mr. Zimmerman's acquittal was made possible because Florida's "stand your ground" laws and its concealed weapons laws conspired to create the perfect background conditions for his exoneration. These laws permitted Mr. Zimmerman to carry a loaded firearm, to disregard the clear directive of a 911 dispatcher, to follow and pursue Trayvon, and then stand his ground when young Trayvon reasonably sought to defend himself—and all because, I strongly suspect, that Mr. Zimmerman could not apprehend any lawful reason for a young black male to be walking through his middle-class neighborhood. To Mr. Zimmerman, Martin's blackness likely served as a crude proxy for criminality.¹²¹

Thus, while it may be difficult to impute overt racist intent in Stand Your Ground laws, or deliberate racism in its application and implementation, there is a voluminous amount of research documenting implicit bias and its impact on criminal justice. Stand Your Ground is not free of such bias; indeed, it is the proverbial Wednesday's child, full of woe, a sad example of how bias is embedded and enshrined in law to the detriment of our African American community.

VI. DATA COLLECTION CHALLENGES

- A. The SHR lacks adequate data to track critical SYG impact on protected classes
- 1. The SHR itself is not complete

As noted before, Florida does not even participate in the report. Nor do all states or their municipalities participate fully, or only intermittently.¹²² Moreover, the data is reliant on self-verification – so researchers have to rely on the data, even if the locality providing it did not check, confirm, or verify whether it was correct.¹²³ Even more chilling, it is likely that many justifiable homicides are severely underreported.¹²⁴

In addition, the methodology does not allow for separation of white and Hispanic in reporting.¹²⁵

2. The lack of charging/non-charging data is important.

¹²¹ Ronald Sullivan, (2013) "Stand Your Ground Laws: Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the Expanded Use of Deadly Force," October 29, 2013. Testimony before the Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the United States Senate, Serial No. J–113–35, p. 13.

¹²² SYG Briefing, Testimony of William Krouse, Vol 2, p. 14.

¹²³ SYG Briefing, Testimony of John Roman, Vol. 2, p. 22.

¹²⁴ Testimony of William Krouse, *supra*, at p. 53.

¹²⁵ Testimony of John Roman, *supra*, at p. 23

Also noted before, the SHR data is based on information from the criminal justice system. If a person does not even enter the system – is not charged – that is not available. One of the challenges this investigation faced was the task of examining "charging sheets" where decisions are recorded as to the disposition of an arrested person. Perhaps now, with the advent of social media and the camera phone, it is more difficult today than at any other time in history for a shooting not to receive the type of scrutiny that would allow someone to escape any examination of their alleged actions in a SYG situation. But that doesn't take the place of requiring data as part of submissions to the FBI, much less requiring submission to the FBI, which Florida resolutely does not do. One of the most important aspects of Florida-style SYG laws is that there is discretion at the charging official, i.e., the police, to simply let someone go - even if they committed homicide because they assert a prima facie case of Stand Your Ground. Both George Zimmerman and Michael Drejka were summarily released because the police determined that they had both asserted adequate SYG defenses to their actions. Only after considerable social and media attention were both men eventually arrested for their actions. Under any reporting regime, there is no obligation to report non-charging decisions, regardless of the underlying action. In the absence of any social media or press media attention, how many other decisions to release, rather than charge, go unnoticed, unreported, unknown. How many other young men not named Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis, or Markeis McGlocktons never have the chance to have their killers go to trial?

VII. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS

It is thus, after this examination that we come to the end and ask: what next?

There are certain steps, recognizing the reality that gerrymandering, lobbying, and campaign contributions have on putting a thumb on the scales of justice, that Congress or state legislatures can do to ameliorate some of the obvious negative impacts that Stand Your Grounds laws have wrought upon our communities.

First, remove the immunity clauses from Stand Your Ground laws. Immunity clauses remove incentives to mitigate or reduce the use of deadly force by protecting the claimant regardless of the collateral consequences. It means that innocent bystanders, families, children, have no recourse to someone spraying an area with bullets. It also removes the confusion and concerns about liability from local law enforcement in investigating all the circumstances of any so-called self-defense claim rooted in Stand Your Ground, so we don't have situations – like we have seen in Sanford and Pinellas – where law enforcement simply throws up its hands and says, in effect, "I can't do it" out of concerns of the civil liability a municipality may incur.

Second, all states should modify their concealed-carry statutes to include proper education and training in how self-defense laws actually work, including conflict avoidance. Stand Your Ground,

at its most positive interpretation, is meant to protect your life and loved ones from imminent death or severe injury. It is not an excuse to pick a bar fight and know, in the end, you can shoot your opponent if you are coming out on the losing end.

Indeed, as a corollary issue to this, I find very puzzling that most self-defense statutes – including Florida's Stand Your Ground law – do NOT allow deadly force or the threat of deadly force when only faced with "unlawful force."¹²⁶ What is unlawful force, and how does one distinguish that from a "forcible felony"? Proper gun education and some legislative and judicial guidance would be helpful in reducing the possibility of the unfortunate circumstances that have claimed so many lives.

Third, Congress should require that all states comply with the Supplementary Homicide Reporting Database, and include additional categories on race and ethnicity on the statistics on justified homicides. Further justified homicide reporting should also include demographic information on the disposition of cases that did not "enter" the criminal justice system, but where charges were never brought or dismissed early on. Ensuring that weapon factors, like use of a gun, will also help shed light and enable researchers to quantify and qualitatively measure the impact of justified homicides on protected classes such as the African American community.

Fourth, if any state is considering implementing a Stand Your Ground-type law (and the NRA continues to push for these, regardless of the negative attention and regardless of the terrible cases that continue to make headlines¹²⁷), I am in favor of the suggestion of Katheryn Russell-Brown of requiring a racial impact statement¹²⁸ to be prepared. Focusing on the themes discussed in this Statement – impact on overall homicide rates, law enforcement decision-making, and most importantly of all, racial disparities in its application and the problems of implicit bias, would be essential.

Fifth, if any state is considering implementing a Stand Your Ground-type law, the legislation should be clear that an objective "reasonable person" rather than a subjective "reasonably believes"

¹²⁷ The NRA continues to advance legislation today in Louisiana (*see <u>https://www.bossiernow.com/la-house-votes-</u> <u>to-boost-gun-possession-and-stand-your-ground-laws/</u>) and Maine (<i>see* <u>https://www.nraila.org/articles/20190506/maine-gun-bills-head-to-criminal-justice-and-public-safety-committee</u>),

and will probably try again in Ohio after having legislation die in late 2018 (*see* <u>https://www.wcpo.com/news/state/state-ohio/ohio-senate-passes-new-gun-rights-law-minus-controversial-stand-your-ground-provision</u>).

¹²⁶ FL. Statutes 776.012(1).

¹²⁸ Impact statements began being used by legislatures to evaluate potential fiscal and environmental consequences of proposed legislation prior to adoption and implementation. Racial impact statements have been adopted in several states to address racial disparities in sentencing and parole. *See* Mark Mauer (2009) *Racial Impact Statements Changing Policies to Address Disparities*, Criminal Justice, Volume 23, Number 4, Winter 2009.

standard should be used. Law enforcement has made it very clear that the subjective standard leads to bizarre and often bewildering results since they are forced to accommodate the particular viewpoint of the claimant of an SYG defense, rather than objectively reviewing the facts to see if the actions taken were reasonable. Such a standard may have made someone like George Zimmerman think twice before continuing his pursuit of Trayvon Martin after law enforcement asked him to withdraw.¹²⁹

Sixth, and a corollary to the fifth point, is that any Stand Your Ground statute should remove the provision that prohibits law enforcement from arresting anyone asserting a Stand Your Ground defense unless they determine there is probable cause that the act was unlawful. Prosecutorial and law enforcement discretion already exists, and this clause is another source of confusion and, when combined with the civil liability clause, becomes another inhibitor on law enforcement investigating an incident.

Seventh, and last – of this section – it goes without saying, but it shall be said anyway, that all parties to the criminal justice system should undergo training to recognize and remove racial bias. It is simply unacceptable that it still remains a fact that the life – or death -- of young black person appears to be worth less than the life of a white person in the eyes of the law.

These are recommendations that are rooted in the reality of our time. But they are, at best, bandaids on a gaping wound that cuts to the core of who we are as a country.

If we are to be honest, to be true to the better angels of our nature, to truly strive to be the more perfect union, we would repeal all Stand Your Ground laws. We would state that the common law and its development has in American jurisprudence¹³⁰ has always recognized a right of necessity of self-defense in exigent and emergent circumstances. That the duty to safely retreat has and always been a prudent rule of self-preservation. That no one will question a person's right to protect their home or, outside the home, their family and loved ones from an imminent threat. That had been the law for over two hundred years, and it is the law now.

Instead, Stand Your Ground has made our lives less safe. It made lives worth less, especially if you are a young black person. It has contributed nothing but pain and misery, including to those who have invoked it to justify the death of another. By removing the duty to safely retreat, it has converted every confrontation to potential shootout—or execution. And for the African American

¹²⁹ An ironic, and tragic, point often made about the circumstances of the struggle between Trayvon Martin and Zimmerman is that Trayvon had a lawful right to be in the neighborhood and a lawful right to defend himself from the obvious stalking engaged in by Zimmerman. In other words, Trayvon – not Zimmerman – was the real legal claimant of any Stand Your Ground defense. See, e.g., Miller Francis (2013) "What about Martin's right to 'stand his ground'"? CNN, July 12, 2013, at <u>https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/11/opinion/francis-zimmerman-trial/index.html</u>.

¹³⁰ See, e.g., Beard v. U.S., 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895).

community, the disproportionate weight of tragedy and fear would be, however slightly, be lifted from their shoulders.

And if we are to truly honor Trayvon, and Jordan, and countless others of ever color and creed and orientation, we would enact sweeping, comprehensive, and strong gun control. Stand Your Ground and concealed carry are the societal equivalent of matches and gasoline, but the lack of any semblance of reasonable gun control is like constructing that society from dried tinder. Congress makes brave noises about closing gun-show loopholes or bump stocks or noise suppressors. But universal background checks and licensing requirements, elimination of assault-style rifles, large capacity magazines – these and more are what is needed. Ask Gabby Giffords. Ask the parents of Newtown, the young men and women of Parkland, the survivors of Columbine and Aurora and Las Vegas and Orlando and too many cities and towns to mention. The solution to guns is not more guns. This is not Tombstone, or Dodge City, not any more.

Making guns less available turns February 26th into a brawl, makes November 23rd a loud and angry dispute. But everyone walks away.

Making guns less available and more rare, and its impact on crime and safety and, yes, on the civil rights of individuals in our country is a debate I would welcome.

Statement of Commissioner Gail Heriot

This report should not have been published in this form. When the results of an empirical study don't come out the way Commission members hoped and expected that they would, the right thing to do is usually to publish those results anyway. Why hide useful information?¹

Instead, the Commission sat on the report for years. Then it decided to discard the draft written by our staff and publish instead a transcript of the witness testimony received at our briefing that took place on October 17, 2014 in Orlando, Florida (along with Commissioner Statements like this one). In that way, the staff's empirical findings could be buried forever.

No one would claim that the results of the staff's empirical study conclusively resolve all the controversy over "Stand Your Ground" laws or even over Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law in particular. But they are useful for what they don't show. The most passionate opponents of "Stand Your Ground" laws appear to have believed that the empirical evidence would show clearly that African Americans are harmed by these laws. But it turns out things are not so clear; the evidence of discrimination against African Americans or even real disparate impact is absent. Yes, it is true that a disproportionate number of those killed in Florida in cases in which, correctly or incorrectly, the "Stand Your Ground" law has been invoked were African American. But it is also true that a similarly disproportionate number of those *for* whom that law has been invoked were African American.² African Americans are disproportionately on both sides of the issue.

¹ This is not the first time in recent years that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has conducted an empirical study, only to downplay its results. In Environmental Justice: Examining the Environmental Protection Agency's Compliance and Enforcement of Title VI and Executive Order 12,898 (2016), the Commission apparently hoped to prove that coal ash dumps were more likely to be located near neighborhoods with disproportionate numbers of African Americans. But the data came back showing the opposite. Although the Commission had originally intended this study to be a centerpiece of the report, instead it was barely mentioned. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Gail Heriot in U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Environmental Protection Agency's Compliance and Enforcement of Title VI and Executive Order 12,898 (2016), available at https://papers.srn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897775.

Another example is the Commission's 2015 civil rights enforcement report, With Liberty and Justice for All: The State of Civil Rights at Immigration Detention Facilities (2015). For that project, a delegation from the Commission toured two immigration detention centers. Yet barely any information about that visit made it into the staff-generated section of the report. As I described at some length in my Statement in that report (pp. 198-210), our visit suggested that these particular centers appeared to be generally well-maintained and that detainees appeared to be treated appropriately at the time. See Statement of Commissioner Gail Heriot in U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, With Liberty and Justice for All: The State of Civil Rights at Immigration Detention Facilities (2015), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897732.

² Statement of John Lott, Draft Report at 76 (stating that 34% of those for whom the law was invoked were African American).

The Commission embarked on this project in May 2013, at a time when public interest and public passions about "Stand Your Ground" laws were running high.³ The immediate trigger of that interest was the Trayvon Martin case⁴—although, oddly enough, that case was not really a "Stand Your Ground Case."⁵

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-the-nra-pushes-stand-your-

<u>hiaasen/article1960643.html</u>; Andy Kroll, *The Money Trail Behind Florida's Notorious Gun Law*, Mother Jones (March 29, 2012)("the money trail leading to the watershed law in Florida—the first of 24 across the nation—traces primarily to one source: the National Rifle Association"), available at

https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/nra-stand-your-ground-trayvon-martin/. For more examples, see Cynthia Ward, *"Stand Your Ground" and Self Defense*, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 89, 96 n.19 (2015).

⁴ Commissioner Michael Yaki, who proposed the project, said that he wanted to take up the issue in part because of the Trayvon Martin case. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Transcript of May 31, 2013 Business Meeting at 6. Commissioner Yaki also discusses the Trayvon Martin case several times in his Commissioner's statement.

⁵ See infra at 54-55. See also, e.g., Scott Lemieux, *The Zimmerman Acquittal Isn't About Stand Your Ground*, The American Prospect, July 14, 2013, available at http://prospect.org/article/zimmerman-acquittal-isnt-about-stand-your-ground (wherein the progressive-leaning political science professor author notes that "Zimmerman's defense involved just standard self-defense," while nonetheless claiming that the case highlights serious racial issues); Jacob Sullum, *The New York Times Admits That Its Reporting on the Trayvon Martin Case Has Been Fundamentally Wrong*, reason.com June 20, 2013, available at http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/20/the-new-york-times-admits-its-reporting</u>: "Zimmerman's defense does not hinge on the right to stand your ground when you are attacked in a public place because he claims he shot Trayvon Martin during a violent struggle in which there was no opportunity to retreat."

Commissioner Yaki also discusses at some length the Jordan Davis case as a supposed illustration of the problems with "Stand Your Ground" laws. But this also is a case that ultimately did not turn on the existence of such a law. Instead, it illustrates the point I have tried to make *infra* at 52-55 that "Stand Your Ground" laws do not authorize an individual to use force simply because "he feels threatened."

The day after Thanksgiving, Davis and three of his friends pulled up to a convenience store. Michael Dunn and his girlfriend parked in the adjacent space, and Dunn began complaining about the music coming from Davis's car. An argument erupted between Dunn and Davis and his friends. Dunn, who had a concealed weapons permit, reached for his gun from his glove compartment and began shooting into the other car, and continued shooting into the other car until it drove away. Davis was killed. Dunn drove away with his girlfriend and did not report the matter to the police.

At trial, Dunn claimed that he had acted in self-defense because he thought he saw Davis armed with a gun. But the police found no gun in Davis's car or near the scene, and Dunn also never told his girlfriend at the time of the incident about the gun. See Kristal Brent Zook, The Lessons of Jordan Davis's Murder, Revisited, The Nation November 13, 2015, available at https://www.thenation.com/article/the-lessons-of-jordan-daviss-murder-revisited/.

The jury convicted Dunn of first-degree murder. He won't be out on the streets anytime soon. We cannot know for sure what the jury's reasons were. But it seems overwhelmingly likely that they thought either (1) he was lying about believing that he saw a gun; or (2) if he believed he saw a gun, he was being unreasonable in doing so. In the unlikely event that it had come to the opposite conclusions on those issues, Florida's Stand Your Ground law could have come into play in the sense that it would obviate the need for the jury to resolve whether Dunn could have safely withdrawn.

³ See, e.g., Gary Yonge, Open Season on Black Boys After a Verdict Like This: Calls for Calm After George Zimmerman Was Acquitted of Murdering Trayvon Martin are Empty Words for Black Families, The Guardian (July 14, 2013), available at <u>https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/14/open-season-black-boys-verdict</u>. One way in which these laws have been impugned is to associate them with the National Rifle Association. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., *Why the NRA Pushes "Stand Your Ground,*" Washington Post (April 15, 2012)(claiming that such laws exists because state legislators were afraid to oppose the NRA) available at

ground/2012/04/15/gIQAL458JT story.html?utm term=.c25da969e2df; Carl Hiaasen, *Welcome to Florida, Where the NRA Rules, and We Proudly Stand Our Ground*, Miami Herald BLOG (February 22, 2014, 7:00 pm)(arguing that Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law will likely never be repealed, since the NRA "owns too many Republican lawmakers"), available at https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/carl-

The concept paper proposing the project defined "Stand Your Ground" laws for the purposes of the project as "any state statutory enactment in the past decade that extends the common law right to use deadly force, without a duty to retreat, beyond an individual's home." See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 776.041 (2014) (attached hereto as Exhibit A).

Much of the passion over "Stand Your Ground" laws was misplaced—a product of an imperfect understanding of their content and their impact. And that passion and its accompanying misunderstanding have not entirely subsided.⁶ Florida gubernatorial candidate Andrew Gillum commented in 2018, with more dramatic flair than was warranted by the actual facts, that "you can't have a conversation about Stand Your Ground without understanding what the racial elements are" and "[Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law] is dangerous, which is why I ask the Governor to declare *a state of emergency*, because in the State of Florida, as long as that law exists, the state is not safe for all kids, it's not safe for all people."⁷

Alas, the Commission has not been immune to that misplaced passion. When the controversy first arose, it made a hasty decision to undertake a study of the racial effects of those laws.⁸ At the time

By racial bias, I'm talking about the fact that just on some statistics out there alone there are questions about whether or not if you are a - if you are a black victim, in other words, the person who was shot by someone asserting the SYG, that there seems to be a disproportionate number of those victims are African-American or are a minority versus homicide victims generally for that.

I know there's some people talking about crime rate, this, that when you're just looking at the homicide rate alone. But when you cut it out for this type of homicide and this type of defense, the number of people who happen to be of minority background seems to be a little bit higher.

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Transcript of May 31, 2013 Business Meeting at 7.

But it is unlikely that even in that event Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law would have affected the outcome. If the jury had found that Davis was indeed threatening Dunn with a gun, they probably would have also found that Dunn could not have safely backed up his car and left the parking lot (thus leaving his girlfriend, who was in the convenience store when the fight erupted).

⁶ Editorial: "*Stand Your Ground*" *Doesn't Stand Common Sense Test*, York Dispatch (October 24, 2018), available at <u>https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/opinion/editorials/2018/10/24/editorial-stand-your-ground-doesnt-stand-common-sense-test/1737906002/.</u>

⁷ Ashley Velez, The Root Video: Andrew Gillum Says Florida Is Not Safe for All While "Stand Your Ground" Law Exists, (November 2, 2018)(emphasis added), available at <u>https://www.theroot.com/andrew-gillum-says-florida-is-not-safe-for-all-while-st-1830188947</u>.

⁸ The project was proposed by Commissioner Michael Yaki. At the time, he said that he thought that alreadyexisting data on the application of "Stand Your Ground" laws indicated a racially biased effect against African Americans. He stated:

I warned the members of the Commission who favored such a study that "Stand Your Ground" laws effect only a fairly minor change to the law in the states that have adopted them and that enough data to draw firm conclusions will be lacking.⁹ There are about 15,000 homicides each

Commissioner Yaki later told MSNBC News that "All of the data shows it [Stand Your Ground] makes people kill people more often, and it makes black people die more often." Zachary Roth, *Is Stand Your Ground Racially Biased?: George Zimmerman vs. Marissa Alexander*, MSNBC News (July 23, 2013), available at http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/stand-your-ground-racially-biased-george. The project won Commissioner Yaki accolades in the national media. See, e.g., Emma Allen, *Customer Relations*, The New Yorker, November 11, 2013, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/11/customer-relations (generally favorable profile of Commissioner Yaki, mainly focused on his job as a consultant for the department store Barneys, that also mentions his work on Stand Your Ground at the Commission); Editorial, *When "Self-Defense" Violates Civil Rights*, N.Y. Times (June 19, 2012)(" Michael Yaki, a member of the civil rights commission, has properly asked that the cases involving Stand Your Ground laws be analyzed to see if there is racial bias in accepting a claim of justifiable homicide when the victim is a minority"), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/when-self-defense-violates-civil-rights.html. Like Commissioner Yaki, the media appear to have expected our study to come out a particular way. The *New York Times* wrote that "There can be no justifying the public mayhem legalized by Stand Your Ground. These laws should be repealed, and the [Commission's] civil rights inquiry should help make that point." Id.

When the Commission held a briefing on the topic, even though we hadn't yet crunched any data, a number of witnesses confidently asserted to the Commission that Stand Your Ground laws had an unfair effect on racial and ethnic minorities. See, e.g., Statement of Ahmad Nabil Abuznaid, Dream Defenders at 1 ("These SYG laws have, in a sense, legalized the devaluing and dehumanizing of minority lives in a very real way... Since we understand that the system itself has had to be constantly revised to deal with its inadequacies related to minorities, it should come as no shock that a law allowing vigilantes to use fatal force on the streets would disproportionately affect minorities.").

Nor is Commissioner Yaki's Draft Commissioner Statement's free of that misplaced passion. In it, he calls "Stand Your Ground" laws "the legal equivalent of carte blanche for the exerciser of a Stand Your Ground right" and quotes the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence calling Stand Your Ground a "Shoot First" law. He also writes that "And if we are to truly honor Trayvon, and Jordan, and countless others of ever[y] color and creed and orientation, we would enact sweeping, comprehensive, and strong gun control. Stand Your Ground and concealed carry are the societal equivalent of matches and gasoline, but the lack of any semblance or reasonable gun control is like constructing that society from dried tinder."

Gun control laws are far beyond the scope of this report, so I will refrain from commenting to them except to say that when guns allow an innocent person to protect himself against an individual who is slamming his head against concrete, that would seem to me to be one of the best arguments in favor of guns. The odd thing here is that the Trayvon Martin case is one in which the only gun involved (Zimmerman's) was used in what the jury clearly found was legitimate (and traditional as opposed to Stand Your Ground) self defense. Strict gun control laws would not have made things better in the case. There is every reason to believe that they would have led to Zimmerman's death.

⁹ My remarks at the meeting at which we officially accepted Commissioner Yaki's concept paper included the following:

Okay. I believe that what's being proposed here is much, much too complicated for our commission to be able to undertake. This is a big issue, plus there's not much in the way of data.

We're talking about with regard to some of these states, you know, with South Carolina we've got almost 700 homicides, but only a very small number of those will have had any kind of a self-defense issue.

year in the United States. That may be a tragically high number by the standards of the developed world, but it is not a lot by the standards needed to draw statistical conclusions from the data. According to the FBI statistics, less than 3% (i.e. less than 450) are deemed to have been justifiable self-defense.¹⁰ Of those, a similarly tiny, but undetermined proportion turn on whether a state has a "Stand Your Ground" law or not.¹¹ Add to that the problems that every murder has unique facts, accessing those unique facts from FBI statistics or even police reports is difficult, state "Stand Your Ground" laws differ from one another, and the states that have adopted "Stand Your Ground" laws differ from those that have not. One must also add that it is impossible to estimate the number of occasions when "Stand Your Ground" laws have allowed an

According to FBI statistics, in 2017, 90 persons were murdered in the course of a burglary (not including justifiable homicides). Presumably, then, all or nearly all of these were cases of the burglar murdering an innocent person. It is understandable why homeowners are thought to be reasonable for believing themselves to be in danger.

Many other cases occurred in the home, but not in the course of a burglary. *Police: Grandfather Fatally Shoots Grandson in Self Defense*, The Columbian (November 13, 2018) available at https://www.columbian.com/news/2018/nov/13/police-grandfather-fatally-shoots-grandson-in-self-defense/; Ken Curtis, *Dothan Police Believe Deadly Shooting Self-Defense*, WTVY.com (November 9, 2018), available at https://www.wtvy.com/content/news/Dothan-police-deadly-shooting-self-defense-500162481.html; Lynn Moore, *Sister's Fatal Stabbing of Brother Rules Justified Self Defense*, Muskegon News (November 7, 2018), available at https://www.mlive.com/news/muskegon/index.ssf/2018/11/sisters fatal stabbing of brot.html.

And the number that would have a self-defense issue that turns on the difference between Stand Your Ground and ordinary common law on self-defense, that's going to get down to like Bob and Suzy ... a couple of homicides in each state.

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Transcript of May 31, 2013 Business Meeting at 18-19.

¹⁰ Even if that is a serious undercount, it is never going to be the case that a substantial proportion of the 15,000 or so homicides each year are cases of legally justifiable self-defense.

¹¹ Some of those justifiable homicides occur in the course of a burglary (and hence, ordinarily in the defendant's home and subject to the Castle doctrine). Even limiting myself to news stories running in 2018, it was not hard to uncover such cases. I think it is safe to state that the number of burglary/home invasion justifiable homicide cases is not insignificant. *Homeowners Tell 11 News They Shot Intruder in Self-Defense*, KKTV.com (October 10, 2018), available at https://www.kktv.com/content/news/Shooting-Investigation-in-Colorado-Springs-495374221.html; *Richmond Homeowner Shoots Intruder in Self-Defense: Police*, NBCbayarea.com (July 6, 2018), available at https://www.kktv.com/content/news/Shooting-Investigation-in-Colorado-Springs-495374221.html; *Richmond Homeowner Shoots Intruder in Self-Defense: Police*, NBCbayarea.com (July 6, 2018), available at https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Richmond-Homeowner-Shoots-Intruder-in-Self-Defense-Police-487512971.html; Thomas, Leavy, *Memphis Homeowner Grabs His AK-47, Kills Two Burglars*, CBSnews.com (June 4, 2018), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/memphis-homeowner-kills-two-burglars-with-ak-47/; Thomas Plank, *Helena Man Who Fatally Shot Burglar Defends Gun Rights at Young Republicans Event*, Helenair.com (May 9, 2018), available at https://helenair.com/news/local/helena-man-who-fatally-shot-burglar-defends-gun-rights-at/article_9b429d41-b70e-5843-a137-df0b93988

In addition, there are cases that occur outside the home, but for which it is obvious retreat would have been impossible. See Jon Wilcox, *Prosecutor: 13 Bullet Holes Showed Self-Defense for Man Cleared of Murder Charge*, The Victoria Advocate (October 22, 2018), available at

https://www.victoriaadvocate.com/counties/dewitt/prosecutor-bullet-holes-showed-self-defense-for-man-cleared-of/article_def55934-d637-11e8-9546-637075a1ed02.html.

individual to threaten self-defense in a way that prevented further violence. That is simply not a lot to work with, especially if one's task is to tease out the law's racial effects.¹²

As a result, it was always highly unlikely that we could obtain the necessary data to decide whether these laws had a *racial* effect or not, which is the issue we arguably have jurisdiction over.¹³ It was not that I was against undertaking challenging empirical studies. Like Commissioner Yaki, I believe that the Commission should focus more of its energies on its own empirical studies and less on simply giving its opinion on policy issues. But I feared this particular exercise would not generate enough useful information to be worth the effort.

Our staff undertook the study and did the best that could be done with the data available. I have no reason to doubt either the competence or the integrity of the statistician in our Office of Civil Rights Evaluation ("OCRE") who undertook the analysis.¹⁴ On the other hand, OCRE was not able to find data allowing it to make a comparison between jurisdictions with "Stand Your Ground" laws and those without them or between a jurisdiction before it adopted a "Stand Your Ground" law and after it did so. Thus even if a mammoth multi-factored analysis was desirable to determine whether "Stand Your Ground" laws disproportionately increase the number of homicides of African Americans, OCRE was in no position to conduct that analysis.

¹² Of course, economists sometimes rush in where angels fear to tread. Two complex empirical studies have now been done on the effects of "Stand Your Ground" laws. Commissioner Yaki relies significantly on them to mount his critique, yet each has significant limitations that I discuss infra at p. 48, n. 50. For example, one of these studies—Chandler McClellan & Erdal Tekin, *Stand Your Ground Laws and Homicides*, 52 J. Human Resources 621 (2017)—suggests that states that have passed "Stand Your Ground" statutes that allow individuals to stand their ground if they are in a place they are legally entitled to be had an *increase* in total homicides per 100,000 in population in the 17 months following the laws' passage relative to other states *for whites, but not for African Americans*. (Indeed, for African Americans, the rate of total homicides was found to decrease slightly, but not significantly). Paradoxically, more limited "Stand Your Ground" statutes—such as those that extend the right to stand one's ground only to one's business or car—were associated with a decrease in the rate of total homicides (relative to states with no such changes in the law). Given these odd results, it is very hard to come away with the conclusion that the associations noted by the authors are causal in nature.

The other such study did not deal with racial effects at all. See Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, *Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence?: Evidence for Castle Doctrine*, 48 J. Human Resources 821 (2013). But given that it finds that laws of this kind increase homicide rates, it does itself rule out the possibility (as McClellan & Tekin purport to) that "Stand Your Ground" laws increase the number of African-American homicides. See infra at n. 50.

¹³ Here is another way to give readers an idea of how small the pool of relevant cases is: In a study for PBS's Frontline, John Roman of the Urban Institute's Justice Policy Center looked at SYG racial disparities using FBI homicide data from 2005 to 2009. Out of 45,300 incidents of homicide from all 50 states in the database, there were only 25 white-on-black justifiable homicides during the period of Roman's study. See Sarah Childress, *Is There Racial Bias in "Stand Your Ground" Laws?* Frontline, July 31, 2012, available at

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-there-racial-bias-in-stand-your-ground-laws/.

¹⁴ That individual head holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Howard University. Before coming to the Commission, he was a Senior Statistician at the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council for the District of Columbia.

Instead, the staff had a database, put together initially by the Tampa Bay Times, consisting of 192 Florida cases. The original list was supplemented by a list of cases compiled by the researcher Albert McCormick for his paper on Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law.¹⁵ In the end, there were 305 cases in total. OCRE focused on whether success in invoking "Stand Your Ground" laws varies by the race of the parties.

Alas, these cases are not what they appear. They are not cases for which Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law made a difference in the outcome. Rather *some* are cases for which Florida's law *might* have made a difference depending upon whether it was ultimately determined that the shooter could have safely avoided the need for self-defense by retreating. (Of course, the point of "Stand Your Ground" laws is that they take that issue out of consideration.)¹⁶

Others cases in the database involved situations in which the defendant or the defendant's lawyer invoked "Stand Your Ground" law, but the facts did not fit "Stand Your Ground" (though in some cases, real issues of self-defense may have fit the facts). In some cases, the term "Stand Your Ground" was simply mentioned by somebody quoted in a news story account of the case. Sometimes that person had no idea what he or she was talking about.

Moreover, the cases were a hodgepodge. No two contained facts that were alike. For example:

(1) Seventy-year-old Ralph Wald woke up at midnight to find a younger man having sexual intercourse with his 41-year-old wife in the living room. According to Wald, he believed his wife was being raped. He went to his bedroom, got his gun and shot the man in the head and stomach. It turned out to be one Walter Conley, with whom Wald's wife had once lived in a house next door to Wald's. Police believed instead that Wald shot Conley in a fit of rage. Whatever this case is, it does not turn on the application of Florida's "Stand Your Ground Law." While the defense cited that law, under the pre-existing Castle Doctrine, Wald had no duty to retreat in his own home anyway. Moreover, this was a case of defending a third party. He could not have successfully defended his wife (assuming she needed defending) by retreating. The case turns on a question of fact: Wald either reasonably believed that he was defending his wife from a rapist or he did not. Wald was charged

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=jpps.

¹⁵ McCormick, Albert E. Jr., *The Enforcement of Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Law: Preliminary Findings*, 6 J. OF PUB.& PROF. SOCIO. 1 (2014), available at

¹⁶ That is an aspect of "Stand Your Ground" laws that must always be kept in mind. Under a "Stand Your Ground" law, it is unnecessary to determine whether the individual claiming the right to self-defense could have retreated in safety. It doesn't matter if he has the right to stand his ground. By contrast, in a jurisdiction with a duty to retreat, it becomes necessary, when an individual fails to retreat and instead acts in self-defense, to determine whether he should have retreated instead. The upshot of this is that law enforcement investigators may classify a case as falling under a "Stand Your Ground" law when they mean only that the individual did not retreat.

with second-degree murder. Rightly or wrongly, the jury acquitted him. Florida's "Stand Your Ground Law' had nothing to do with it.

- (2) Andrew Smith and Keith Quakenbush got into an argument while in Smith's car. Smith requested that Quackenbush get out of his car, but Quackenbush refused. Smith was able to remove him from the car and *attempted to drive away*, but Quakenbush re-entered it. Smith removed him again. At that point, Quakenbush jumped onto the car and a physical fight began. When Quakenbush cut Smith with a box cutter, Smith took out a knife and stabbed Quakenbush, but did not kill him. The police arrested Smith. There does not appear to have been an opportunity for Smith to retreat once the physical fight began. Indeed, the Tampa Bay Times database specifically notes that retreat was not an option. Florida's "Stand Your Ground Law" is thus, again, superfluous.¹⁷
- (3) Gregory Gayle had been staying with his pregnant sister and her fiancé, Jakob Penrod, for three weeks when an argument turned violent. Penrod told Gayle to move out. Fearing Gayle, Penrod and Gayle's sister locked themselves in the bathroom (with Penrod's gun). When Gayle forced his way into the bathroom and struck Penrod, Penrod shot him. This was a routine self-defense case and not one that turned on Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law. Penrod was in his own home and had no opportunity to retreat anyway. According to the Tampa Bay Times website, "Witnesses, including some of Gayle's relatives, agreed with Penrod's description of the events and he was not arrested."¹⁸ The only connection to "Stand Your Ground" law that I am aware of was the fact that Gayle's father told the local television station that the "Stand Your Ground Law" needs a second look.¹⁹

These cases were not difficult to find. There are certainly many more in the database that did not turn on the existence of the "Stand Your Ground" law. Indeed, while I did not look at them all, I did not run across a single case that really turned on the existence of a "Stand Your Ground" law, although I assume that some do.

Both the fact that every case has different facts and the fact that large numbers of cases in the database are not true "Stand Your Ground" cases make drawing conclusions very difficult. Add to that the database does not include cases where an individual who stood her ground was

¹⁷ Florida Stand Your Ground Cases (Tampa Bay Times) <u>http://stand-your-ground-law.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/cases/case_262</u>.

¹⁸ Florida Stand Your Ground Cases (Tampa Bay Times) <u>http://stand-your-ground-law.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/cases/case_269</u>.

¹⁹ Lisa McDonald, "*Stand Your Ground*" *Put to Test in Leesburg Shooting*, ClickOrlando.com (April 9, 2012) <u>https://www.clickorlando.com/news/florida/lake-county/stand-your-ground-put-to-test-in-leesburg-shooting</u>.

successful in scaring off her assailant just by brandishing a weapon (rather than running away) or cases where an individual retreated anyway, despite a legal right to stand his ground.²⁰

The first draft of the report found that none of the attributes of those who claim the Stand Your Ground defense, including race/ethnicity, was significantly associated with the probability of a successful claim.²¹ I would quote the draft and give the specific figures, but some of my fellow Commissioners have taken the position that for the Commission to publish this Statement quoting those figures might be interpreted to waive the Commission's deliberative process privilege. To address their concerns I have edited this statement. Suffice it to say that insofar as there was evidence, it suggested that African Americans and Hispanics were more likely to successfully assert the defense than whites, but the difference was not statistically significant.²² The report also found that the probability of a successful Stand Your Ground claim was greater if the initial attacker was Hispanic than if he or she was black or white. But the differences were insignificant at the conventional 0.5 level.²³ The draft ultimately concluded that there was no significant difference in the probability that a Stand Your Ground claim would be successful based on the race or ethnicity of the claimant or the race of the initial attacker.

But Commissioner Michael Yaki, who spearheaded the project, was unhappy with the results and protested them. To the credit of our statistician in the Office of Civil Rights Evaluation, while he listened to and considered Commissioner Yaki's complaints, he *stood his ground* and declined to alter his results to follow a particular narrative.

²² Draft Report at 28.

²⁰ In the absence of a "Stand Your Ground" law, brandishing a weapon in a case in which one has a duty to retreat would presumably be at least technically an assault. And yet, cases in which an otherwise innocent individual scares off an assailant by showing his weapon seems like a benefit of "Stand Your Ground" laws to me. Of course, the individual who shows his assailant his weapon in this way may put himself in a position where he must use it, since he has likely used up precious time that could have been used to retreat.

²¹ Draft Report at v. Given the existence of ordinary self-defense and Castle Doctrine cases in the database, even if the data had shown bias, it would be unclear whether the bias came from the application of "Stand Your Ground" laws or the application of other self-defense doctrines. It is one thing to argue for the repeal of "Stand Your Ground" laws. Reasonable policymakers have taken both sides of that issue. It is quite another to argue for the repeal of the right of self-defense generally and hence for a "Duty to Die" rule for those who find themselves under attack. Alas, while it appears that racial bias may not be an issue in this particular context, racial bias has certainly been known to rear its ugly head in employment, real estate sales and credit. Yet no one argues that this is a sufficient reason to abolish employment, home ownership and credit. Nor would it be a good reason to eliminate the basic right to self-defense.

²³ The difference between blacks and Hispanics were significant at all levels. The difference between whites and Hispanics was statistically significant at the .10 level.

For a while, there was talk within the Commission about trying to re-do the project.²⁴ Eventually, though, the staff who had originally been the most immersed in this project (our statistician from OCRE, as well as Commissioner Yaki's special assistant and counsel) left the Commission, and the discussions stopped. A majority of the Commission's members were apparently happy not to issue a report. But lately, they seem to be taking the position that the *quantity* of reports that the Commission issues is important. More than two years after we received the initial draft, the Commission voted to scrap that draft altogether and instead publish the report in the form you see today.

I believe that the findings that were contained in the draft are worth publishing, despite the fact that they do not resolve every issue we might like them to have. They are at least a bit of a counterweight to some of the more fevered commentary about the intent and effects of "Stand Your Ground" laws. Take, for example, the following comments, all of which were aimed at "Stand Your Ground" laws:

"There is a word for the unfounded, pre-emptive, due-process-free (but tacitly sanctioned) form of killing perpetrated against black people in this country in an effort to safeguard white property: lynching." –Sabrina Strings, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of California at Irvine.²⁵

"... SYG laws make it easier for straight, cisgender people to kill queer people, for white people to kill people of color, and for men to kill women, while preventing targeted minorities from defending themselves." Caroline E. Light, Director of

²⁴ In February 2016, there was supposed to be a meeting of the eight special assistants and the then-head of OCRE to address some of the concerns about the first draft and discuss a plan for moving forward with the report. The meeting was cancelled after the OCRE head was assigned to a different role within the Commission. It was never rescheduled.

In his Commissioner's statement, Commissioner Yaki writes that "Through no fault of the Commission and its staff, the lack of resources—both fiscal and personnel—hampered the ability of the Commission to engage in the type of fact-finding this matter deserved. Because of the way that data is recorded in Stand Your Ground shootings—or, more accurately, was not recorded, as will be discussed later—the intensive investigative resources that would have been required to be dedicated proved to be beyond the reach of the Commission." As discussed above, I do not fault the Commission's career staff for the staff-generated section of this report's failure to come to fruition. But I do not think it is entirely accurate to suggest that the failure was mostly about a lack of resources. It was not. The Commission could have had three times its level of resources, and it still would have been without the data it needed to draw conclusions.

²⁵ See Sabrina Strings, *Protecting What's White: A New Look at Stand Your Ground Laws*, The Feminist Wire (2014), available at <u>https://thefeministwire.com/2014/01/protecting-whats-white-a-new-look-at-stand-your-ground-laws/</u>.

Undergraduate Studies in the Program in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Harvard University.²⁶

"This [is] structural racism at its finest: a modern-day lynch law. ... The arming and acquitting of racists is nothing new in our country, but [proposed Stand Your Ground laws] are open invitations for racist violence."—Mari Christmas, Visiting Fellow in Creative Writing, Idaho State University.²⁷

The Commission's study certainly fails to substantiate these statements. Common sense is all that's needed to understand that they are unhelpful and overblown.

Of course, misunderstanding about the racial aspects of "Stand Your Ground" laws is only one of several misunderstandings concerning these laws. There are others:

THE APPARENTLY WIDESPREAD NOTION THAT "STAND YOUR GROUND" LAWS ARE A RECENT INNOVATION IS FALSE.

Many people are under the incorrect impression that "Stand Your Ground" laws are a recent innovation and that they greatly expand the circumstances under which the right to self-defense can be invoked. The truth, however, is that "Duty to Retreat" rules and "Stand Your Ground" rules have existed side by side, at least as far back as 17th century England.²⁸ It hasn't always been easy to tell which rule applies to which situations, but Anglo-American law has muddled through nonetheless. It is true that American law may be leaning somewhat more than English common law toward "Stand Your Ground" rules. But the differences are smaller than many seem to think.

Former Attorney General Eric Holder is among those who seems to be under this misimpression that "Stand Your Ground" laws are novel (beyond the fact that they are now statutory, whereas before they were common law). In addressing the NAACP in 2013, he stated: "These laws try to fix something that was never broken. ... [I]t's time to question laws that senselessly expand the concept of self-defense and sow dangerous conflict in our neighborhoods [W]e must examine laws ... eliminate[e] the common-sense and age-old requirement that people who feel threatened have a duty to retreat, outside their home, if they can do so safely. By allowing and perhaps

²⁶ Caroline E. Light, Stand Your Ground: A History of America's Love Affair with Lethal Self-Defense 184 (2017).

²⁷ Mari Christmas, *Stand Your Ground Is a Modern-Day, Racist Lynch Law*, Idaho State Journal (March 11, 2018), available at <u>https://www.idahostatejournal.com/opinion/columns/stand-your-ground-is-a-modern-day-racist-lynch-law/article_d530e232-c638-5c00-a8d2-2cbb8bcee138.html</u>.

²⁸ Cynthia Ward, "Stand Your Ground" and Self Defense, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 89 (2015).

encouraging violent situations to escalate in public, such laws undermine public safety.... [W]e must ... take a hard look at laws that contribute to more violence than they prevent."²⁹

Those who believe that recent "Stand Your Ground" statutes overrule a long history of precedent imposing a duty to retreat (outside the home) before a right of self-defense can be invoked sometimes rely upon William Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* as their authority. That treatise states, "[T]he law requires, that the person, who kills another in his own defence, should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the violence of the assault"³⁰ I'm guessing that most of those who cite to Blackstone for this purpose do not own their own copies of Blackstone. I do. Browsing his section on homicide, one finds that he is speaking of a particular kind of homicide—that arising in the course of a "sudden brawl or quarrel."

This is an important qualifier. Going back to Lord Edward Coke's Institutes of the Lawes of England, we learn that initial aggressors and mutual combatants had a duty to retreat before invoking the right to use lethal force in self defense, but that no duty to retreat existed where the an individual was simply defending his or her life or property.³¹ (Yes, I own my own copies of

³¹ Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England 55-56 (1669). In it, he makes the distinction between mutual combatants and victims of an attempted serious crime. Here we learn that retreat, if it can be accomplished in reasonable safety is required for mutual combatants:

Some [homicides] be voluntary, and yet being done upon an inevitable cause are no felony. As if A, be assaulted by B, and they fight together, and before any mortall blow given A, [retreats], until he cometh unto a hedge, wall, or other strait, beyond which he cannot passé, and then in his own defence, and for safeguard of his own life killeth the other: this is voluntary, and yet no felony, and the jury that finde, it was done *se defendendo*, ought to finde the speciall matter. ... If A assault B so fiercely and violently, and in such place, and in such manner, as if B should [retreat], he should be in danger of his life, he may in this case defend himself; and if in that defence he killeth A, it is *se defendendo*

On the other hand, the victim of an attempted serious crime has no duty to retreat:

²⁹ Attorney General Eric Holder's Remarks on Trayvon Martin at NAACP Convention (full text), Washington Post (July 16, 2013), available at <u>https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/attorney-general-eric-holders-remarks-on-trayvon-martin-at-naacp-convention-full-text/2013/07/16/dec82f88-ee5a-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html?utm_term=.e69c760b26c4.</u>

³⁰ IV William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 184-85 (University of Chicago facsimile ed. 1979).

Some without any [retreat] to a wall, &c. or other inevitable cause. As if a thiefe offer to rob or murder B, either abroad, or is his house, and thereupon assault him, and B defend himself without any [retreat], and in is defence killeth the theif, this is no felony; for a man shall never give way to a thief, &c., neither shall he forfeit anything.

See also 1 Edward Hyde East, A Treatise on the Pleas of the Crown 220-21 (1803)(stating that there is no duty to retreat from someone who comes with the intent to commit a forcible felony against one's person or property); Michael Foster, A Report of Some Proceedings 273 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762)("[An] injured party may repel force with force in defense of his person, habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intends and endeavors with violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either. In these case he is not obligated to retreat");

Coke's Institutes too. I am a law nerd.) This is consistent with a different section of Blackstone's Commentaries in which he discusses "such homicide, as is committed for the *prevention* of any forcible and atrocious *crime*" and makes no mention of a duty to retreat.³² In the modern world, where dueling and just plain brawling is less common, this part of Blackstone's and Coke's commentaries is more significant. Never lose sight of the fact that we live in gentler times than most of our 17th and 18th century ancestors, no matter what part of the globe those ancestors came from.

Professor Cynthia Ward attempts to summarize the dominant theme among these distinguished legal commentators this way:

"Early English commentators distinguished between two fundamental scenarios: (1) cases in which the defendant's use of deadly force was *justified*—for example, where a blameless and law-abiding defendant used deadly force to repel an attack from a thief or a burglar who intended to kill or gravely injure him, and (2) cases in which the use of deadly force was merely excused-for example where the defendant either bore some responsibility for the deadly encounter, or had reasonably but incorrectly believed that he or she was faced with imminent threat of death or serious injury and responded with deadly force. In the former type of case, a defendant could claim self-defense although he or she had stood his or her ground and did not retreat; in the latter case, only defendants who could prove that they attempted to retreat before using deadly force could successfully claim selfdefense. Even then, defendants of the second type did not merit a full acquittal but only an escape from execution, which was the usual penalty for intentional killings by private citizens. Thus under the English rule, as articulated by Edward Coke, a person was justified in using deadly force against another, even to the point of killing the other, if threatened with imminent death or grave injury for which the defendant bore no responsibility or blame. In other cases where the defendant and the deceased mutually came to blows and the embroglio reached the point where the defendant found it necessary to kill the other rather than die, the defendant could only claim self-defense in the defendant had first attempted to retreat."33

American law has developed beyond the English law over the course of 19th and 20th centuries. And, for the most part, it has done so toward somewhat more liberal use of the "Stand Your

³³ Ward at 98-99.

Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 481 (1736)(stating that a "true man" has no duty to retreat and that if he kills his assailant, it is not a felony). See Cynthia Ward, "*Stand Your Ground*" and *Self Defense*, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 89 (2015)(citing all three of the above).

³² Blackstone at vol. III at 180.

Ground" approach.³⁴ *Erwin v. State* (1876) was a significant early case.³⁵ It concerned an altercation between a farmer and his son-in-law, who is described as a "cropper" on the farmer's land. The two argued over who had the rights to a certain shed. In the course of the argument, the son-in-law was said to have approached his father-in-law with an ax in a threatening manner, despite the latter's warning to stop. When the son-in-law got within striking distance, the father-in-law shot him.

After discussing the evolution of the doctrine in this area, the Ohio Supreme Court asked: "Does the law hold a man who is violently and feloniously assaulted responsible for having brought [the necessity for self defense] upon himself, on the sole ground that he failed to fly from his assailant when he might have safely done so?" The Court's answer was no. It held that while the right to use deadly force in self-defense is not available for minor trespasses or to a man who provoked the assault, "a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm."

Some later authorities have assumed that the *Erwin* court was using the term "true man" as a way of invoking a particularly "virile man" or "macho man."³⁶ In fact, the court was simply using the term used by Matthew Hale in the 17th century. Both the Erwin court and Hale appear to have

³⁴ See Ward at 99-100 ("In the mid-to-late nineteenth century ... the American approach changed as homegrown commentators, influential state supreme courts, and United States Supreme Court opinions developed a more robust Stand Your Ground doctrine, which become a widely adopted basis for self-defense in this country"). See Richard Maxwell Brown, No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society 5-7 (1994).

³⁵ 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876).

³⁶ See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961)("advocates of no-retreat say the manly thing to do is to hold one's ground, and hence society should not demand what smacks of cowardice"); Richard Maxwell Brown, No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society 17 (1994)(The language of the [Erwin Court] with its emphasis on the action of a 'true man' ... illustrates ... concern for the values of masculine bravery in a frontier nation"). See also Caroline E. Light, Stand Your Ground: A History of American's Love Affair with Lethal Self-Defense (2017). Light acknowledges that Hale used the term "true man," but seems unaware that of how that term was used in the 18th century. Instead, she writes that "[1]ethal self-defense was a right of "true manhood." For reasons that make no sense to me, Light specifically associates "Stand Your Ground" laws with white men in particular:

Standing one's ground against a perceived threat has long been a white, masculine prerogative in the United States. When European settlers arrived on American soil, they justified violence as necessary to their basic survival, seizing land that was already inhabited while imprisoning or exterminating its occupants. Settler colonialism and, later, the idea of Manifest Destiny—spreading Christianity across the continent—together demanded the subjugation of nonwhites. And the rights, privileges, and protections of citizenship were inaccessible to all but white, property-owning men. The legacies of this under-recognized history of repression and exclusion in the name of national survival still haunt us today.

meant "true" in the sense of trustworthy and honest. A "trueman" as used in the 18th century was a law-abiding man.³⁷

Note that the defendant in *Erwin* had been arguing with the deceased. Just in case Blackstone and Coke viewed mutual combatants as including two individuals engaged in an spirited argument, the court made it clear that, under Ohio law, given that the father-in-law had not assaulted the son-in-law, he was not blameworthy and hence retained the right to stand his ground. It is not and should not be regarded as blameworthy to engage in an argument—not in America.

A year later, the Indiana Supreme Court decided *Runyan v. State* (1877).³⁸ *Runyan* was an Election Day altercation. Both the defendant and the deceased were in town to vote and to hear the election results for the 1876 Presidential contest between Rutherford B. Hayes (favored by the deceased) and Samuel Tilden (favored by the defendant). The deceased, who was described by the court as "a large and vigorous man," had several encounters with the defendant during the day at which he used strong and threatening language. Out of fear of the deceased, the defendant, who had lost much of the use of his right arm fighting for the Union during the Civil War, borrowed a gun. Later that day, the deceased rushed him, striking him several times. The defendant drew his gun and shot him dead. The jury was instructed that he had a duty to retreat and hence convicted him.

The Indiana Supreme Court reversed. Stating that "the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when assailed," the Court stated: "[W]hen a person, being without fault and in a place where he as a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force by force, and if, in reasonable exercise of his right of self-defense, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable."³⁹

³⁷ See The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1991)("trueman ... A faithful or trusty man; an honest man (as distinguished from a thief or other criminal"). The OED considers this definition to be obsolete. See Garrett Epps, The History of Florida's "Stand Your Ground Law, American Prospect (March 12, 2012)("a 'true man' in the legal sense—means not a manly man but, in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, 'an honest man (as distinguished from a thief or other criminal"), available at <u>http://prospect.org/article/history-floridas-stand-your-ground-law</u>.

³⁸ 57 Ind. 80 (1877).

³⁹ Id. at 84.

Many courts followed *Erwin* and *Runyan*⁴⁰--but not all. In *Judge v. State* (1877),⁴¹ the Supreme Court of Alabama, in retaining its duty to retreat, had this to say:

We are pleased to observe that in this case, the old, sound, and much disregarded doctrine, that no man stands excused for taking human life, if, with safety to his own person, he could have avoided or retired from the combat, has been given in charge, and must have been acted on by the jury. It is to be regretted that this salutary rule is not universally observed by juries, without reference to the social standing of the prisoner. Its observance would exert a wholesome restraint on unbridled passions and lawlessness, and would, in the end, preserve to the commonwealth many valuable lives.⁴²

Note that the Alabama court wrote that *no* man who could have retreated stands excused for taking a life. This differs not just from *Erwin* and *Runyan*, but also from Coke and Blackstone (although the court does not appear to know this).

Federal courts have been accused of initially appearing to have gone in two directions. In *Beard v. United States* (1895), the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to some to be taking an approach similar to *Erwin* and *Runyan*.⁴³ Indeed, it quoted with approval broad language from *Erwin*. But just a year later, in *Allen v. United States* (1896), the Court made it clear that it intended to apply a "Stand Your Ground" rule only to cases that occur in the defendant's home or on his or her property.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, Harvard law professor Joseph H. Beale called the doctrine pronounced in *Erwin* and *Runyan* "brutal."⁴⁵ In his view, ""[n]o killing can be justified on any ground, which was not necessary to secure the desired and permitted result; and it is not necessary to kill in self-defense when the assailed can defend himself by the peaceful though often distasteful method of withdrawing to a place of safety."⁴⁶

⁴³ 158 U.S. 550 (1895).

⁴⁴ 164 U.S. 492(1896).

46 Id. at 580.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 48 Pac. 1088, 1089-90 (Cal. 1897); Boykin v. People, 45 Pac. 419, 422 (Colo. 1896); State v. Hatch, 46 Pac. 708, 708 (Kan. 1896); State v. Bartlett, 71 S.W. 148 (Mo. 1902). Professor Joseph H. Beale has collected a number of other such cases in Joseph H. Beale, *Homicide in Self-Defense*, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 526, 539, §8 n. 5 (1903).

⁴¹ 58 Ala. 406 (1877). Professor Joseph H. Beale has collected a number of other cases that appear to impose a duty to retreat in cases involving an otherwise non-blameworthy defendant acting outside his or her home in Joseph H. Beale, *Homicide in Self-Defense*, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 526, 540, §8 n. 1 (1903).

⁴² Id. at 413-14.

⁴⁵ Joseph H. Beale, *Retreat from a Murderous Assault*, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 579 (1902-1903).

While Beale advocated a duty to retreat, he took pains to point out that the availability of firearms changes the calculus for many Americans:

It is of course true that to retreat from an assailant with a revolver in his hand is dangerous, and one whose revolver is in his hip pocket is not to be despised; the hip-pocket ethics of the Southwest are doubtless based on a deep-felt need. But because retreat is less often safe than in the days of knives and small-swords, it by no means follows that retreat when certainly safe should be less requisite.⁴⁷

Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court moved in the direction of *Erwin* and *Runyan*. It just took a few years. In *Brown v. United States* (1921), Justice Holmes argued against any duty of retreat on the part of otherwise non-blameworthy defendants:

The law has grown, and even if historical mistakes have contributed to its growth it has tended in the direction of rules consistent with human nature. Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his ground and that if he kills him he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense. That has been the decision of this Court [referring to *Beard*]. Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. Therefore in the Court, at least, it is not a condition of immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant rather than kill him.⁴⁸

I can see at least two arguments for "Stand Your Ground" laws. The first argument is the one the Ohio Supreme Court employed in the *Erwin* case: A "Stand Your Ground" rule saves lives.

In *Erwin*, the Attorney General of Ohio, arguing in favor of a duty to retreat, had asserted that the Court should pick the rule that will save the most lives. In rejecting the Attorney General's argument, the Court stated that, yes, in adopting a "Stand Your Ground" rule, it was doing exactly that:

The suggestion, by the attorney-general, that that rule should be declared the law which is best calculated to protect and preserve human life, is of great weight, and we can safely say, that the rule announced is, at least, the surest to prevent the occurrence of occasions for taking life; and this, by letting the would-be robber, murderer, ravisher, and such like, know that their lives are, in a measure, in the

48 Id. at 343.

⁴⁷ Id.

hands of their intended victims.49

What did the Ohio Supreme court mean by that? It meant that if thugs, including would-be rapists, murderers and armed robbers, are conscious—even vaguely conscious—of the fact that their intended victims are obliged to flee rather than fight, it will embolden them. Indeed, it will embolden them even if they simply have a vague expectation that they are more likely to flee. Put differently, there will be more such attacks as they perceive, however faintly, that efforts to commit a crime are low risk and efforts to forcibly drive someone from a place they have a right to be will be successful.

Thugs need not have a grasp of the law for the Ohio Supreme Court to be right. Laws both reflect culture and influence culture, and they do it in ways that both subtle and not-so-subtle. Sure, expectations about how a victim is likely to behave may be based on knowledge of what the law requires him to do. But, perhaps more likely, they will be based on vague notions of what the victim ought to do, which in turn are influenced by often-distant memories of what has happened in the past or of what others have said about what should happen based on their own memories of what has happened in the past.

Also the extent to which thugs are emboldened need not be great for the Ohio Supreme Court to be right. They need not believe their victims will certainly flee. All that is necessary is that a "Duty to Retreat" rule alter their expectations slightly relative to their expectations under a "Stand Your Ground" rule.

On the other hand, the view that "Stand Your Ground" rules save lives is contestable. Indeed, the Alabama Supreme Court did just that in *Judge v. State*, when it wrote that a "Duty to Retreat" rule "would exert a wholesome restraint on unbridled passions and lawlessness, and would, in the end, preserve to the commonwealth many valuable lives."

Who is right? Does a "Stand Your Ground" rule or a "Duty to Retreat" rule save more lives? I am somewhat inclined to believe that in the long term it is a mistake to send a message to aggressors that their victims are required by law to respond passively. Eventually, they may learn to take advantage of that. I note that some researchers believe they have evidence to the contrary,⁵⁰

⁴⁹ 29 Ohio St. at 200.

⁵⁰ McClellan & Tekin (whose study is cited favorably by Commissioner Yaki in his Commissioner's Statement) are among those who believe that they have uncovered evidence to the contrary. States that have passed "Stand Your Ground" laws or are considering passing or repealing such laws should certainly be willing to examine that evidence and any further evidence that may come to light on the issue. But comparing crime rates of two very different sets of states with different histories, cultures and demographics, attempting to control for those differences the best one can, but then attributing the remaining differences to "Stand Your Ground" laws is fraught with risk. States are complicated things. And the evidence that McClellan & Tekin have produced is rather odd. It purports to show that in the seven months following each "Stand Your Ground" state's adoption of its law, homicides dropped sharply relative to other states, but that beginning in the eighth month through the fourteenth month, the homicide rates in

those states began to climb, while they remained more stable in the other states. The net effect of these changes was to raise the homicide rate in "Stand Your Ground" state relative to the other states. Such a roller coaster relationship is hard to attribute to changes in the law (which, at least with a change as minor as this one, one would expect to take a decade or more to affect the culture anyway). Why would a "Stand Your Ground" law cause a decrease in homicides during the first seven months followed by a six-month increase?

The most obvious explanation is that something else is driving this (especially since the study finds states that enacted more limited "Stand Your Ground" statutes during the same period were found to have experienced a *decrease* in homicides rather than an increase like that found for the states that enacted the stronger versions of that law). Knock me over with a feather if large numbers of the citizens of these states could tell you the difference between their state's statute and the statutes of other "Stand Your Ground" states.

There are several possibilities I can think of that are worth exploring. I'm sure others can think of more. First, the states that adopted the strong versions of "Stand Your Ground" are disproportionately located in the South, where incarceration rates have historically been higher than average. During the period of the enactment of these statutes, those incarceration rates had become controversial and difficult to maintain. The trend toward greater incarceration de-accelerated and ultimately reversed itself in the years around 2006-2009. Is it possible that Southern states were disproportionately affected and hence witnessed an uptick in homicides not matched in other parts of the country? I believe this is worth looking into.

An alternative explanation was suggested by the authors themselves--that gun ownership was climbing faster in "Stand Your Ground" states than in others (although the authors suggest that "Stand Your Ground" statutes may have *caused* that increase). The notion that "Stand Your Ground" laws led to a greater rate of gun ownership rates strikes me as attributing too much to these laws. The more likely explanation for any difference in rates of increase in gun ownership is that Southern states, for cultural reasons, were especially fertile ground for sparking increased interest in firearms at a time that the Supreme Court was deciding Second Amendment rights. Issues of firearm control were very much on the minds of many Americans. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Prior to the Trayvon Martin case "Stand Your Ground" laws received far less attention.

A third possibility is that that increases in population over the course of the decade were insufficiently taken into account by the authors. Since the "Stand Your Ground" states tend to be high-growth states, this would make it appear that homicides were increasing in "Stand Your Ground" states, while the increase was largely a function of population growth. Texas, Arizona, and Florida, for example, grew 20.6%, 24.6% and 16.6%% respectively and were "Stand Your Ground" states, while Illinois, New York, and Ohio grew 3.3%, 2.1% and 1.6% respectively and did not enact "Stand Your Ground" statutes. I cannot tell the extent to which the authors adjusted their figures to account for this constant change in population size.

Note the fact that population growth can itself result in increased feelings of rootlessness and hence in higher crime. Even taking into consideration actual population for each time period looked at will not account for this.

I am not in a position to draw conclusions here, except to state that the peculiarities in the findings of McClellan & Tekin leave me unconvinced that they have discovered a causal connection between "Stand Your Ground" statutes and an increase in homicide rates. See also supra at n. 12.

The same is true of the findings in Cheng & Hoekstra. Their study is similar to that off McClellan & Tekin in that it attempts something that is nearly impossible: It tries to isolate the effects of "Stand Your Ground" laws from the many other differences between states like Texas, Florida, and Arizona (which have adopted "Stand Your Ground" statutes) and states like New York, Illinois and Ohio (which have not).

Cheng & Hoekstra (whose study is also cited favorably by Commissioner Yaki) used a difference within difference approach. They make two findings: (1) If "Stand Your Ground" statutes have any deterrence effect on robbery, aggravated assault and burglary, it is a very small one; and (2) On the other hand, states that passed "Stand Your Ground" statutes (which the authors repeatedly call "Castle Doctrine" laws) experienced a very substantial uptick in homicide following the adoption of those statutes.

just as some believe they have evidence in support.⁵¹ But I am skeptical that overly ambitious and complex regressions can be the basis of any conclusions.⁵² And I submit that anybody who is

That may not be as impressive as the effect one might get from hiring 500 more police officers or cutting the unemployment rate by a percentage point, but it takes far less from the public purse than the former and it is more within the control of the state legislature than the latter. If I were a Texas legislator I would be more than delighted to learn that such a small tweak to state law had such a beneficial effect.

But Texas legislators shouldn't get excited. Cheng & Hoekstra did not find such an effect; they simply could not eliminate the possibility. Moreover, their finding that "Stand Your Ground" states have experienced an 8% uptick in homicide relative to other states (after controlling for many differences between the groups of states) demonstrates that their analysis did not take into consideration all the differences between the groups of states. It is simply implausible that "Stand Your Ground" statutes would have such a profound effect on homicide rates. It would be easier to believe that "Stand Your Ground" laws cause cancer. Consequently, their findings on deterrence must be viewed with great skepticism as well.

Why is the 8% implausible? "Stand Your Ground" laws affect only a very small number of homicide cases. Very few homicides involve claims of self defense. See text and note at n.10. Of those that do, most involve situations in which it is obvious that the individual invoking self defense had no opportunity to flee. The danger was imminent. Of those where flight would have been possible, many occur in the home, where the right to stand one's ground is longstanding and universal across American jurisdictions.

⁵¹ A Texas study in this regard is interesting. In September of 2007, Texas passed a "Stand Your Ground" law. In November of the same year, in suburban Houston, resident Joe Horn shot and killed two burglars who had been burglarizing his neighbor's home. He said they were coming at him in the neighbor's front yard. The incident was recorded on a 911 tape with the 911 operator urging Horn to wait for the police to arrive rather than to insert himself into the situation. See <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Horn_shooting_controversy</u>. Rightly or wrongly under Texas law, the grand jury declined to indict.

Researchers found that through the period leading up to August 31, 2008, burglaries decreased in Houston, but not in Dallas. Ling Ren, Yan Zhang & Jihong Solomon Zhao, *The Deterrent Effect of the Castle Doctrine Law on Burglary in Texas: A Tale of Outcomes in Houston and Dallas*, 61 Crim & Delinquency 1127 (2012). Did Texas' "Stand Your Ground" law have any causal role to play here? It is certainly plausible that the intense publicity surrounding the Horn case deterred burglaries. But did Horn's action have any causal connection to the "Stand Your Ground" law? If he would have acted the same way under previous law, then the answer would be "no." But it is difficult to say. Maybe he would not have.

⁵² A good example is a study of Arizona's 2006 "Stand Your Ground" law. Looking at data from 2002 to 2011, its author found that the number of robberies was not decreased by the passage of that legislation and (more importantly) the number of homicides was not increased. This suggests the change was not very important. Curiously, it nevertheless found that the number of suicides had increased. Since it is not obvious why "Stand Your Ground" legislation would lead to more suicides (but not more homicides), it seems odd to attribute the suicide increase to the "Stand Your Ground" law. But the author seems inclined to do so anyway. Mitchell B. Chamlin, *An Assessment of the Intended and Unintended Consequence of Arizona's Self-Defense, Home Protection Act*, 37 J. Crime & Justice 327 (2014). Perhaps the Great Recession, which commenced in 2008 and lasted many years, is a more likely contributor to rising suicide rates over this period. Mayowa Oyesanya, Javier Lopez-Morinigo, and Rina Dutta, *Systematic Review of Suicide in Economic Recession*, 5 World J. Psych. 243 (2015). See also David K. Humphreys, Antonion Gasparrini & Douglas J. Wiebe, *Evaluation the Impact of Florida's "Stand Your*"

If I were, for example, a Texas state legislator, I'm not sure I'd be as discouraged as Cheng & Hoekstra at the evidence of the deterrence effect of "Stand Your Ground" laws. They admit that it may well be the case that "Stand Your Ground" laws caused a 2.5% decrease in aggravated assault, a 1.9% decrease in robbery, and a 2.1% decrease in burglary. The authors evidently think that is small potatoes. In fact, however, that would represent 1,822 fewer aggravated assaults, 633 fewer robberies, and 3, 123 burglaries in Texas each year.

certain about the answer to this question for all time is making a mistake. It depends on a host of unknowables. And the answer may be different for one culture than it is for another. It is thus a question that needs to be left to the political judgment of legislatures or, in the absence of a judgment by a legislature, by the courts.

The best I can offer may be this: I very much doubt the effect is large, no matter which direction it goes. Stand Your Ground laws apply to only a few cases, and most citizens are unaware of their existence. Some advocates of the "Duty to Retreat" have tried to suggest that the states that have adopted "Stand Your Ground" rules tend to be those that value a gun-slinging image. One would think, however, the longer a state has employed a "Stand Your Ground" rule, the more dangerous they would be to live in (and the longer a state had been known for its "Duty to Retreat" rule, the more tranquil it would be). If so, that would mean Ohio and Indiana should be among the most dangerous, and Alabama among the most tranquil. Yet I doubt many Americans view those states that way.

The second argument in favor of a "Stand Your Ground" rule is a prudential one that arises out of the difficulty of knowing for sure whether a defendant could have safely retreated. One could say that "Stand Your Ground" rules create an irrebuttable presumption that if an otherwise innocent person decides to stand his ground rather than flee, that is was because he could not have safely retreated. Such a presumption will be wrong sometimes, but it may be right more often than a rule that juries must decide in each case whether the defendant could have safely retreated.⁵³

Beale, of course, disputed the wisdom of such a rule. He argued that just because it is often difficult to judge whether retreat would have been safe it "by no means follows that retreat when certainly safe should be less requisite. "

One can conceptualize taking the issue away from the jury by irrebuttably presuming an otherwise innocent defendant could not have safely retreated as adhering to the logic of Justice Holmes: Expecting detached calculation from someone who is in danger of imminent death is to expect far too much. Give them a break.

I don't need to resolve these issues. Legislatures are in a better position to judge these matters than a law professor. But here's the bottom line: Whether one supports or opposes "Stand Your

Ground" Self-Defense Law on Homicide and Suicide by Firearm, JAMA Intern. Med. 44 (January 2017)(making extraordinary claims out of proportion to the number of self-defense cases).

⁵³ The argument for this approach may be stronger in more recent centuries than it was in 16th century England, when altercations were more likely to involve swords, knives or fists than guns. In 19^{th-}, 20^{th-} or 21st-century United States, the likelihood that guns will be involved increased very substantially. The proportion of cases in which retreat will be ill-advised thus increased substantially. At some point, it arguably makes sense to presume irrebuttably that retreat would have been unsafe.

Ground" laws, Attorney General Holder's view that they are somehow novel is incorrect. This is a debate that has been going on a long time.

THE APPARENTLY WIDESPREAD NOTION THAT "STAND YOUR GROUND" LAWS ALLOW AN INDIVIDUAL TO USE DEADLY FORCE IF HE SIMPLY "FEELS THREATENED" IS FALSE.

The argument that "Stand Your Ground" laws allow anyone who feels threatened is frequently repeated.⁵⁴ Even former President Obama appears to have bought into this misimpression. Shortly after George Zimmerman was acquitted in the Trayvon Martin case, Obama asked what would have happened had the roles been reversed: "[D]o we actually think that [Trayvon Martin] would have been justified in shooting Mr. Zimmerman, who had followed him in car, because he *felt threatened*?"⁵⁵

But it is an ill-informed question. Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law as to the use of deadly force is as follows:

776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.

(2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she *reasonably* believes that using or threatening to use such force is *necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony*. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.

Note that what I am discussing here is not really about "Stand Your Ground" itself. This goes to the contours of basic self-defense law.⁵⁶ Florida requires a reasonable belief that one is being

⁵⁴ Commissioner Yaki appears to be among those who buy into this misconception. See Yaki Statement at 16-17.

See also Robert Leider, *Understanding Stand Your Ground*, Wall Street Journal (April 18, 2012)("Many have asserted that in Florida anyone who believes he is in danger can use deadly force. ... These perceptions of the law are wrong. ... [Florida's Stand Your Ground law requires that an individual] "reasonably believe that the aggressor threatened him with death, great bodily injury, or intended to commit a forcible felony").

⁵⁵ *Transcript: Obama Addresses Race, Profiling and Florida Law*, CNN (July 19, 2013)(italics added), available at <u>https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/politics/obama-zimmerman-verdict/index.html</u>. See also *Editorial: "Stand Your Ground" Doesn't Stand Common Sense Test*, York Dispatch (October 24, 2018)("[T]here should be little argument that so-called "stand your ground" laws, which allow armed citizens to shoot and kill assailants if they feel threatened, are unnecessary invitations to vigilante homicide and need to be rescinded"), available at <u>https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/opinion/editorials/2018/10/24/editorial-stand-your-ground-doesnt-stand-common-sense-test/1737906002/</u>.

⁵⁶ In tort law, only someone who *reasonably* believes that his assailant is about to inflict an *intentional contact or other bodily harm* and that he is thereby put in *peril of death, serious bodily harm or ravishment*, which can be *safety prevented only by the immediate use of force* likely to cause death or serious bodily harm. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 65 (1965). The Model Penal Code, on the other hand, is a little different and is considered

racial and ethnic minorities without being aware of it.

threatened. And not just any threat of intentional contact or bodily harm will do. The threat has to put the individual in peril of death, great bodily harm or the imminent commission of a forcible felony (e.g. rape). Moreover, the threat must be imminent. If there is time to call the police, then the police must be called. Any suggestion that deadly force can be employed if someone merely feels threatened is thus false. ⁵⁷

⁵⁷ A variation of this argument involving the concept of "implicit bias" appears in Commissioner Yaki's Statement. Commissioner Yaki does not define the term "implicit bias," but I understand him to be referring to the "attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner." <u>http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/</u>. In the racial context, this is often interpreted to mean that many white persons who profess not to be racially biased nonetheless actually are unconsciously biased against racial and ethnic minorities and that this unconscious bias means that whites frequently discriminate against

Talk of "implicit bias" is fashionable these days, especially among those involved in the diversity training business – perhaps in large part because a free, readily available online test purports to be able to measure an individual's "implicit bias" against African Americans. See Project Implicit, available at <u>https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html</u>. There is, however, significant reason for skepticism that the test accurately measures an individual's actual bias.

A full discussion of the merits of the IAT lies beyond the scope of this Statement, but for overviews of the major criticisms of the IAT, *see generally* Jesse Singal *Psychology's Favorite Tool for Measuring Racism Isn't Up to the Job*, New York Magazine, January 11, 2017, available at <u>https://www.thecut.com/2017/01/psychologys-racism-measuring-tool-isnt-up-to-the-job.html</u>; Olivia Goldhill, *The world is relying on a flawed psychological test to fight racism*, Quartz, December 3, 2017, available at <u>https://qz.com/1144504/the-world-is-relying-on-a-flawed-psychological-test-to-fight-racism/</u>; Althea Nagai, The Implicit Association Test: Flawed Science Tricks Americans into Believing They Are Unconscious Racists, The Heritage Foundation, December 12, 2017, available at <u>https://www.heritage.org/science-policy/report/the-implicit-association-test-flawed-science-tricks-americans-believing-they;</u> Heather Mac Donald, *Are We All Unconscious Racists?* City Journal, Autumn 2017, available at https://www.city-journal.org/html/are-we-all-unconscious-racists-15487.html.

The important part is this: Even if one is less skeptical of implicit bias than I am, it still makes little sense to use implicit bias as an argument against the "reasonable belief" component of "Stand Your Ground" laws. As discussed above, the plain text of the Florida law requires that the person must believe that the use of force is "necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony." The perception that an individual is threatening merely because of his or her race would not qualify under this standard. Moreover, the "reasonable belief" standard in not just a component of "Stand Your Ground" laws, it is part of traditional self defense. I trust that Commissioner Yaki would not abrogate traditional self defense—i.e. impose upon Americans who are being threatened with imminent death or great bodily harm have a duty to die simply because the implementation of that defense will never be perfect.

unusual: It doesn't mention reasonableness (though it does require "the actor [to] believe[] that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." Model Penal Code § 3.04(1). The Model Penal Code, however, does impose a duty to retreat (in places other than the home). I can see the argument for the Model Penal Code's failure to require the use of deadly force in self-defense to be reasonable for criminal law purposes (although for tort law purposes there needs to remain, at the very least, a requirement of reasonableness). One could argue that incarcerating or otherwise punishing a person who happens to be unreasonably timid and anxious serves no purpose. But if one is going to take that position it is important that one stick with a duty to retreat. "Stand Your Ground" jurisdictions should (and do) require reasonableness.

THE APPARENTLY WIDESPREAD NOTION THAT INITIAL AGGRESSORS CAN BENEFIT FROM "STAND YOUR GROUND" LAWS IS ALSO FALSE.

Another common misunderstanding is that an initial aggressor can invoke the right to stand his ground. This, too, is mistaken. From the time of Coke and Blackstone, it has been repeatedly articulated that if two individuals are engaging in mutual combat with each other, such that they are both in some way at fault, there is a duty to retreat if it can be done safely before deadly force may be employed. This aspect of the rule is important to the law. Consider, for example, the case of duelists—perhaps the quintessential mutual combatants. Without a duty to retreat on the part of mutual combatants, whoever prevails in the duel would be able to claim that since the other party intended to kill him they are in the clear for acting in self-defense. Imposing a duty to retreat on both of them preserves to the state the ability to come down hard on duelists.

The case for denying the initial aggressor in an attack on an innocent victim is a fortiori an exception to traditional "Stand Your Ground" rules. Blackstone discusses the *innocent* victim's right of self-defense without any qualifier. Coke is explicit that the *innocent* victim has no duty to give way.

This was evident in American cases as well. For example, in *Erwin v. State*, the Indiana Supreme Court placed an important qualifier on its "Stand Your Ground" rule. It stated that a man "who is without fault" "is not obliged to fly from his assailant." It never suggested that an initial aggressor (i.e. a man who is with fault) is entitled to that same option.

Most important, the Florida "Stand Your Ground" law is not to the contrary. It explicitly states that the justification of self-defense is *not* available to an individual who:

- (1) Is attempting to commit, committing or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony; or
- (2) Initially provokes the use or threatened use of force against himself or herself, unless:
 - (a) Such force or threat of force is so great that the person reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he or she has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use or threatened use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or
 - (b) In good faith, the person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the use or threatened use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use or threatened use of force.

Fla. Stat. § 776.041 (2014).

Determining what constitutes the "initial aggression" (or in the words of the Florida statute, what "initial[] provo[cation]" may sometimes require a little thought. The most obvious cases involve physical attacks. Indeed, physical attacks are by far the most typical initial aggression. If Alice walks up to Bob and punches him in the nose, and Bob, fearful that Alice is about to cause him seriously bodily harm, draws his gun, Alice has a duty to retreat, if she can do so safely, rather than to draw her gun and kill Bob. Why? Because Alice initially provoked Bob (§ 776.041(2)). This is so even though the punch in the nose may itself be only a misdemeanor and not a felony under § 776.041(1).

At the other end of the spectrum, certain things are *not* considered initial aggression or provocation. An individual has the right to discuss a sensitive subject, to engage in an inconsiderate act, to demand an explanation of the other individual's actions, and even to hurl insulting epithets at the other individual without forfeiting any aspect of his right to defend himself.⁵⁸

One can easily see how a nation that is careful to protect free expression in so many ways would be careful not to define the exercise of free expression as "aggression" or "provocations."

Are there things that don't constitute violence that are classed as initial aggression or provocation? Professor Cynthia Ward in "Stand Your Ground and Self-Defense" cites "being caught sleeping with the deceased wife" as a possible example.⁵⁹ But, if so, that goes far beyond inconsiderate acts, insults, or annoying interrogations.

The Trayvon Martin case was thus not a case of initial aggression by Zimmerman. Some have suggested that George Zimmerman somehow "provoked" Martin by following him and asking him why he was there. But this does not rise to the level of aggression or provocation as those terms have been understood.

Even if it did constitute aggression or provocation within the meaning the Florida statute, Zimmerman would likely qualify under § 776.041 (2)(b) as having "withdraw[n] from physical contact with [Martin] and indicate[d] clearly to [Martin] that he ... desire[d] to withdraw and terminate the use or threatened use of force, but [Martin] continue[d] ... the use or threatened use of force.

The uncontradicted evidence was not just that he had turned away and was surprised by Martin, who had turned the tables and was now following Zimmerman. The jury found that Martin had knocked Zimmerman to the ground and was beating Zimmerman's head into the concrete sidewalk when Zimmerman pulled out his gun and shot Martin. At that point, retreat was impossible.

⁵⁸ 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 128 (5th ed. 1993), quoted in Ward at 114.

⁵⁹ Ward at 114 (citing id.).

Might the jury have been wrong about the facts? Anything is possible (though the scrapes on the back of Zimmerman's head must have gotten there somehow). But the point remains that the problem in that case was not the Florida "Stand Your Ground" law.

CONCLUSION:

The Commission is publishing this transcript more than seven years after Trayvon Martin passed away—without any reference to its independent research on the subject. The controversy over his death and over "Stand Your Ground" laws has largely faded out of the headlines. Some members of this Commission might be inclined to bemoan this report not being as relevant as it might have been had it been ready closer to 2012. I disagree. Cooler heads should have prevailed early on during the debate over Stand Your Ground laws. But they did not. Now that years have passed, the Commission could have made a modest contribution to that debate by publishing the results of its research. It chose to bury those results instead only because they did not go in the direction the Commission's majority was hoping for.

Statement of Commissioner Peter N. Kirsanow

The Commission held a hearing on Stand Your Ground laws in the wake of the death of Trayvon Martin. In my view, this is not a subject the Commission is well-equipped to address. Reviewing the witness statements and hearing transcripts four years after the hearing, it seems that most of the disagreements center around four primary issues:

- 1) Whether there is a duty to retreat when exercising self-defense;
- 2) Self-defense;
- 3) Possession of firearms; and
- 4) Race.

The first three items are closely linked. However, all of them were jumbled together during our briefing under the heading "Stand Your Ground," and also in regard to the tragic Martin-Zimmerman altercation. This did not bring clarity to the discussion.

The Duty to Retreat

The term "Stand Your Ground" is confusing. It sounds novel, when it is merely one long-standing interpretation of the law of self-defense.¹ Nor is this interpretation limited to states regarded as politically conservative.² Therefore, in this section, I will discuss the disagreement over whether there is a duty to retreat when exercising self-defense, as that better describes the issue.

One of the problems with having the Commission investigate an issue such as Stand Your Ground is that there are different and irreconcilable values in play. It is tempting to view Stand Your Ground as a matter of determining whether individuals of a particular race are more likely to invoke Stand Your Ground or not, but the conflict is more fundamental. The issue is really a matter of determining who should bear a heightened risk of injury – the aggressor or his victim. States that have adopted stand your ground laws or have common-law doctrines of self-defense that are similar to stand your ground have decided that the aggressor should bear the heightened risk of

¹ See Eugene Volokh, "The Duty to Retreat in the Founding Era," The Volokh Conspiracy, December 21, 2017, http://reason.com/volokh/2017/12/21/the-duty-to-retreat-in-the-founding-era.

² See Cal. Jury Instr. – Crim. 550. Self-Defense – Assailed Person Need Not Retreat.

A person threatened with an attack that justifies the exercise of the right of self-defense need not retreat. In the exercise of [his][her] right of self-defense a person may stand [his][her] ground and defend [himself][herself] by the use of all force and means which would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge; and a person may pursue [his] [her] assailant until [he][she] has secured [himself][herself] from danger if that course likewise appears reasonably necessary. *This law applies even though the assailed person might more easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene.* [emphasis added]

injury. States that adhere to a "duty to retreat" say that the victim should bear the heightened risk of injury.

I was struck by this while reading exchanges between various commissioners and South Carolina Representative Todd Rutherford. This exchange is representative:

Vice-Chair Timmons-Goodson: Okay. Second and last question. You say that stand your ground law to you means that you don't have to live in force –

Representative Rutherford: Fear

Vice-Chair Timmons-Goodson: - that it doesn't make sense to you that one would not be permitted to elevate force. I guess I'm left wondering why is it not common sense that if someone comes up and pushes you, that you push them back, or someone comes up and hits you with a fist that you hit them with a fist, why should -I mean, why does it make such sense that you could elevate the force that you use to a gun or a knife in response to being pushed or hit with a fist?

Representative Rutherford: Commissioner, respectfully, I submit that you should have a right to not have people hit you with a fist. That you have a right not to be pushed. That you have a right not to wait and see what the next step will be once someone hits you in the face.

You should not wait to see whether you're going to be knocked out. You should have a right to pull that gun if you have one and say, "Leave me alone. I don't want to be bothered." And that's what the general assembly found. We have a right to live in peace.

And peace means that I'm not going to wait on you to hit me. I'm not going to wait on you to push me. I'm standing with my two children – I have two little boys. And if you're going to walk up to me and try and assault me or one of them I'm not going to wait to see what your next step is going to be before I decide what I'm going to do.

That's what the general assembly found. And I think that's common sense.³

It might seem hyperbolic to say that a duty to retreat shifts extra risk on to the victim of aggression, and undoubtedly that is not what my colleagues have in mind. Nonetheless, that is the practical effect. As Representative Rutherford said, the duty to retreat means that you have to "wait and see what the next step will be once someone hits you in the face." Professor Katheryn Russell-Brown also discussed these disparate values in her written testimony:

The second approach [to the issue of use of deadly force in self-defense] is "no retreat." In the face of threatened violence, a person should be allowed to stay put – to stand his ground and fight back against his attacker. In the 1800s, the "no

³ Transcript at 73-74.

retreat" approach was particularly attractive to frontier states, which viewed retreat as a sign of cowardice. Erwin v. State, an 1876 case decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, represents this perspective. The court declined to use the retreat rule and overturned the defendant's conviction. It stated, "[A] true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant who, by violence of surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm." In Brown v. United States (1921), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the retreat rule. The murder case involved a victim who had a knife and a defendant who had a gun. The Court ruled that retreat is not always required. Instead, it is a factor for the court to consider evaluating a self-defense claim. Many people viewed the rule of retreat as an outdated legal carryover from the common law. Today the majority of states do not require retreat before the use of deadly force.⁴

This difference of opinion, largely rooted in cultural differences, persists today.⁵ As Ilya Shapiro stated in his written testimony, "[T]he core of the debate over SYG – the real one, not the phony way we've been having lately – is really one about the duty to retreat."⁶

Self-Defense

The views expressed at the hearing would in many cases cast the idea of self-defense into jeopardy entirely. For example, David Labahn stated:

Even hearing that California is a stand your ground state surprises me immensely. I was a 10 year prosecutor there in that state, I prosecuted plenty of homicides and lots of violence, especially in Southern California.

I then spent 10 years at the State Association. I was running the California District Attorneys Association when the proponents of this legislation – it was 2006, they brought it to Sacramento and they tried to put the bill in. We laughed at it. We laughed that you're going to have criminal immunity and civil immunity for taking somebody else's life. We thought it was almost funny that – you've got to be kidding me.⁷

One problem with Mr. Labahn's statement is that if you kill someone in self-defense (and Stand Your Ground is merely one way the law approaches the natural right to self-defense) then yes, you are not criminally prosecuted for taking someone's life. Nor should you be civilly liable for taking someone's life if you were attacked by that person and had to defend your own life. If you clearly acted in self-defense, you shouldn't have to go through a trial to prove that. As with so many other aspects of government, the process is itself a punishment. The fact that Mr. Labahn thought this

⁴ Written Statement of Katheryn Russell-Brown, University of Florida, Levin College of Law, at 3-4.

⁵ Written Statement of Ilya Shapiro, Cato Institute, at 3.

⁶ Written Statement of Ilya Shapiro, Cato Institute, at 3.

⁷ Transcript Panel 3 at 61-62.

idea laughable illustrates how opposition to Stand Your Ground is often rooted in skepticism of self-defense.

John Lott made an interesting observation regarding homicide rates in states that introduce Stand Your Ground laws. If the homicide rate in a state does increase, and if that increase is attributable to this law, it could be because more people are availing themselves of the right of self-defense. (There are relatively few homicides, so even a small increase in the number will show up in the statistics.) A person who would have been robbed, assaulted, or raped defends herself, and in doing so takes the aggressor's life.⁸ Some of my colleagues raised the question of why a person wouldn't use something short of deadly force to defend herself. I agree that is preferable. But many times, a criminal (or an angry ex-boyfriend) will prey on someone who is physically weaker. If a would-be mugger is looking for a victim and an Ohio State football player walks down one side of the street, and an elderly man in a wheelchair rolls down the other side of the street, the mugger will probably think it will be less trouble to attack the elderly man. A wheelchair-bound person is unlikely to be able to defend himself – unless he has a gun.⁹ The Ohio State football player might – *might* be able to punch the mugger and go on his way (and maybe not if the mugger has a knife or gun), but the man in the wheelchair certainly can't. But if he shoots the mugger, the mugger is more likely to die than if the football player punches him.

Possession of Firearms

Many of the panelists cite George Zimmerman's history of arrests and question why he was not barred from owning a gun.¹⁰ The fact is, though, that Zimmerman was never convicted of a felony. Usually progressives support programs that divert low-level offenders from jail, like the program that sent Zimmerman to alcohol-education classes rather than convicting him of two felonies. Let us imagine this had played out differently. Let us imagine that George Zimmerman had been convicted of those two felonies and had served his time. Then in October 2014, he is sitting in

It was the other way around.

⁸ John Lott, "Misleading Journal of the American Medical Association research about Florida's Stand Your Ground law," November 28, 2016, https://crimeresearch.org/2016/11/misleading-journal-american-medical-association-research-floridas-stand-ground-law/.

⁹ John Barnes, "Justified to kill: Why there are more self-defense killings in Michigan than anyone knows," MLive, June 12, 2012, https://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2012/06/justified_to_kill_why_there_ar.html.

Sometimes, cases are reported [to the FBI] that are wildly inaccurate.

The FBI lists an incident in Flint in 2001 where a 17-year-old boy shot a 68-year-old man.

The 68-year-old, Clinton Burns, was confronted in his home by Howard Byas, who climbed through the window and threatened to kill Burns unless he surrendered his wallet and other valuables.

Burns pointed a remote control at the teen and ordered him to leave. When the teen snatched the remote, Burns shot him with a .38 caliber pistol hidden under a seat cushion.

The cushion was on his wheelchair. Burns, who passed away in 2008, was a paraplegic.

¹⁰ Written Statement of Arkadi Gerny, Center for American Progress, at 1.

front of the Commission testifying about how he committed a youthful indiscretion and had tried to go straight, and yet had been unable to obtain employment that matched his skills because of his criminal record. The Commission would have solemnly nodded and agreed that there is a need for diversion programs so that the lives of foolish young people are not permanently blighted, and issued a report on the need to prohibit the use of criminal background checks in hiring.¹¹

I support the use of criminal background checks in hiring, and I believe the current regime of criminal background checks in gun purchases is defensible. But I think employers should treat arrests and convictions differently when evaluating an individual's suitability for employment. We should be at least as careful when it comes to curtailing an individual's constitutional rights. After all, no one has a constitutional right to a particular job – or to any job at all – but the right to carry a gun is protected by the Second Amendment.

Our Constitution was not drafted with "safety" as its overriding concern. It protects certain rights, even at the expense of other interests. It protects freedom of speech, even though that freedom has often been used to hurt people while providing (in the minds of many) no discernable benefit.¹² Defendants have the right to confront their accuser, even though that has pained many victims of

But see Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011)(Alito, J., dissenting).

Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.

¹¹ Those few readers who follow this Commission closely may be aware that the Commission has in fact done exactly that, except that the man sitting in front of us explaining the difficulty ex-felons have obtaining employment had committed, among other offenses, armed robbery. *See* U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Assessing the Impact of Criminal Background Checks and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Conviction Records Policy*, December 2013, at 49 (testimony of Glenn E. Martin), http://www.eusccr.com/EEOC_final_2013.pdf; Glenn E. Martin, JustLeadership USA, https://www.heartsonfire.org/glenn-e-martin-justleadershipusa/.

¹² Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011)(Roberts, C.J.).

The "content" of Westboro's signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of "purely private concern." The placards read "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11," "America is Doomed," "Don't Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Fag Troops," "Semper Fi Fags," "God Hates Fags," "Maryland Taliban," "Not Blessed Just Cursed," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "You're Going to Hell," and "God Hates You." While these messages may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight – the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy – are matters of public import.

Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any parent who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son in peace. But respondents, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued a press release and thus turned Matthew's funeral into a tumultuous media event. They then appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a result, Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury. The Court how holds that the First Amendment protected respondents' right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I cannot agree.

crime. And individuals have the right to bear arms, both as a shield against government tyranny and for self-protection, even though people sometimes unlawfully kill others.¹³

We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding "interest-balancing" approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government-even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is *really worth* insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad. We would not apply an "interestbalancing" approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. See National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977) (per curiam). The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very *product* of an interest balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew. And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.¹⁴

Race and Self-Defense

This hearing was prompted by the tragic death of Trayvon Martin. No one really knows what happened that night. Even George Zimmerman may not recall events with complete clarity, given the darkness and the stress of the situation. And tragically, Trayvon Martin is dead. What we can say is that a Florida jury of six women found George Zimmerman not guilty¹⁵, and that the Obama Justice Department found that there was insufficient evidence to charge Zimmerman with violating Martin's civil rights.¹⁶ It is worth noting that even states that have a duty to retreat only require a person to retreat if he can safely do so. If Martin was on top of Zimmerman and attacking him, as Zimmerman claimed (and which is supported by forensic evidence), Zimmerman physically could not have retreated. Depending on how the confrontation between Martin and Zimmerman played

¹³ District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

¹⁴ *Heller* at 634-35.

¹⁵ Trayvon Martin shooting fast facts, CNN, updated May 7, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/index.html.

¹⁶ Department of Justice, Federal Officials Close Investigation Into Death of Trayvon Martin, February 24, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-death-trayvon-martin.

out before they wound up on the ground, Zimmerman may not have been able to *safely* retreat even before he was on the ground.¹⁷

None of this is to say that I think Zimmerman followed the best course of action leading up to the altercation with Martin. But the most heated claims made about this sad series of events were not supported by the evidence.

The hearing was prompted by the claim that "Perhaps the most divisive and inflammatory of those questions [about the Martin-Zimmerman altercation] is whether racial bias skews our justice system through "Stand Your Ground" (SYG) laws that shield those who claim self defense."¹⁸ This question is very difficult to answer at any level of generality. There are few justifiable homicides¹⁹, an even smaller number would be classified as "SYG," and whether or not a homicide is justified is very fact-specific.

Still, there is some statistical evidence that SYG laws do not have a significant racial disparate impact, which I discuss below. When this report was proposed, the idea was that Commission staff, principally Dr. Sean Goliday²⁰, would analyze Stand Your Ground cases to determine if there was a racially disparate impact or racial bias in the application of Stand Your Ground Laws.²¹ The

Senator Smith:

[O]ne of my pet peeves when discussing stand your ground is when anyone mentioned "retreat" today, remember Florida law and I'm unsure of other laws, always had a word that everyone neglects, it said, "safely retreat."... The Florida law has always been, you had a duty to safely retreat.

¹⁸ Commissioner Michael Yaki, "USCCR Special Investigation: Stand Your Ground Laws & Racial Bias," Concept Paper, June 7, 2012.

¹⁹ Transcript 2 at 17-18.

William Krouse:

[I]n any given year white-on-black justifiable homicide incidents they range from about 25 to 30 with a slight increase in the latter five year period. ... [But] if you go to Gary Kleck in Point Blank, he estimates that we under-report justifiable homicides by private citizens by about two, three, maybe four-fold. So you're looking at, over this 10 year period, about 250 cases or 25 cases a year of white-on-black justifiable homicides. ... But if you were to look at comprehensive data you might be looking at anywhere between 50, 75, to 100 cases per year. So if you did it for a 10 year period that'd be a thousand cases.

²⁰ Unfortunately, Dr. Goliday left the Commission for another position within the federal government. I thank him for his hard work on this report, even though none of his work saw the light of day.

 21 There's a lot of – there's data out there that suggests, and it only suggests, and again that's why I think that it's appropriate that we get involved in this, that there may be racial bias in the enforcement and application of these statutes.

By racial bias, I'm talking about the fact that just on some statistics out there alone there are questions about whether or not if you are a - if you are a black victim, in other words, the person who was shot by someone asserting the SYG, that there seems to be a disproportionate number of those victims are African-American or are a minority versus homicide victims generally for that.

Commissioner Michael Yaki, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Transcript of May 31, 2013 Business Meeting at 6-7.

¹⁷ Transcript 1 at 37-38.

projected budget for this study was $100,000^{22}$ It is now more than six years since the Commission voted to proceed with this project, and now we are releasing only a transcript – not any of the statistical analysis that staff conducted. I leave it to the reader to draw his own conclusions as to why this is so.

Statistical Research of William Krouse, John Roman, and John Lott

William Krouse, John Roman, and John Lott presented statistical research at the Commission's hearing. When considering their research, it is important to remember that they were using different datasets. Krouse and Roman used justifiable homicide data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Statistics Supplementary Homicide Reports.²³ In addition, Krouse was only presenting data on justifiable homicides generally, not on homicides where SYG was invoked.²⁴ Lott used the Tampa Bay Times'²⁵ database of SYG claims made in Florida since the law was enacted through October 1, 2014.²⁶ This means that Krouse and Roman were drawing from a larger but incomplete universe of cases (for example, Florida is not included in the Supplemental Homicide Reports).²⁷ Lott was using a data set that included cases from only one state, but was arguably more complete in regard to that state and had more details about individual cases²⁸

²⁶ Written Statement of John Lott at 3, 5.

Up through October 1st this year, the newspaper had collected 119 cases where people charged with murder relied on Florida's Stand Your Ground law, starting with cases filed in 2006.... Besides information on the victim's and defendant's race and gender, the Tampa Bay Tribune collected a lot of other useful information on the cases: whether the victim initiated the confrontation, whether the defendant was on his own property when the shooting occurred, whether there was physical evidence, whether the defendant pursued the victim, and the type of case (a drug deal gone bad, home invasion, etc.). This detailed information about cases is valuable and has not been available in other studies.

²⁷ Transcript 2 at 13.

The Supplementary Homicide Reports suffer from certain very serious limitations. One, Florida does not report in a manner that is accepted by the FBI. I think it has to do with a technicality on the offender/victim relationship, familial relationship. . . . Other states and localities more importantly do not participate, do not participate fully, and/or only participate intermittently in this Supplementary Homicides Reports Program.

Making things more difficult these reports do not always reflect the final disposition of these cases. Like the UCR, federal and tribal law enforcement do not report to the Supplementary Homicide Report Program.

²⁸ Unfortunately, it appears that the Tampa Bay Times stopped updating its SYG database in 2013. To get a sense of the type of information Lott is referring to, the archived version of the site is available here: http://stand-your-ground-law.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/data.

²² Id. at 5.

²³ See Written Statement of William Krouse; see also Transcript 2 at 19 (Roman: "I'm going to talk about the same data that Bill [Krouse] talked about, we used it in our analysis".).

²⁴ Transcript 2 at 11.

²⁵ Throughout the hearing transcript, witnesses refer to this newspaper as the "Tampa Bay Tribune," but the name is the Tampa Bay Times.

Krouse provided data to the Commission that showed the number of firearms-related intra- and inter-racial homicides involving black and white individuals (single victim/single offender incidents) from 2001-2010.²⁹ The number of black-on-black homicides was the largest, hovering around 2,000 homicides annually. The number of white-on-white homicides hovered around 300-500 fewer homicides annually – around 1500-1700. The number of inter-racial homicides was quite small. The number of black-on-white homicides held steady at around 250-350 annually, and the number of white-on-black homicides was steady at around 150 annually. The number of black-on-white homicides held steady at around 250-350 annually, and the number of white-on-black homicides was steady at around 150 annually.

The number of firearms-related, intra- and inter-racial *justifiable* homicides involving black and white individuals from 2001-2010 was quite small, starting around 150 in 2001 and rising to just over 200 in 2010.³⁰ The annual numbers of black-on-black and white-on-white justifiable homicides both hovered around 60 and slowly rose over 10 years. There was only one year (2004) when the number of white-on-white justifiable homicides was larger than the number of black-on-black justifiable homicides. The number of black-on-white justifiable homicides was miniscule – perhaps around 5 annually – and the number of white-on-black justifiable homicides, although small, was much larger, around 25-30 per year.

Viewing these two charts in conjunction brings to mind a possibility that was not mentioned by Krouse, or indeed by anyone at the hearing: if the number of black-on-white homicides (let us say 250 in a particular year) is much larger than the number of white-on-black homicides (150), perhaps it is not surprising that there are more white-on-black justifiable homicides. If whites are more likely to be on the receiving end of inter-racial violence, they are more likely to use violence to defend themselves. If there are 250 murders of whites by blacks per year, it is perhaps unsurprising that 25 whites per year kill a black attacker in self-defense.

John Roman, also testified at the briefing. His work in this area has received quite a bit of attention. In a report for the Urban Institute, Roman argued that whites were more likely to successfully utilize a SYG defense than were blacks.³¹ In particular, Roman argued, white-on-black homicides were more likely to be ruled justified than were black-on-white homicides, and this disparity became more pronounced after a state became a SYG state.³² In Roman's report for the Urban

²⁹ Appendix A, "Firearms-Related, Intra-and Inter-Racial Homicides Involving Black and White Individuals (Single Victim/Single Offender Incidents, 2001-2010)," from Written Statement of William Krouse, at 12.

³⁰ Appendix A, "Firearms-Related, Intra- and Inter-Racial Justifiable Homicides Involving Black and White Individuals (Single Defender/Single Assailant Incidents, 2001-2010)," from Written Statement of William Krouse, at 13.

³¹ John K. Roman, Race, Justifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws: Analysis of FBI Supplementary Homicide Data, July 2013, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23856/412873-Race-Justifiable-Homicide-and-Stand-Your-Ground-Laws.PDF.

³² Transcript 2 at 25-26.

Institute, he found that of all justified homicides from 2005-2010 (that were included in the FBI's Uniform Crime Statistics Supplementary Homicide Reports):

Overall, 2.57 percent of homicides in the six-year period were ruled justified (1,365 out of 53,019). White-on-black homicides were most likely to be ruled justified (11.4 percent), and black-on-white homicides were least likely to be ruled justified (1.2 percent). Whether a state was an SYG state also affects the likelihood of a homicide being ruled justified.³³

If you examine shootings that share the salient characteristics of the Martin-Zimmerman shooting, the statistics look different. Roman wrote in his report for the Urban Institute that in shootings where there is a single victim and a single shooter, they are strangers, both are male, and the defendant is older than the assailant, 41.14 percent of white on black homicides are ruled justified in non-SYG states, and 44.71 percent of white on black homicides are ruled justified in SYG states. When you have the same incident characteristics, except that the assailant is white and the defendant is black, 7.69 percent of homicides were determined to be justified in non-SYG states, and 9.94 percent in SYG states.³⁴

It is worth noting that according to Roman's research, the only time a self-defense claim was less likely to succeed in a SYG state than a non-SYG state was when there was a black assailant and a black victim.³⁵ In fact, a greater percentage of black-on-white homicides were deemed justified in SYG states (11.10 percent) than were black-on-black homicides (9.94 percent). This would seem to cut against the claim that law enforcement is hopelessly explicitly or implicitly biased against blacks and in favor of whites in SYG states.

Furthermore, John Lott pointed out at the Commission briefing that Roman's analysis actually indicates the opposite of what he claimed – SYG states actually have a smaller disparity between whether a white-on-black homicide will be found justified rather than a black-on-white homicide. Lott testified:

If you look at Table III of his reports, what he has is, he has a column for the rate of justifiable homicides for black-on-white, white-on-black, for non-Stand Your Ground States, and for Stand Your Ground states. If you look at the coefficients for the non-Stand Your Ground states essentially, when a white kills a black he has a coefficient of like 41, and the coefficient of 7 for blacks killing whites. So it's a

³³ John K. Roman, Race, Justifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws: Analysis of FBI Supplementary Homicide Data, July 2013, at 6, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23856/412873-Race-Justifiable-Homicide-and-Stand-Your-Ground-Laws.PDF.

³⁴ John K. Roman, Race, Justifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws: Analysis of FBI Supplementary Homicide Data, July 2013, at Table 3, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23856/412873-Race-Justifiable-Homicide-and-Stand-Your-Ground-Laws.PDF.

ratio of about 5.4 to 1. So it's saying whites who kill blacks are 5.4 times more likely to be found justified in terms of the homicides than blacks.

But then if you look at the Stand Your Ground states the ratio of the coefficients actually falls to 4. So rather than exacerbating it, he simply doesn't – didn't read his coefficients correctly.

And so – also when he talks about 10 to 1, his regressions actually show 4 to 1 difference for Stand Your Ground rather than the 10 to 1 that he was saying. And the problem that you have there is that when you bring up the type of things that Commissioner – a commissioner earlier asking him about the 3 to 1 differences just in terms of whether the person was armed. You pretty much can explain away the differences even just for one of the factors that are there. . . .

So his results actually showed the opposite of what he was claiming. Rather than the Stand Your Ground laws exacerbating it, it actually reduces the difference in the coefficient between black and white that are there.³⁶[emphasis added]

Lott presented his own research at the briefing using cases from the Tampa Bay Times' database of Florida Stand Your Ground cases. He responded to the Tampa Bay Times' [remember that Lott and others consistently referred to the paper as the "Tampa Bay Tribune," but the correct name is the "Tampa Bay Times"] finding that "67 percent of those who killed a black person faced no penalty compared to 57 percent of those who killed a white."³⁷ Lott wrote:

Just because two people are charged with murder doesn't mean the two cases are identical. In particular, black and white victims are usually killed by their own race. **The Tribune data shows that seventy-six percent of blacks who were killed in cases where Stand Your Ground was invoked as a defense were killed by other blacks.** Similarly, the vast majority of those who killed whites were white, though that isn't true for Hispanics.

Again, since most blacks are killed by other blacks, that also means that blacks who claim self-defense under the Stand Your Ground law are convicted at a lower rate than are whites. About 69 percent of blacks who raised the Stand Your Ground defense were not convicted compared to 62 percent for whites. Interestingly, Hispanics who raise the Stand Your Ground defense are successful the most often – 78 percent of the time.

If blacks are supposedly being discriminated against because their killers so often are not facing any penalty, wouldn't it also follow that blacks are being discriminated in favor of when blacks who claim self-defense under the Stand Your

³⁶ Transcript 3 at 57-58.

³⁷ John R. Lott, Jr., Written Statement, at 4. In analyzing the Tampa Times data, Lott found that in Stand Your Ground cases where a black person was killed, 76.3% of the killers were black, 18.4% were white, and 5.3% were Hispanic. In Stand Your Ground cases where a white person was killed, 11.9% of the killers were black, 80.6% were white, and 7.5% were Hispanic. In Stand Your Ground cases where a Hispanic person was killed, 22.2% of the killers were black, 55.6% were white, and 22.2% were Hispanic.

Ground law are convicted at a lower rate than are whites? If this is indeed a measure of discrimination, rather than merely reflecting something different about these particular cases, why are conviction rates so low for Hispanics who raise the Stand Your Ground defense? The figures used to support claims of racism are cherrypicked from the data.

There were also other important differences across the cases not reflected by the simply averages. Using the Tribune data, blacks killed in these Stand Your Ground confrontations were 26 percentage points more likely to be armed with a gun than whites who were killed. This strongly suggests that their killers reasonably believed they had little choice to kill their attackers. By a 42 to 17 percent margin, the blacks killed were also more often in the process of committing a robbery, home invasion, or burglary. Further, it is much more likely that there is both a witness and physical evidence around when a white person was killed (by a 51 to 38 percent margin). [emphasis added]³⁸

Stand Your Ground and Criminal Records

Panelist David Labahn stated that individuals with arrest records³⁹ successfully invoke Stand Your Ground legislation. As I discussed above, an arrest is not the same as a conviction and should not prohibit you from losing important rights. Furthermore, simply because you have engaged in criminal activity in the past does not mean you are engaging in criminal activity now. A person who has a criminal record may be more likely to live in a poorer area that has higher crime rates, and thus be more likely to need to engage in self-defense.

Even if you have a criminal conviction, you do not lose the right to defend your life, even if you are generally prohibited from possessing a firearm.⁴⁰ For example, a felon in possession of a firearm (at least in Florida, this seems to be a common offense that bars individuals from invoking

People v. Rhodes, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 226, 232, 233 (Cal.Ct. App.4th 2005).

³⁸ John R. Lott, Jr., Written Statement, at 4-5.

³⁹ Transcript 3 at 25 ("A recent study concluded that the majority of defendants shielded by stand your ground laws had arrest records prior to the homicide at issue.").

⁴⁰ See People v. King, 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 (Cal. 1978).

We conclude, therefore, that the prohibition of section 12021 [forbidding felons from possessing concealable firearms] was not intended to affect a felon's right to use a concealable firearm in self-defense, but was intended only to prohibit members of the affected classes from arming themselves with concealable firearms or having such weapon s in their custody or control in circumstances other than those in which the right to use deadly force in self-defense exists or reasonably appears to exist.

[[]A]lthough Rhodes was a convicted felon, he had the right to defend himself, stand his ground, and use the amount of force reasonable under the circumstances.... The cumulative effect of these misdeeds [misstatements of law by prosecutor and erroneous jury instructions] was to impose upon Rhodes the duty to retreat when there was no such duty.

Stand Your Ground⁴¹), should not be punished for defending his life solely because of the other offense.⁴² The authorities can separately prosecute him for the firearms offenses, if need be.

Aaron A. Little seeks certiorari review of the circuit court's order denying his motion to dismiss the criminal charge of second-degree murder with a firearm. Little argued that he shot the victim in self-defense and was entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution under section 776.032(1), Florida Statutes (2009), which is part of what is commonly known as the "Stand Your Ground" law. . . . We agree with Little that his use of deadly force was justified under the circumstances. We also reject the State's alternative argument that Little was not entitled to immunity under the Stand Your Ground law because he was engaged in an unlawful activity at the time he used the deadly force. We therefore grant Little's petition for writ of prohibition.

I. Facts

The incident in question occurred when Little was walking to his girlfriend's house with his friend, Rashad Matthews. The two men happened upon Matthews' friend, Terry Lester, who was standing in the driveway of his mother's home. Lester was leaning into the driver's door of a vehicle parked in the driveway when Matthews approached and engaged Lester in conversation. Little, who was a stranger to Lester, initially waited for Matthews by the street.

After a few minutes, Little started walking toward the two men. When Little reached the driver's side of the car, Demond Brooks jumped out of the back seat. Little knew Brooks, but the two were not friends. Without warning, Brooks pulled two handguns from his waistband, pointed them at Little, and yelled that he was "going to make it rain." Little believed Brooks was threatening to shoot him, so he ran behind Lester and asked Lester to intervene, or to "get" Brooks. Lester tried to calm Brooks down to no avail.

Lester's mother, Janet Speed, heard the commotion from inside the house and came to the open front door for a moment. Little used the distraction as an opportunity to obtain shelter and ran into the house. Brooks followed Little but stopped on the second of the three front porch steps. From there, Brooks held his guns down by his sides and yelled through the open door for Little to come outside. Little pressed his back up against the wall, pulled a handgun out of his pants pocket, and held it down by his side. He called to Ms. Speed to "get" Brooks.

Ms. Speed had not seen Little arm himself. Ms. Speed was alerted to the gun by her daughter-in-law, Kimberly, who was also in the room. Little, who was visibly afraid, tried to explain that he was holding the gun because Brooks was threatening to shoot him from outside. Ms. Speed did not want a gun in her house and responded by telling Little to leave. But Brooks was still on the porch step yelling for Little to come outside. Little told Ms. Speed, "I ain't going out there," and said something about both men having their "fire." Ms. Speed called for her son Lester.


Lester then came into the house and ordered Little out. Little begged for Lester to stop Brooks, but Lester offered no help. In fact, Lester appeared to think the situation was funny because he had been laughing with Brooks as he passed him on his way inside the house.

Seeing no backdoor exit, Little reluctantly exited the house through the front door. Brooks backed up to let Little pass, but Brooks still had his guns down by his sides. Little proceeded cautiously, turning sideways to stay facing Brooks and keeping his gun hidden behind his back. When Little reached the yard, Brooks walked toward him and said something like, "[D]o you know what he did to me?" Little told Brooks to calm down and backed away. Brooks did not take action until Little backed into the car parked in the driveway. Then Brooks raised his guns and pointed them at Little. Little brought his gun around, closed his eyes, and pulled the trigger several times. Brooks dropped to the ground and eventually succumbed to his gunshot wounds. Little fled to his girlfriend's house.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Little v. State, 111 So.3d 214, 216 (Dist.Ct.App.Fla., 2d Dist. 2014); Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So.3d 803 (Dist.Ct.App.Fla., 2d Dist. 2016); Garrett v. State, 148 So.3d 466 (Dist.Ct.App.Fla, 1st Dist. 2014).


⁴² Little v. State, 111 So.3d 214, 216 (Dist.Ct.App.Fla., 2d Dist. 2014).

Firearms-Related, Intra- and Inter-Racial Homicides Involving Black and White Individuals (Single Victim/Single Offender Incidents, 2001-2010)



Source: FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports

Firearms-Related, Intra- and Inter-Racial Justifiable Homicides Involving Black and White Individuals (Single Defender/Single Assailant Incidents, 2001-2010)



Source: FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports

STAND YOUR GROUND PUBLIC BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT (OCT. 17, 2014)

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS BRIEFING ON STAND YOUR GROUND. Place: The Rosen Hotel 9700 International Drive Orlando, Florida 32819 9:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. Date: October 17, 2014 Reported by: Kathy Wescott, CSR (Volume I, pages 1 through 108, a.m. session, Panel Number 1)

Ţ	
2	
3	Present:
4	Commissioner Michael Yaki
5	Commissioner Roberta Achtenberg
6	Marlene Sallo
7	Commissioner Marty Castro (Chairman)
8	Commissioner Karen K. Narasaki
9	Commissioner Patricia Timmons-Goodson
10	Commissioner Gail L. Heriot
11	
12	Appearing by phone:
13	Commissioner David Kladney
14	Commissioner Peter Kirsanow
15	
16	Panel Number 1:
17	Senator Chris Smith
18	Representative Todd Rutherford
19	Mr. Ahmad Nabil Abuznaid
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	3
2	CHAIRMAN CASTRO: I'm calling the
3	meeting to order. I'm Marty Castro, Chair of the
4	U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. And I want to
5	welcome everyone this morning to our briefing on
6	racial disparities and the stand your ground laws.
7	It is currently 9:06 a.m. on
8	October 17, 2014. I am joined today by
9	Commissioners Achtenberg, Commissioner Narasaki,
10	Commissioner Timmons-Goodson, Commissioner Yaki,
11	and Commission Heriot. Commissioner Kladney and
12	Commissioner Kirsanow will join us by phone.
13	The purpose of this briefing is to
14	determine whether there is a possible racial bias
15	in the assertion, investigation, or enforcement of
16	justifiable homicide laws in states with stand
17	your ground provisions.
18	Experts at this briefing will present
19	testimony on the personal impact of the laws,
20	findings from their research, especially those
21	research pieces regarding the racial dimensions of
22	justifiable homicides and elaborate upon actions
23	that are being taken by advocacy groups to
24	alleviate concerns related to stand your ground
25	laws.

1 4 Now stand your ground laws, some of us 2 3 are part of a larger issue. We see what happened here in Florida. Other states obviously have 4 similar situations. We see what's happened in 5 Ferguson. Names like Trayvon Martin, Jordan 6 7 Davis, these are now part of the national fabric 8 of conversation about race and the impact about 9 race. 10 Whether laws are biased, implicitly 11 biased, explicitly biased. Those sorts of 12 questions must be answered not by anecdote, or 13 example, but by concrete research. 14 And it is our hope that the work that 15 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is doing on 16 this topic will present concrete statistical information, much of which is lacking in this area 17 right now. To allow us to critically look at the 18 19 true impact of these laws. 20 Today we're going to hear from folks 21 from different perspectives and different points 22 of view. Our job here at the U.S. Commission on 23 Civil Rights is to shine our historic light on 24 these issues and separate the wheat from the chaff 25 of what is being said and what is being produced

1 5 on these topics, and present to the President and 2 3 Congress and the people of the United States our opinion based on over 50 years of advocacy and 4 being a watchdog on civil rights as to what we 5 believe to be the impact of these laws on minority 6 individuals and minority communities. 7 8 I want to thank Commissioner Yaki for 9 his opportunity to bring this forward to us. I 10 will ask him to make a very brief statement and 11 then I will introduce the members of the panel and 12 we'll begin our briefing. 13 Commissioner Yaki. 14 COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you very much, 15 Mr. Chair, and thank everyone who is here today. 16 I called for this investigation. And 17 today while it's just a briefing it's part of a broader -- broader discussion and broader analysis 18 19 by the commission. 20 This investigation is by -- today will 21 help the investigation. It is by no means an end, 22 but just a beginning of the analysis that will be 23 conducted by our staff. I did so because a year 24 and a half -- about two years ago I actually 25 started calling for this investigation, and it

1	e	6
2	wasn't until last year that the commission had the	
3	resources and the personnel in order to start this	
4	down this path.	
5	I did so because I'm troubled by stand	
6	your ground laws. I'm troubled by the fact that	
7	we have to have discussions about the deaths of	
8	African American men like Trayvon Martin and	
9	Jordan Davis. I'm troubled by conclusions and	
10	statistics showing racial disparity in the	
11	research of people like John Roman.	
12	I'm troubled by the expansion of a	
13	common law doctrine that now allows people not	
14	only to defend themselves in their home, but	
15	converts it into a "shoot first" anywhere policy.	
16	And I'm troubled by the fact that despite its	
17	claims homicides seem to increase rather than	
18	decrease in states with stand your ground laws.	
19	And I'm especially, as a member of the	
20	U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, deeply troubled	
21	by the fact that here we are in the 21st century	
22	and we are here to try to understand and study the	
23	implications, extent, and effect of bias,	
24	unconscious, implicit bias and its impact on laws	
25	like stand your ground. I hope today and in the	

1	7
2	days ahead that we will get evidence and hear data
3	and collect information that can help policy
4	makers, lawyers, judges, and others understand
5	better these laws and their impact on our society.
6	And I want to thank again everyone here
7	today. And I want to extend a special thanks to
8	our staff director, Marlene Sallo, for working so
9	diligently and hard on this matter with me. And,
10	again, I appreciate everything that she's done.
11	Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
12	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,
13	Commissioner Yaki.
14	So now on to some housekeeping matters.
15	So today's briefing is going to consist of a
16	number of panels. Our first is going to be made
17	up of all total of 16 distinguished speakers.
18	The first panel is going to consist of legislators
19	and advocates.
20	Panel two will consist of statistics
21	behind the stand your ground laws. And a guest
22	advocate speaker that will give us a real life
23	perspective on the consequences of the
24	implementation of stand your ground laws.
25	And ultimately panel three, with

8 1 scholars giving us their perspective on this 2 3 important topic. Now during the briefing each panelist 4 will have eight minutes to speak. After all of 5 the panelists have made their presentations 6 7 commissioners will then have an opportunity to ask 8 questions of them. There will be an allotted time 9 period for that to occur. 10 As I have in the past I will fairly 11 recognize commissioners who wish to speak. Those 12 commissions who were unable to get here that are 13 on the phone, you'll have to designate -- shout 14 out your name and let me know that you want to 15 speak. Otherwise, the commissioners present just 16 raise your hand and I will keep a list of who will 17 be next. So we also want everyone to adhere 18 19 strictly to their time allotments so that we all 20 have an opportunity to engage in the conversation 21 on this important topic. 22 You panelists will notice there's a 23 series of warning lights that have been set up. 24 When the light turns from green to yellow that 25 means you've got two minutes remaining. When the

9 1 2 light turns red I ask you to wrap up your З statements. And just be mindful of other panelists' times so we don't take away from 4 anyone. I certainly don't want to cutoff anyone 5 mid-sentence. 6 Again, I ask my fellow commissioners to 7 8 be considerate of the panelists and one another 9 and try to keep our questions and comments 10 concise. I know there will be followups and I 11 will allow that to a point, but we want to have 12 everyone have the opportunity to ask questions. 13 Once we do all this I think that we will 14 have the data that we need. So what I'd like to 15 do is first proceed with the panel that is before us now, our first panel. I will introduce you to 16 17 the panelists and I will swear you in. Our first panelist this morning is 18 19 Chris Smith, Florida State Senator representing 20 the 31st State Senate District. 21 Our second panelist is Todd Rutherford, 22 Minority Leader for the South Carolina State 23 House. Representing South Carolina's 71st House 24 District. 25 And let's see. Our third panelist is

1		10
2	Ahmad Nabil Abuznaid a Legal and Policy Director	
3	for Dream Defenders.	
4	And for the first panel we were to have	
5	Lucia McBath, the mother of Jordan Davis.	
6	Unfortunately, she won't be able to join us today.	
7	She sends her sincere apologies and asks that her	
8	previously submitted statement be accepted for the	
9	record in lieu of her testimony, which we will do.	
10	So I will now ask the panelists to swear	
11	and affirm that the information that you're about	
12	to provide us as true is true and accurate to	
13	the best of your knowledge and belief. Is that	
14	correct?	
15	SENATOR CHRIS SMITH: Yes.	
16	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Yes.	
17	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: Yes.	
18	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you.	
19	Senator Smith, please proceed.	
20	SENATOR CHRIS SMITH: Thank you. And I	
21	want to first welcome you to the sunshine state of	
22	Florida. I appreciate you coming down here and	
23	having this very important grownup discussion	
24	about stand your ground. And I especially as a	
25	legislator who deals with the budget really	

1 11 2 appreciate you coming to Florida. 3 My district is the 31st Senate District which is Broward County, which is Fort Lauderdale, 4 about three hours south of here. Which is home of 5 a lot of good shopping so after this feel free to 6 trek down I-95. 7 8 I'll begin my remarks. In 2005 Florida 9 passed the first stand your ground law becoming in 10 the process the national pioneer for all 11 subsequent tragedies and unintended consequences 12 that have followed. We have seen the law used by 13 aggressors as a license to kill by allowing anyone 14 to escalate minor disputes into a deadly incident. 15 Anyone to provoke a confrontation and then seek 16 immunity under stand your ground, an escape hatch 17 of fear of imminent bodily harm or death. While these provocations can occur anywhere at any time, 18 19 aside from the most notorious cases, namely, the 20 Trayvon Martin case and the Jordan Davis case. Other less well known cases and 21 22 incidents have occurred outside of family 23 restaurants, bars, house parties, public parks, 24 and as a result of road rage confrontations. 25 Within weeks of the national uproar over

1	
2	the killing of Trayvon Martin in 2012 I convened a
3	task force of prosecutors, defense attorneys, law
4	enforcement personnel, and scholars to review the
5	law and make recommendations for legislative
6	changes.
7	My task force issued a report and
8	recommendations in May of 2012. Among the things
9	my task force recommended were education of the
10	public and law enforcement officers on the stand
11	your ground law.
12	Two, creation of a system to track
13	self-defense claims in Florida so we could
14	identify any desperate (phonetic) treatment.
15	Three, allowing police to fully
16	investigate all killings by detaining suspects,
17	even when they claim stand your ground immunity.
18	Four, defining the term "unlawful
19	activity" and clarification of the role of
20	provocation, thus allowing the law exactly when
21	people are aggressors such as that they should
22	not when people are aggressors they should not
23	be able to hide behind stand your ground after
24	taking a life.
25	The Governor of Florida convened a task

1	1
2	force and they also recommended that the
3	legislature examine the term "unlawful activity"
4	as to give guidance to court's on the proper
5	application of the law with the intent to protect
6	innocent persons.
7	The Governor's task force also agreed
8	with my recommendations to educate law enforcement
9	agencies, prosecutors, and judiciary on
10	self-defense laws and to review the standards
11	regulating neighborhood watch associations.
12	Despite the recommendations by my task
13	force and the governor the legislature only looked
14	at two of the recommendations, removal of immunity
15	from injuries and deaths of an innocent third
16	party. And review of 10/20 life, minimum
17	mandatory in a narrow scope of cases involving
18	stand your ground.
19	At this time the state still refuses to
20	compile a comprehensive database of cases.
21	Luckily, the Tampa Bay Times, the Urban Institute,
22	and the American Bar Association and others have,
23	and data shows disturbing disparity involving the
24	impact of this law which remains bewildering to
25	law enforcement, confusing to prosecutors, and

1	
2	misapplied by courts.
3	I noticed on your agenda that you have
4	persons discussing the statistics and so I will
5	not go through those statistics.
6	Just to recap that the overwhelming
7	statistics show that it's the race of the victim
8	which is most dispositive of the outcome of the
9	cases. When the victim is black there are huge
10	statistics showing that you're more likely to
11	proceed with a stand your ground defense.
12	This year I filed a bill, a bipartisan
13	bill, which did four of the things in which I
14	discussed. It clarified the definition of
15	aggressor, and made clear that people who start
16	fights and chase victims down cannot later claim
17	immunity or self-defense under stand your ground.
18	It provided guidance to judges and
19	jury's about the legislative intent of the law.
20	And it placed guidelines on neighborhood watch
21	programs and allowed innocent bystanders to file
22	lawsuits to recover injuries.
23	Even though the bill passed two
24	committees it was later blocked from the Senate
25	floor.

1 Still I provided the legislature with 2 3 yet another opportunity to right the wrongs of this law. I proposed a simple, common sense 4 amendment to a bill being considered on the floor 5 of the Senate. My amendment would have specified 6 the how, when, and by whom of using the statutes' 7 8 defense. 9 It would have defined aggressor. 10 Stopped those who start and bring themselves to a 11 deadly fight from hiding behind the law's 12 protections. It would have simply added a 13 bipartisan statement of legislative intent which 14 would finally give notice to the public and 15 guidance to judges and juries about what the 16 legislature meant to achieve with stand your 17 ground statute. My amendment would have clarified that 18 19 justification and immunity protections in the 20 statute were not meant to show aggressors, 21 vigilantes, and others -- and condoned other acts 22 of revenge. Yet, the Senate rejected these 23 concepts. My amendment was rejected along party 24 line votes with the majority party prevailing. 25 Over and over some legislators have

1 2 disingenuously said that this -- that that tragic 3 outcome was not the intent when we passed stand your ground. But that is cold comfort to anyone 4 who has lost a family member to a senseless 5 violence inspired in part by perpetrators belief 6 7 that this law gives them absolute right to take a 8 life and provide them immunity after doing it. 9 Adding insult to injury, when given the 10 opportunity to clarify, clearly outline and 11 statute, what exactly they meant when they passed 12 the statute, some of my colleagues turned their backs on the opportunity, and in doing so turned 13 14 their backs on many youth who tend to be victims 15 of this egregious abuse of the immunities and 16 defenses contained in the current law. Even the -- notably, the one thing that 17 the legislature did do this session was to expand 18 19 stand your ground. Cynically invoking the case of 20 Marissa Alexander to justify broadening the flawed 21 law. Purportedly the purpose of the new expanded 22 language was to help protect a person who fires a 23 warning shot in circumstances where they would be 24 free to use stand your ground to injure or kill

someone. It provides that such a person cannot be

25

prosecuted.

1

2

3 However, the new language goes further and does much more. It allows stand your ground 4 claimants to have their records expunged if their 5 charges are later dropped or they prevail in 6 court. This will make it virtually impossible for 7 8 the public to effectively track these incidents 9 and thereby use the data to demonstrate desperate 10 (phonetic) impact of the law. 11 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you, 12 Senator, appreciate your presentation. 13 Representative Rutherford, you can have 14 the floor. 15 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Thank you 16 and good morning. And thank you for inviting me. 17 And I apologize that I seem to have lost my tie in transit, didn't realize it until this morning when 18 19 I was coming over. 20 And I do want to state first and 21 foremost that while I am one of the legislator's 22 that voted for the stand your ground law in South

Carolina and continue to be one of its proponents
I am interested in the conversation and the dialog
this morning as to whether any changes can be made

to make it any better.

1

2

3 In South Carolina I do believe that it will remain the law of the land, that it is not 4 going anywhere any time soon. And as a lawyer I 5 have used stand your ground successfully in one 6 7 case and have another hearing coming up in 8 November. And recently used it this week in 9 another case. And have not seen the data to 10 suggest that there's a disparate impact on African 11 Americans, although I am very interested in 12 Senator Smith's data and how we can look at that 13 and make sure that that is not going on.

I will not remain a proponent of a law
that clearly has a disparate impact on African
Americans, although it has not been shown to me
that that is the case currently in South Carolina.

The last case that I tried was the State 18 19 of South Carolina versus Shannon Scott. It deals 20 with one of the instances that Senator Smith 21 brought about. My client was charged with -- when 22 he was at home he received a phone call from his 23 daughter who was being chased home from a 24 nightclub by some female thugs. They chased her 25 all the way to her house. He had his daughter

1 2 pull in the backyard. When he did the female 3 thugs out front fired a warning shot. They turned around at the end of the street, cut off their 4 headlights and as they were approaching his house, 5 again he requested that they please stop. 6 Не fired a shot. And that shot hit a second car that 7 8 was following the female thugs and killed a 15 9 year old individual in that car. 10 My client was charged with murder for 11 the death of the 15 year old child. It was a 12 senseless tragedy that never should have happened. 13 But one that could have been prevented, (A) by the 14 female thugs never following his daughter home. 15 And (B) by the police arresting the female thugs 16 and charging them with felony murder as would be allowed in South Carolina. No clue why that did 17 not happen and on the stand the police, when 18 19 confronted with why they did not arrest them said, 20 "I don't know." 21 And so an innocent person shot, clearly 22 the wrong person shot. But my client Shannon 23 Scott simply defending his home, his castle, and 24 his family who were cowering on the floor in the

25 kitchen trying not to get shot.

1 2 The one this week was an individual who 3 was at home and some people tried to do a home invasion on his house. Beating on his door with a 4 sledgehammer. They beat on it three different 5 times as confirmed by witnesses across the street. 6 7 He opened the door, did not realize that someone 8 had tried to get in until he saw the marks on the 9 door. He then went to leave his apartment. In 10 doing so he was confronted by an individual with a 11 gun. The other gentleman with the sledgehammer, 12 who he thought had a gun, the individual pointed a gun at him, my client exited his vehicle, fired 13 14 several shots, one of whom hit the gentleman with 15 the sledgehammer. He was not prosecuted. Is 16 going to do a statement to the police and will receive immunity under the stand your ground law 17 18 for that case. 19 The next one in November is an 18 year 20 old -- ah, he's a 17 year old child at the time, 21 was at a restaurant, fast food place, after a 22 basketball game. He -- it was a -- because it was 23 a basketball game with rival teams there was --24 there were several words being thrown back and

forth in the restaurant. My client leaves the

25

1 2 restaurant, goes and gets in his vehicle and as he 3 is leaving the restaurant is approached by another kid -- because these are 17 year olds -- who comes 4 up to his window, and the allegation is that the 5 victim in this case, or the person who was 6 7 stabbed, reached in the window and tried to grab 8 my client. And certainly put him in fear for his 9 life. My client reached out the window with his 10 knife -- the knife that his grandfather had given 11 him -- and he stabbed him one time, cut off the 12 bottom of his heart, and the victim died within 13 the next five minutes.

Tragic cases in every single instance. 14 15 But, cases that in South Carolina would have left 16 an African American male charged with a murder charge that they would probably not be able to 17 defend financially. That would have left them in 18 19 jail in South Carolina typically for a year, two 20 years before they would have ever gone to trial. 21 And having the ability to use the self-defense 22 case law, South Carolina does not have a 23 self-defense statute prior to stand your ground so 24 you would have had to have relied on case law, 25 which suggests that you must retreat. That you

1 22 cannot elevate the use of force. Which in most 2 3 instances is troubling in and of itself, but certainly in these cases, it would have led to the 4 most recent client, the child -- the basketball 5 game, because he used a knife on someone who was 6 unarmed, not able to avail himself of the 7 8 self-defense law. 9 It has been my opinion since I saw the 10 -- the proposal for stand your ground that the old 11 law, the old case law as it related to 12 self-defense was outdated. That people should not have to live in fear. That you should not have to 13 measure your use of force by that which is being 14 15 used against you. That it was archaic and that it 16 continues to be. I am troubled by the fact that someone 17 could act as a vigilante. But I do believe that 18 19 the courts, at least in South Carolina thus far 20 have rooted those cases out. Am troubled by the fact that someone could be a wrongdoer and claim 21 22 that he was lawfully someplace where he should not have been. 23 24 That case came up in South Carolina. Α 25 gentleman that was in the middle of a home

1	
2	invasion tried to claim that he was forced to do
3	the home invasion. And when he shot the homeowner
4	that he deserved immunity under stand your ground.
5	The judge laughed at it. Sent it up to the
6	Supreme Court and the Supreme Court tossed it out.
7	I am told by a number of lawyers who
8	have not given me permission to use their clients
9	names or their fact scenarios, but that there are
10	several other cases pending in South Carolina with
11	African American defendants who shot white
12	individuals who were the wrongdoers who are
13	seeking to claim stand your ground as an immunity
14	defense, but have not been able to do so because
15	they simply cannot get a hearing. It is the
16	evidence that I have seen in South Carolina, the
17	anecdotal evidence has been that it is more used
18	by African American defendants than it is by white
19	defendants.
20	I can tell you that I watch the news as
21	everyone else and I am concerned about the Trayvon
22	Martin case, about all of the cases in Florida
23	that seem to be going in the wrong direction. But
24	I don't know that I've seen one where the stand
25	your ground law was used successfully and used in

1		24
2	an immunity hearing in such a way as to create a	
3	disparate impact.	
4	I welcome that data. And as you all,	
5	once I get that data if there is a change that can	
6	be made in the law I'd seek to do it.	
7	Thank you.	
8	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,	
9	Representative Rutherford.	
10	Next we'd like Mr. Abuznaid to present.	
11	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: Thank you.	
12	Thank you to the commission for convening this	
13	initiative. We are extremely excited for the	
14	future results.	
15	I'm here representing the Dream	
16	Defenders, a youth based human rights organization	
17	in Miami, Florida. Our organization was created	
18	in response to the tragic killing of Trayvon	
19	Martin. A national and international dialogue has	
20	been brewing around the harmfulness of stand your	
21	ground laws, also known by many as "shoot first"	
22	laws, and their implications for the right to	
23	life, non-discrimination and equality before the	
24	law. These stand your ground laws have, in a	
25	sense, legalized the devaluing and dehumanizing of	

1 2 minority lives in a very real way. 3 We have recently heard from the members of the United Nations Human Rights Committee that 4 stand your ground laws are incompatible with the 5 right to life. We have also heard great concern 6 from the Inter-American Commission on human rights 7 8 regarding many of these tragedies. It is 9 imperative that the federal government ensures 10 that state and local governments do not promulgate 11 laws that violate rights as fundamental as the 12 right to life and equality before the law. 13 Stand your ground laws amount to state 14 complicity in the perpetuation of violence by its 15 citizens. Furthermore, our society has a long 16 history of racial discrimination and a system that 17 to put it mildly has never been kind to its black and brown minorities. Since we understand that 18 19 the system itself has had to be constantly revised 20 to deal with its inadequacies related to 21 minorities it should come as no shock that a law 22 allowing vigilantes to use fatal force on the 23 streets would disproportionately affect 24 minorities. Obvious history and notions aside,

research has shown that stand your ground laws are

25

dangerous in terms of increasing levels of homicide and are discriminatory in their application as to race and gender.

1

2

3

4

Statistics based on a database compiled 5 by the Tampa Bay Times of SYG cases in Florida 6 7 since the passage of the law show that a defendant 8 who killed a white person was more likely to be 9 convicted of a crime than a defendant who killed a 10 black person. White-on-black homicides are 250 11 percent more likely to be found justified than 12 white-on-white homicides in stand your ground 13 states. This disparity increases to 354 percent 14 in stand your ground states. Moreover, the Urban 15 Institutes Justice Policy Center conducted a study 16 using the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Report for 17 2005 until 2009 and determined that less than 2 percent of homicides are eventually ruled to have 18 19 been committed in self-defense, that number 20 contains a significant split between stand your 21 ground and non-stand your ground states. 22 Women have also been disproportionately

23 impacted by stand your ground, especially those
24 dealing with domestic violence. Florida has been
25 home to the tragic handling of Marissa Alexander's

1 case. In a recent analysis of FBI homicide data 2 3 prepared by the Urban Institute comparing stand your ground and non-stand your ground states and 4 examining the use of stand your ground laws in 5 cases involving women defendants, 13.5 percent of 6 cases where a white woman killed a black man were 7 8 found justified, whereas in contrast only 2.9 9 percent of cases where a black woman killed a 10 white man were found justified. Again, this 11 highlights the disproportionate -- thank you --12 disproportionate role that race plays in 13 justifiable homicides and how that is overlaid in cases involving women defendants. 14 15 The data also revealed that such laws 16 introduce bias against black victims and in favor 17 of white defendants. In cases where the defendant

18 was black and the victim was white, there was 19 little difference between the stand your ground 20 states and other states. However, when the 21 defendant was white and the victim was black 16.85 22 percent of the homicides were ruled justified in 23 stand your ground states and only 9.15 percent in 24 non-stand your ground states.

Even worse, blanket immunity and broad

25

1 2 discretion to law enforcement offered by 3 Florida-type stand your ground laws infringe on victims access to courts and their right to a 4 remedy. The more recent case involving the murder 5 of Jordan Davis and the jury's deadlock on his 6 7 murder -- his murder count exposed just how much 8 confusion stand your law -- stand your ground have 9 introduced into the criminal process. 10 It took a second trial and jury to 11 convict a man of a murder that everyone knew he 12 committed. Why did the jury find trouble with the decision? Stand your ground laws of course, 13 14 because they allow for subjective biases, implicit 15 biases to guide decision making that could later be fortified by law. Sadly, most victims and or 16 their families will never receive justice and 17 worst off they will have to live without their 18 19 loved ones for the rest of their lives all because 20 someone thought they looked suspicious while 21 walking through their father's neighborhood, or 22 they disturbed someone's movie experience while 23 texting the babysitter. As you may know, some of 24 the most high profile tragedies we have witnessed 25 in stand your ground have occurred here in

1 Florida. We have been the first state to enact 2 3 such a law and Florida should be the first state to repeal such a law. The federal government must 4 support such a repeal. The federal government 5 must step in to condition funding to states based 6 on its ability to guarantee equal protection of 7 all of its citizens and elimination of laws that 8 9 hinder their ability to fulfill that duty. 10 On the ground here in Florida groups 11 like the Dream Defenders, Community Justice 12 Project, Power You, and others have been rallying 13 around communities concerned about that very protection of our lives, which stand your ground 14 15 stands in the way of. 16 Unfortunately, the people's call for a 17 repeal has been ignored by the Florida legislature. Not only that, but more legislation 18 19 being sent down the pipelines to gun us down, 20 including a so-called "warning shot" bill whose 21 advocates propelled it forward under the guise of 22 support for Marissa Alexander. But these 23 lawmakers have shown that they don't care about 24 Marissa. They don't care about Trayvon, Jordan or 25 our communities. Florida and other states are

1		30
2	currently looking at laws that would arm	
3	schoolteachers with guns, and I would postulate	
4	that it would not be long before one of our	
5	teachers stands their ground against one of our	
6	kids. We are not safe in our streets, our	
7	neighborhoods, gas stations, movie theaters, and	
8	soon to be schools.	
9	Thank you.	
10	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you. At	
11	this point in time I would like to encourage	
12	commissioners to begin to ask questions. I'll	
13	cede the floor to Commissioner Yaki to begin. And	
14	just identify for me then we'll keep a list.	
15	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you very much,	
16	Mr. Chair. And this goes to all three panelists.	
17	I was struck by the notion of due process, and I	
18	think for, especially Mr. Rutherford who's a	
19	lawyer as well. The issue of due process I think	
20	is very important in stand your ground from a	
21	number of different factors. But especially from	
22	the standpoint of the person who may be the victim	
23	of a stand your ground defense. That person may	
24	be injured, that person may be dead, and not being	
25	able to present his or her side of the story	

1 you've essentially ceded the authority to be 2 3 judge, jury, and for lack of a better word, executioner to the person asserting that. And I 4 guess, the question that I'm asking is, if you 5 were confronted with a statistic, a scientific 6 7 fact, that the research shows that people are more 8 likely to act in a certain way based on 9 unconscious racial stereotypes they may have 10 within them. I mean, I'm not talking about 11 somebody who says, "I'm a racist I hate, you know, 12 blankity, blank, blank, or blank, blank." I'm talking about the studies that show that if you 13 14 give a test to people there's a disparity in how 15 people judge people based on what they look like. It doesn't matter -- it doesn't matter if they 16 claim themselves to be racist or not. But the 17 most current example's the fact that if you show 18 19 -- if you talk about voter I.D. law to a white 20 voter, but if you accompany that image with that 21 of the image of a black person at the voting poll 22 support for a voter I.D. law shoots up well beyond 23 the statistical range. By the same token when you 24 have these tests that test for implicit --25 implicit bias a black person is much more likely

1	
2	to be shot by someone much more than a white
3	person in these tests based on the fact that it's
4	unconscious bias in the system.
5	So I'm just asking when you have a law
6	like stand your ground which has in it essentially
7	a, for lack of a better word, a trigger component
8	in it to say I have to make a decision right here
9	and right now, what am I going to do. And if
10	there's a built in bias against finding for not
11	shooting against a white person and for shooting
12	against a black person how do you reconcile that
13	as a legislator and a policy maker?
14	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD:
15	Commissioner, thank you for that question. And I
16	can tell you that as a black man growing up who
17	grew up in South Carolina I am well aware of
18	implicit bias. And as the lawyer for the
19	gentleman that, most recently in South Carolina,
20	Levar Jones, who was shot by the trooper while
21	simply reaching for his wallet. A trooper who
22	I've known for 10 years. I can tell you that I
23	understand also how implicit bias comes into play.
24	In that particular case Mr. Jones was
25	requested by the trooper to get his I.D., he

1 patted his back pocket, not finding it there he 2 3 turned to go into the car and Trooper Groubert of the South Carolina Highway Patrol shot at him four 4 times hitting him once in the hip. 5 The most troubling part was Trooper 6 Groubert's statement afterwards where he defined 7 8 or tried to define Mr. Jones as being an 9 aggressor. That he aggressively went into his 10 car. That he aggressively went into his case. 11 That he aggressively approached him. That he 12 aggressively -- none of which was indicated on the 13 video, but all of which, absent the video would have been enough to clear Trooper Groubert. 14 15 Troubling because I still see members of 16 the South Carolina Highway Patrol when I go to 17 court who talk about race and that Trooper Groubert is not a racist. And they missed the 18 19 point that he would not have done that if it were 20 not a black male, who looked unlike Trooper 21 Groubert. Who did something that Trooper 22 Groubert, in his mind, may have believed to be 23 aggressive. Because he was simply following his 24 commands. 25 I, like, Attorney General Holder was

1 2 walking in Georgetown when I was in college and a 3 cop walked up to me and placed his baton in my chest and told me to cross the street. I said, 4 "Why?" And he hit me again with the baton and 5 told me to cross the street. And I crossed the 6 street. This was in 1989, this is not the '60s. 7 8 I am well aware of the bias that goes 9 on, but I also see the bias in the judicial 10 system. I've listened to the statistics that are 11 given and well aware that a white defendant in a 12 stand your ground case may have a better ability 13 to hire a lawyer to assert his stand your ground 14 rights than an African American defendant, that as 15 my client this week with the stand your ground 16 hearing he was able financially to bring me to the scene to talk to law enforcement at the scene to 17 detail for them how this happened. And to mention 18 19 stand your ground to law enforcement before an 20 arrest was ever made. And I know that implicit 21 bias and racism run rampant throughout the 22 judicial system, especially in South Carolina. 23 It cannot be taken out of the system in 24 one fell swoop. And to suggest that by myself or 25 any other proponent of stand your ground is simply

1 ridiculous. I would be curious to know in --2 3 within the statistics how much racism as a whole played into the impact in the end. And that means 4 that the law enforcement officer didn't care that 5 stand your ground laws existed. There was a black 6 7 person with a gun and a dead white person and he 8 was simply going to arrest them anyway and ignore 9 stand your ground. Which I have had happen as 10 well. Stand your ground, the way that I intended 11 when I voted for it, the way that I stand behind 12 it as a proponent is meant so that people do not have to live in fear. That you don't have to walk 13 down the street with your children and someone 14 15 intends you harm and you would have to retreat back to the furthest place. You could not elevate 16 force. You could not do any of those things, 17 which to me negate common sense. 18 19 Now in saying that about common sense I 20 again use common sense and apply the fact that

21 racism is rampant in our system and I don't know 22 how to take it out. Implicit bias is rampant in 23 our system and I don't know how to take it out. 24 But in a situation where an individual 25 is using the law and the law as it is currently

1 2 written in my case is, African Americans in some 3 cases, wrongfully used by white Americans, but simply using the law as it is written judges are 4 supposed to determine without the implicit bias, 5 without the built in racisms that are in the 6 7 system, are supposed to determine that someone is 8 immune from prosecution. They are supposed to be 9 the ones that determine reasonableness. If 10 they're not doing their jobs in South Carolina we 11 would look to remove them. But I don't know how 12 to take that out of the system without taking out 13 the ability of other persons to defend themselves. 14 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Senator Smith. 15 SENATOR SMITH: If I can -- two points. 16 When you talked about due process, looking at the 17 Florida law, I haven't looked at the South Carolina law, due process also involves the 18 19 officer on the scene. The Florida law is so 20 ambiguous that it's not a judge making the 21 determination it's an officer on the scene, 22 because the way the law's written it says, 23 "person cannot be arrested." And in the arrest 24 definition it says, "detained." So the Florida 25 law is so ambiguous that an officer coming up on a

1 2 scene in a park with a dead person and a person 3 holding a gun that says, "I'm invoking stand your ground," realistically that officer cannot detain 4 that person, thus do a full investigation. 5 We saw it play out in the Trayvon Martin case where the 6 officers were confused as to whether we can even 7 8 detain Mr. Zimmerman. 9 And so when you talk about due process 10 that is a major problem in Florida. We're not 11 even getting to judges, we're not getting to 12 jury's. Officers on the scene are told within the law, that we've tried to change, they cannot 13 arrest. An arrest is defined as "detaining" also. 14 15 And secondly I noticed in all of the 16 paperwork and I just heard, one of my pet peeves when discussing stand your ground is when anyone 17 mentioned "retreat" today, remember Florida law 18 19 and I'm unsure of other laws, always had a word 20 that everyone neglects, it said, "safely retreat." Prior to 2005 we had self-defense in 21 22 Florida that's often ignored. The Florida law has 23 always been, you had a duty to safely retreat. 24 There wasn't a "turn and run" portion of the 25 Florida law. It always had "safely retreat,"

1 38 which is ignored. So please, as people discuss 2 3 the Florida law today keep that in mind, prior to 2005 it had the words "safely retreat." It was 4 never a concern of you having to run away from 5 6 someone attacking you in public. MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: 7 If I may add, 8 I think that Senator Smith definitely contributed 9 a couple of very important points, but I also 10 wanted to add that while it's important that 11 people shouldn't have to live in fear, due to 12 stand your ground others have to live in fear now. 13 And also, looking at fear and breaking down fear and finding that a lot of times the fear 14 15 is unfounded with -- Michael Dunn it was 16 because hip hop music was blaring from the car. 17 And Jordan Davis and his friends seemed to be like thugs to Michael Dunn. And, you know, to George 18 19 Zimmerman, Trayvon Martin seemed suspicious 20 because he had an implicit fear of black men in 21 hoodies. 22 And so I think that people should not 23 have to live in fear, however we should navigate 24 that fear a little bit deeper and figure out where 25 it comes from. You know, the fact is that if

1 2 we're going allow for, you know, vigilantes to not 3 be afraid then those of us minorities who are often viewed as threats by society might start 4 being very afraid of walking around our 5 6 neighborhoods. COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Before I give the 7 8 floor to Commissioner Narasaki I actually have a 9 question. Well, we really have been talking about 10 this issue and it is talked about in a black/white 11 binary for the most part. Is there anything each 12 of you might be able to shed light on in terms of the impact on Latino's when the stand your ground 13 laws are used? 14 15 SENATOR SMITH: If I can, Mr. Chair. It's -- in part of my introduction I talked about 16 the lack of statistics. We can only go by what's 17 been reported in say the St. Pete Times and those 18 19 others. That's part of the problem, we don't keep 20 the actual statistics about black, white, and 21 Latino. A lot of times when you're looking at it 22 you can only go by if it was said that "this was a 23 black male," or it doesn't say, "this was a 24 Hispanic male." And so it's hard to really give 25 you a definitive answer and that was part of the

40 1 concern that we have in Florida is actually 2 3 keeping statistics because part of what we proposed is that if an officer comes up on the 4 scene in Hialeah and it's involving a Latino and 5 someone else and that officer determines that it's 6 7 a -- this is a stand your ground case, they could 8 go home. We wanted to make that officer keep 9 actual records that stand your ground, victim, 10 aggressor and perpetrator or however, so that we 11 can -- so that you can come back in 2 or 3 years 12 and discuss that. 13 So as you look at these laws please look 14 at -- it's hard to really answer your question 15 without anecdotally looking at facts because in a 16 lot of these states we don't require officers or judges or prosecutors to keep actual statistics 17 that you can look at empirically in a year or two 18 19 to determine that. 20 MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: I would also 21 like to add that often times, you know, who's 22 categorized as white, Latino, Hispanic, Arab, 23 Muslim, has a great weight in factors. 24 If you look at the Department of 25 Corrections, you'll look down at the list of

1	4
2	inmates, you'll see all types of Muhammad, Ahmad
3	all that and it says "white." So I think
4	sometimes, you know, the way people are labeled
5	has a great deal with our ability to keep these
6	statistics.
7	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: I've not
8	seen that data in South Carolina and certainly
9	would be interested in looking at making judges
10	and law enforcement officers keep that data to see
11	whether there is a disparate impact on Hispanic
12	males as a class.
13	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you.
14	Commissioner Narasaki.
15	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Thank you,
16	Mr. Chair. I want to thank Minority Leader
17	Rutherford for sharing the stories of his clients.
18	It shows how tragic all of these situations are.
19	I have two questions though. One is,
20	does South Carolina law also include like Florida
21	immunity from civil liability? And if so, what
22	should the rights of the family who's lost a loved
23	one who was an innocent bystander in that
24	situation if there is immunity from civil
25	liability because there's more than one victim in

1	
2	that case?
3	And the second is, it sounds like you do
4	support data collection. Would you support the
5	federal government tying funding for federal
6	criminal justice funding to requiring states to
7	set up sufficient reporting systems?
8	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: I'll answer
9	the second question first and say, absolutely.
10	The collection of data is essential to the
11	understanding of any law and its impact. And in
12	these cases especially so because, like I said, in
13	South Carolina I have not seen what I've seen in
14	Florida. I could not stand here as a lawyer, and
15	a proponent of justice, and look at what goes on
16	in Florida and act like it's okay.
17	The first question is and now I'm
18	losing the first question
19	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Civil liability.
20	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Right, yes.
21	South Carolina the stand your ground laws came
22	out of the conservative group that sent the law to
23	South Carolina. We looked at it, we passed it.
24	It mirrors Florida's law. In fact, our case law
25	in South Carolina initially came from Florida as

1 the Supreme Court looked at how to deal with stand 2 3 your ground cases. It not only offered civil liability -- I'm sorry, civil immunity, it also 4 allows for the return of attorney fees if someone 5 is sued after they are found immune from 6 7 prosecution under a stand your ground case. 8 As to the victims and what the victims 9 can do, the problem gets to if you have a 10 situation where someone has truly availed 11 themselves of the stand your ground law, which is 12 difficult to determine. And I say that because if a law enforcement officer comes out to the scene 13 and believes that an individual used self-defense, 14 15 that law enforcement officer's typically an 16 investigator at that level making that determination, not just a line officer, but 17 somebody that has, hopefully, years of experience. 18 19 That person is determining that the 20 individual, the perpetrator in this case because 21 there's a shooting or a stabbing or whatever the 22 -- the -- it's the person that took the life. So 23 I don't want to call them the victim, but the law 24 enforcement officer may consider them to be the 25 victim.

1	
2	That he is determining that they didn't
3	do anything wrong or that they simply acted in
4	self-defense. Your stand your ground is somewhat
5	of an articulation of self-defense.
6	In doing so stand your ground says they
7	are not to be detained, they are not to be
8	arrested. Which some people take well, they're
9	not investigated. I disagree. I think that an
10	investigator should, at least, in South Carolina
11	an investigator would investigate a murder case
12	not just a line officer.
13	That investigator determines that this
14	person used self-defense, that they can articulate
15	that they had a lawful right to be where they
16	were, that they had a reasonable fear for their
17	life, and that they acted on that fear and that
18	belief. The investigator determines that they are
19	clear and he's not going to detain or arrest them.
20	Which, under self-defense he should not have done
21	anyway. But, South Carolina, as I stated before
22	had no self-defense law it was based on case law.
23	So in order for an individual to be cleared in
24	South Carolina they would have to have been
25	charged with murder or charged with whatever the

offense was --

1

2

3 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Yeah, I'm actually, though, I'm not focused on the criminal 4 process I think it's -- I'm focused on the civil 5 liability, which as you well know is a different 6 7 standard. And the question here is, I'm not 8 focusing on whether the person who felt fear, what 9 he did versus the person who was causing the fear. 10 I'm talking about the innocent bystanders who had 11 nothing to do with either side of the equation, 12 who nonetheless lost their lives. So what is the 13 recompense for them? REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: 14 The 15 recompense --16 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: And are you 17 concerned that this stand your ground law could in fact create a huge public safety issue because now 18 19 you're not talking about someone who's close to 20 their home, but you're talking about someone who

21 could be in a crowd wildly shooting. Is that 22 something that you feel comfortable with, and if 23 there's no civil liability do you feel like there 24 might be a tendency for more of that to happen? 25 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: No, ma'am.

And the reason why I say that, where I was going was, because on a lot of these cases those where no one is arrested or detained there's not going to be enough information out there for a civil case.

But nine times out of ten, and I would 7 8 venture to say 99 times out of a 100 for innocent 9 victims, for victims in these cases, there's not 10 going to be any recompense on a civil basis 11 anyway. Rarely could you find insurance to cover 12 a -- someone that was involved in a stand your ground case. And for the innocent victim --13 there's a perfect case on that in South Carolina, 14 15 an individual who is a convicted felon was in an entertainment district, another individual walked 16 17 up and pulled a weapon, clear on video. The second individual pulled his gun, shot at the guy 18 19 that was pulling the gun and hit and paralyzed a 20 University of South Carolina student. The shooter 21 in that case would have been able to avail himself 22 of the stand your ground law because it was clear 23 on video that he was reacting to someone else 24 pulling a gun.

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

He was a convicted felon. He did not

1	
2	have a right to possess a firearm and the federal
3	government gave him 23 years in prison.
4	And so that's how they dealt with that
5	case. But would he have if he had shot, as he
6	did, and paralyzed someone would they be able to
7	sue him, he wouldn't have any assets for them to
8	be able to sue him anyway
9	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Yes, but what
10	we're talking about in your case, your client had
11	a house.
12	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Right. So
13	well, he rented the house and so there was no
14	insurance.
15	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Well, I think,
16	you know, the issue about whether they would have
17	actually had money or not is not the question that
18	I'm asking. The question is, should there be some
19	kind of recognition in the law that something
20	happen to someone who is an innocent bystander?
21	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Thank you.
22	And, yes, to answer that question succinctly, an
23	innocent bystander who is shot can always sue,
24	whether they could ever collect is a different
25	story. Even under this they could sue someone

1	4
2	that was cleared because well, when you say
3	"innocent" it it gets dicey. And the short
4	answer is, "I don't know."
5	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Ah, Representative
6	Senator
7	SENATOR SMITH: If I can, I think you
8	would the Florida law clearly says immunity
9	even from civil liability. So I guess in your
10	scenario or even in your scenario if the person
11	negligently is defending themselves and then just
12	sprays the room or something that in Florida even
13	though they were negligent and just, you know,
14	spraying a room they're immune from civil
15	liability even though they were highly negligent
16	as long as they claim stand your ground. And I
17	think that is a concern. I don't know if your
18	statute is that specific.
19	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: The statute
20	is that specific but I think I don't think you
21	can negligently spray a room. I think if you're
22	spraying a room you're not going to be cleared
23	you should not be cleared under the statute by
24	stand your ground. That's not defending yourself.
25	That's negligently spraying a room.

49 1 And there's a difference -- so if -- if 2 3 someone can show me the case where someone is clearly defending themselves and found immune from 4 prosecution by -- under stand your ground, and 5 should be sued, I'd love to look at it. But you 6 7 can't negligently spray a room and claim stand 8 your ground, that's not the same thing --9 SENATOR SMITH: There is a Miami case in 10 which it happened, a drive-by shooting and a 3 11 year old sitting on her porch, the young man was 12 defending himself under stand your ground, and 13 when he shot at the guys shooting at him he hit a 14 3 year old sitting on her porch. He's immune from 15 civil liability, we're not talking about the 16 criminal case, we're talking about civil 17 liabilities. So her family could not sue that perpetrator even though he's maybe judgment-proof 18 19 because he's broke there still is a civil immunity 20 from going after that person who shot. REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: But as 21 22 tragic as it is that 3 year olds parents should 23 not be suing him they should be suing the people 24 in the car that were shooting at him. That's what 25 stand your ground says. And to take that to its

1 logical conclusion --2 3 SENATOR SMITH: That's what we're talking about --4 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: -- the 5 suggestion is that the individual that was being 6 shot at should, what, get shot? Should not be 7 8 able to defend themselves? The civil liability 9 for that 3 year old, for those parents of that 3 10 year old, goes against the initial people that 11 started the shooting, not against the person that, 12 unfortunately, and tragically, took the life of 13 their 3 year old. So liability would extend not to the person that did the shooting, but to the 14 15 person that caused the shooting to take place. 16 So, yes, the person that did the actual 17 shooting would be immune, but the person that caused the shooting absent a collection, absent 18 19 being able to do so, should be the one that is 20 sued. 21 So they are not blocked from civil 22 liability, the civil liability is taken from the 23 person that is found immune and extended to the 24 person that actually caused this to transpire in

the first place.

25

1 In the case that I just mentioned in the 2 3 entertainment district it would be that they would sue the person that pulled the gun. In the case 4 that I talked about initially where the people 5 were in their home, they would sue the girls in 6 the car, if all of these people are rich, and 7 8 understand that you have to have the ability to 9 pay. 10 But in the 17 year olds case there would 11 be no -- they would have nobody to sue because 12 their child was simply involved in -- and it's a one-on-one situation. But anytime you've got an 13 14 innocent person who was hit, someone not involved 15 in whatever is going on, that person's civil action 16 is against the wrongdoer not the person that is found immune. 17 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Senator, did you 18 19 want to add something it looked like you were --SENATOR SMITH: Well, I guess we're --20 21 I'm a little confused. The wrongdoer even if --22 when I gave the scenario of the person doing the 23 shooting from the car -- and I understand under 24 the Representative's scenario the person who 25 initially -- who initiated it and caused the

1 52 2 incident to happen should be the person liable. 3 But if the person that's actually doing the shooting even though they're defending themselves, 4 if they defend themselves in a negligent manner 5 under the case law they're immune from -- from --6 even in the case of negligence they're immune from 7 8 civil liability. 9 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Yes, sir. 10 And this is where this came up and this is prior 11 to stand your ground. And it came up several 12 times in the case that I tried with the 15 year 13 old deceased victim. If someone robs a store and the store 14 15 owner has a gun and he pulls the gun to defend 16 himself and he accidently hits someone else in the 17 store, do we say that store owners should not have 18 guns to protect themselves? 19 Do we mandate that the police always 20 shoot straight? Do we take guns from police 21 officers who mistakenly hit innocent victims? The 22 answer is, that the wrongdoer, the person that is 23 causing the problem in the first place, is the one 24 that's subjected to civil liability and criminal 25 liability. That's the way that it should go.

1 I understand that under stand your 2 3 ground we have an issue of whether this actually -- whether this person is actually the wrongdoer. 4 And that's the bigger issue. But as it relates to 5 civil liability, the civil liability goes to the 6 7 person that created the wrong in the first place. 8 You can't say that someone negligently 9 shot if the only reason why they shot is because 10 they were being shot at. You can't mandate that 11 -- in the case that I just mentioned with the 12 South Carolina Trooper, at pointblank range he 13 fired at my client 4 times, he hit him once in the 14 hip and just barely on the side. He almost missed 15 him that time too, 4 times, pointblank range. 16 You don't mandate that people shoot 17 straight. You would hope that they would not have to shoot at all. And stand your ground, in my 18 19 opinion, suggests that I have a right to defend 20 myself and I should not fear defending myself that 21 later on someone's going to say, "Well, you should 22 have shot better." And that was actually the 23 testimony from the police officer as to why he 24 arrested my client, he said, "He should have been a better shot." 25

1 54 That's not the law. That ain't the law 2 3 for police officers. It's not the law for individuals. The law says I have the right to be 4 clear, to free myself from thugs, from people that 5 intend to do me harm. And that if I defend myself 6 I should not be sued, nor should I be arrested, 7 8 detained, or prosecuted because of it. 9 I'm expensive and if someone is arrested 10 or detained and they have to hire me to defend 11 them they have spent a lot of money doing so. And 12 in doing so and they are initially found -- and 13 they are eventually found immune from prosecution 14 what the system has said is that you were wronged, 15 you were wronged by police officers who may have 16 seen you as a black man who killed a white person 17 who they didn't want to find you immune at the scene so they arrested you. They made you go 18 19 through this trial. That's wrong. And that 20 happens. We can't take racism out of the system, 21 but we can't also sit here and act like situations 22 don't occur. And they will. And they will 23 continue to where someone defends themselves and 24 then finds themselves placed in a position where 25 they have to avail themselves of the stand your

1 55 ground law. 2 3 And once they do so civil liability is there. It is clear. And it goes against the 4 wrongdoer, the perpetrator, not the person that 5 defended themselves. 6 SENATOR SMITH: Every accident is not 7 8 negligence, and I concede that. And 9 Representative Rutherford you keep talking about 10 "accident" and I concede that you don't have to be 11 a perfect shot, but there are times when people 12 are negligent. If it's an accident where your 13 store owner, if he accidently shoots someone, you 14 must agree that all accidents are not negligence. 15 We're talking about in cases where there is true 16 negligence. 17 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: I think by definition accidents are negligent, because if 18 19 it's not negligent, then it's intentional. So 20 you're only getting situations where someone 21 either negligently did something or they

intentionally did something.

22

You can do reckless. Reckless is they
did it negligently but they should have known
better. Someone that gets in an accident for

1 speeding on a highway, they're going 10 miles over 2 3 the speed limit, that's negligence. They're going 100 miles over the speed limit, that's reckless 4 and there's a difference. 5 SENATOR SMITH: Well, I stand corrected, 6 7 even in reckless in Florida you are still immune. 8 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: But, again 9 if the recklessness -- if the reckless act was 10 brought on, simply by the person doing a wrong 11 act, meaning that, my recklessness I'm firing 12 because this person shot a gun at me we're not 13 going to go back in South Carolina, and I doubt 14 Florida will either, and say that when you are 15 fired upon you can only fire one shot and that 16 shot must be at the upper torso, at the head. 17 That's not the law. The wrongdoing is the person that caused this person to fire a shot. 18 19 In the Trayvon Martin case, and I've said this 20 repeatedly, what would have been interesting in 21 Florida is if Trayvon Martin would have shot 22 George Zimmerman and tried to avail himself of 23 stand your ground, and was denied that by law 24 enforcement and then by a judge. That's what 25 would have been interesting whether a black man in

1 57 a hoodie could avail themself of stand your 2 3 ground. That's a test of the law. That's a test 4 of the law. What George Zimmerman did, did not 5 use your stand your ground. He simply said, "I'm 6 white, he's black. Self-defense." People found 7 8 that. 9 But if Trayvon Martin would have shot 10 George Zimmerman, that's a test of the law. 11 The five -- it's five points, the 12 entertainment district shooting where the young lady was paralyzed, that gentleman's family called 13 14 me and I knew that there was a stand your ground 15 case. I did not know that he was a convicted 16 felon. That was going to be a test case in South Carolina as to whether they truly have the 17 backbone to support when an individual that we 18 19 know society -- whether he's Latino or African 20 American has shot someone, an innocent white woman 21 who's now paralyzed, whether he's going to be able 22 to use the stand your ground defense. 23 They were able to skirt that by letting 24 the federal government take it over, but that's a 25 test of the law. That's a test of the law.

1	58
2	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Before we go on to
3	Commissioner Achtenberg, actually Commissioner
4	Yaki has an article here that is germane to the
5	colloquy that was going on here.
6	Commissioner Yaki and then we'll go to
7	Commissioner Achtenberg and then no, I know
8	I've got a list here. It's Achtenberg, Patricia
9	Timmons-Goodson, and then Gail.
10	COMMISSIONER YAKI: I just wanted to
11	point out that cutting through cutting through
12	all of this is that a South Carolina Judge has
13	interpreted the statute to be identical to Florida
14	and to grant civil immunity to an individual who
15	who in exercising his or her stand your ground
16	rights shot and killed an innocent bystander. I
17	just wanted to put that on the record.
18	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Right,
19	that's my case.
20	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner
21	Achtenberg, then Commissioner Timmons-Goodson, and
22	then Commissioner Heriot.
23	And do any of the Commissioners on the
24	phone want to indicate an opportunity to ask a
25	question?

1	59
2	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Mr. Chair, this
3	is Kirsanow, I may have one question.
4	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. I'll have
5	you after Commissioner Heriot.
6	Commissioner Achtenberg.
7	COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: Thank you,
8	Mr. Chairman. Senator Smith, my I have many
9	grave concerns about the Florida version of the
10	stand your ground law. The most significant of
11	which is the interjecting of complete subjectivity
12	into the self-defense law of Florida.
13	And by that I mean what used to be an
14	objective standard, whether or not it was a
15	reasonable person would have perceived the threat
16	sufficiently to warrant his or her response with
17	deadly force not whether or not a person with a,
18	you know, a thin a thin skinned plaintiff or
19	what have you, but whether or not this person
20	perceived that they were in in danger of being
21	having deadly force used against them they
22	responded preemptively and in kind.
23	Can you explain the rationales being
24	offered at the time that this revolutionary
25	statute was adopted by the Florida legislature?

1	
2	What was the was there a precipitating event
3	that encouraged the legislature to throw out a
4	hundred years of common law and to change the
5	paradigm such that implicit bias is then baked
6	into the system?
7	We talked before about the limitations
8	to due process and the assertion was made, with
9	which I agree that given that there's implicit
10	bias abounding it affects everything that we do,
11	including what judges do, and what prosecutors do,
12	and what police do, and what persons on the street
13	do. But why bake in that bias into the
14	assumptions of this new law, what was the
15	rationale offered at the time, Senator?
16	SENATOR SMITH: It's funny that you
17	mention it, there was a case in North Florida that
18	was that cited as the impetus of this. It was a
19	it was after a hurricane, an elderly gentleman
20	and his wife and what was told to the
21	legislature by the proponents of it, there was an
22	elderly gentleman and his wife living in their
23	trailer after a hurricane and a man from South
24	Carolina who was working in Florida to help with
25	the clean up came to the gentleman's house, and an

1 altercation ensued and the older gentleman shot 2 3 the young guy. And it was told that the older gentleman was arrested and had to go through all 4 of these months of worrying about whether he was 5 going to be convicted, had to get lawyers and 6 7 everything. But it turned out to be a fallacy 8 once the purporters started looking into it later. 9 But just -- the climate in the Florida legislature 10 is the easiest law to pass is something, you know, 11 giving people more gun rights or tough on crime or 12 something like that.

13 And to go more to your concern it wasn't 14 thought that it would be such a subjective 15 standard. When it was passed and I voted against 16 it, but even colleagues of mine that voted for it 17 did not know and it wasn't fully explained that it would be a subjective standard. And that's why 18 19 we've tried to go in subsequently and at least 20 move it to more of an objective standard. Because 21 as you've stated that's where the racial bias 22 comes in. That's where some of the concerns come 23 in because it's such a subjective standard that 24 people can avail themselves of this even -- not in 25 a reasonable circumstance. I don't reasonably

1 think that I should shoot someone in a movie 2 3 theater because they threw popcorn at me. But if it's subjective, if I go to a subjective and did 4 this person actually fear when the person stood up 5 and threw popcorn, they can avail themselves. 6 And so that's been some of the concerns 7 8 that we've had and some of the changes that we've 9 proposed to make it more of an objective standard 10 instead of subjective. 11 COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: And did the 12 legislature recognize that all of these judgments 13 would be made at the scene and essentially by the officer? Did they understand that what had 14 15 traditionally been the prerogative of judges and 16 lawyers in courtrooms with due process, 17 evidentiary protections, et cetera, et cetera, would now be pushed down to the investigating 18 19 officer to make some kind of, at least, 20 preliminary judgment about whether or not the 21 person had reasonable -- not reasonable fear, 22 whether the person had fear at all and I therefore 23 used deadly force against an aggressing, you know, 24 an aggressor?

SENATOR SMITH: At the time in 2005 I

25

1 63 was the Minority Leader of the Florida House and I 2 3 can honestly say this wasn't a big issue. When stand your ground passed, myself and two other 4 lawyers that were in the Democratic Party, we 5 wrote a letter -- we voted against it. And only 6 about 12 of us did. The entire Senate, 7 8 bipartisan, every member of the Florida Senate 9 voted for it. It wasn't seen as a groundbreaking 10 piece of legislation, and it sat actually dormant 11 and not used until you started hearing about the 12 Trayvon Martin case. So remember this passed in 2005, and when did you really hear about this law? 13 After the Trayvon Martin case. 14 15 And now we've seen a plethora of cases 16 come after it because people are starting to avail themselves and become embolden because they think, 17 you know, "I got this great get out of jail ticket 18 19 to do my aggression." 20 But, honestly, in 2005 members did not 21 understand the full ramifications, non-lawyer 22 members because we're, you know, legislature of a 23 lot of people, did not understand the 24 ramifications. And even the lawyers in the 25 legislature didn't fully understand because it was

1		64
2	such a new and groundbreaking piece of	
3	legislation. It was just sold on a political	
4	basis as "you shouldn't have to cut and run, you	
5	shouldn't have to retreat, you shouldn't have to	
6	turn and run. And this is the way of making	
7	giving your citizens a chance not to have to turn	
8	and run and get shot in the back."	
9	COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: Thank you,	
10	Senator, I appreciate that.	
11	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Next we have	
12	Commissioner Timmons-Goodson, who will be followed	
13	by Commissioners' Heriot, Kirsanow, Kladney, and	
14	then Commissioner Yaki.	
15	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Thank you	1
16	so very much, Mr. Chair.	
17	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: You're welcome.	
18	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: My	
19	question is for Representative Rutherford. One of	-
20	the major criticisms offered of the stand your	
21	ground laws by opponents is that it so easily	
22	allows the escalation of fairly small incidents	
23	into deadly affairs.	
24	And with that in mind I'd like to just	
25	explore with you for just a few moments your	

1	6
2	thoughts based on statements that you've made.
3	You've said early on that at the time
4	that the stand your ground law was enacted in
5	South Carolina that there was no self-defense law.
6	That laws related to self-defense were outdated
7	and archaic. That one could not elevate, I
8	believe you said, the use of force.
9	In fact the common law was what was in
10	effect. Is that not right? In other words, the
11	judges used the common law, applied that to the
12	facts that came before them. Is that right?
13	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: They applied
14	prior case law, exactly.
15	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Okay.
16	And that prior case law was based on common law?
17	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: That's
18	right.
19	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Now
20	you've also said that stand your ground or the
21	stand your ground that you support means that
22	people don't have to live in fear. That elevating
23	not elevating force doesn't make sense to you.
24	First, I guess I want to know ask you
25	to explain your thought that the laws that were in

1		66
2	effect or applied relating to self-defense prior	
3	to stand your ground laws, why they were archaic,	
4	you know, what makes you say they were outdated?	
5	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Well,	
6	remember South Carolina had no statute on	
7	self-defense. So it was simply based on your	
8	ability to articulate your self-defense or why you	
9	did something in a trial while you were on trial	
LO	for a judge, determine that are	
11	absolutely right. You defended yourself. You	
12	have a right to do so. And in doing so you should	
L3	be immune from prosecution.	
L 4	The non-elevation	

1	6
2	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Well, let
3	me just ask you. How does that differ from any
4	other defendant defending themself in response to
5	a criminal charge filed or a civil case where a
6	plaintiff asserts something and, you know, one is
7	called upon to gather your resources and to
8	defend, I mean, how is that
9	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Your liberty
10	is not in jeopardy in a civil case. In a criminal
11	case your liberty is in jeopardy. And so, for
12	most criminal cases if a trial is going forward on
13	a forgery or a fraud charge, what you're saying is
14	that "I did not do this."
15	When it's related to self-defense then
16	stand your ground requires that you say, "I did
17	this. And I did this for this reason." And
18	you're asking that a judge in an immunity hearing
19	say, "What you did is reasonable." Or "What you
20	did is unreasonable."
21	In the case where the gentleman was
22	involved in the home invasion and he tried to say,
23	"I should be cleared under stand your ground."
24	The judge sent it up. The Court of Appeals said,
25	"No, give him a hearing." The judge gave him a

1	68
2	hearing and denied him immunity. Period.
3	It is based on reasonableness. And I'll
4	read you 1611.420
5	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: That's
6	that is well, we could go in different
7	directions, but I hear and I didn't mean to cut
8	you off. But I hear what you're saying. But you
9	do have bond in cases that would have involved
10	self-defense as you would have had bond offered in
11	other cases in South Carolina, do you not?
12	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Yes, ma'am.
13	And bond is based on what should be based on,
14	simply someone's whether they're going to show
15	back up in court. Whether they're a danger.
16	If they're charged with murder even
17	under the stand your ground cases they would still
18	have to go forward and get a bond. But at least
19	at the bond hearing you'd have the right, as I did
20	in the most recent case to say, "We believe that
21	this that stand your ground is going to apply
22	in this." And have a judge listen and agree or
23	disagree and set bond accordingly.
24	Bonds are not meant to punish, but most
25	often in murder cases they do exactly that.

1	69
2	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Okay. So
3	as I understand that the reason that your existing
4	or the existing South Carolina laws relating to
5	self-defense were viewed as archaic is that it
6	required an individual to it required an
7	individual to go forward and to defend themselves?
8	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: To stand
9	trial. And at trial only then could you defend
10	yourself, not prior to that point.
11	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Okay.
12	Second and last question. You say that stand your
13	ground law to you means that you don't have to
14	live in force
15	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Fear.
16	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: that it
17	doesn't make sense to you that one would not be
18	permitted to elevate force. I guess I'm left
19	wondering why is it not common sense that if
20	someone comes up and pushes you, that you push
21	them back, or someone comes up and hits you with a
22	fist that you hit them with a fist, why should
23	I mean, why does it make such sense that you could
24	elevate the force that you use to a gun or a knife
25	in response to being pushed or hit with a fist?

1	5
2	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD:
3	Commissioner, respectfully, I submit that you
4	should have a right to not have people hit you
5	with a fist. That you have a right not to be
6	pushed. That you have a right not to wait and see
7	what the next step will be once someone hits you
8	in the face.
9	You should not wait to see whether
10	you're going to be knocked out. You should have a
11	right to pull that gun if you have one and say,
12	"Leave me alone. I don't want to be bothered."
13	And that's what the general assembly found. We
14	have a right to live in peace.
15	And peace means that I'm not going to
16	wait on you to hit me. I'm not going to wait on
17	you to push me. I'm standing with my two children
18	I have two little boys. And if you're going to
19	walk up to me and try an assault me or one of them
20	I'm not going to wait to see what your next step
21	is going to be before I decide what I'm going to
22	do.
23	That's what the general assembly found.
24	And I think that's common sense.
25	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Thank

1	71
2	you, sir.
3	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner
4	Heriot, you have the floor.
5	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Thank you,
6	Mr. Chairman.
7	Here's my problem with the discussion so
8	far. It seems like a lot of what is being said
9	here is not special to stand your ground at all,
10	but rather could be an argument against the
11	doctrine of self-defense in the first place. And
12	I assume that nobody here is in favor of repealing
13	self-defense as a basic doctrine here.
14	Representative Rutherford, I was
15	impressed by your discussion a little while ago
16	about implicit bias. Let me see if I can restate
17	it and see whether you still agree with me.
18	The way that I see it, as you put
19	it implicit bias is background. It's involved not
20	just in stand your ground laws it's involved in
21	every kind of law there can be including the
22	exercise of basic self-defense.
23	So if we're talking about a non-stand
24	your ground state one of the things that has to be
25	guarded against, generally, is implicit bias

1 72 2 against black males, a trigger-happy person who 3 believes he's under attack, but isn't. You know, he thinks the black male is about to attack him, 4 but it's not true, he pulls the gun. And, you 5 6 know, that problem's always there. 7 And that problem's there when we talk 8 about home invasions and the general Castle 9 Doctrine. And what stand your ground adds to that 10 is simply now there's this small number of cases 11 -- I think it's important to recognize stand your 12 ground applies only on very, very few cases. Ι mean, you know, the result will turn on stand your 13 14 ground in just a shockingly small number of cases. 15 These will be the cases that don't occur in a 16 home. Do occur in some place where the person who 17 is exercising self-defense or supposedly exercising self-defense believes reasonably that 18 19 he could retreat but chooses not to. 20 In most of these cases in public places 21 that's not going to be possible to retreat and 22 therefore stand your ground doesn't make any 23 difference you still have a right to self-defense. 24 And we're talking about this tiny number of case 25 -- cases where the defendant or the person who is

1 exercising or is said to be exercising 2 3 self-defense knows that he can retreat but chooses not to, that's a very small number of cases. 4 Stand your ground adds an implicit bias problem 5 against the black male who is perceived to be 6 7 attacking. 8 But on the other hand it helps the black 9 male in the opposite position, the one who's 10 actually purportedly exercising self-defense, he 11 has to worry about implicit bias at the time of 12 trial whence the jury is second guessing him on 13 whether or not he could have retreated. They 14 weren't there. And they may be more likely to 15 find "Hey, you know, the guy says that he was under attack, we don't believe him." Or "Hey, he 16 17 says that he could have retreated, we don't believe him." 18 19 So implicit bias is everywhere in that 20 respect. And stand your ground doesn't add to the

21 problem for the black male it simply helps a22 different category of black male.

23 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Absolutely.
24 You succinctly stated exactly what my position has
25 been. And I agree with you. I think that a lot

74 1 of these cases that have been mentioned aren't 2 3 necessarily turning on stand your ground, but an officer and an investigator's perception of what 4 is self-defense any way. And then he's saying, 5 "Well, because of stand your ground I'm not going 6 to arrest you -- I'm not going to detain you." 7 8 But it's his assertion of self-defense in using 9 that as a --10 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: So the second 11 manifestation that I saw with this problem where 12 we seem to be moving between self-defense and stand your ground and not recognizing that the 13 14 arguments were being -- made that apply to 15 self-defense too. 16 REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Right. COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Was -- in the area 17 -- Senator Smith, you mentioned the detain issue 18 19 in the Florida statute. But isn't that just what 20 the basic law would be with regard to self-defense 21 if police officers investigate a crime and it's 22 not a stand your ground case, it's just basic 23 self-defense, everybody agrees there was no 24 ability to retreat so stand your ground doesn't 25 make any difference. You don't arrest someone if

1	75
2	the police officer concludes, "Oh, I believe based
3	on what I know this was self-defense."
4	You wouldn't arrest somebody like that,
5	would you? You wouldn't advocate that would you?
6	SENATOR SMITH: The concern with stand
7	your ground, and it puts the officer in a very
8	defensive posture. Before stand your ground I
9	agree you need probable cause and you would do
10	that. But stand your ground, now the officer now
11	has a statute that says I cannot detain and
12	also
13	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: But he couldn't
14	before could he?
15	SENATOR SMITH: ma'am, if I could
16	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: On a self-defense
17	case you couldn't he can't detain somebody if
18	the police
19	SENATOR SMITH: Within that statute it
20	explicitly gives a civil liability to that police
21	department if it's found that they were detained
22	in a stand your ground case. So it couldn't
23	before but that was case law and officers use
24	prudent judgment. But now an officer has a
25	statute a statute that says "I cannot detain,"

76 1 and "by the way if I detain I might get sued." 2 3 And so it affects the way that officer truly investigates. As before he would just use 4 investigative skills and figure out do I have due 5 process. Now he has this hover above his head 6 saying, "Oh, my God, if I use my investigative 7 8 skills and I may be wrong I have a statute 9 particularly pointing to civil liability for me 10 and my department." 11 So it affects the officers use of his 12 investigative skills because now we've put in statute -- not just common sense and case law, but 13 14 we've put in statute that you better not detain. 15 And by the way if you make the wrong judgment, officer on the street, your department's getting 16 17 sued. REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Yes, but 18 19 that's exactly what should happen. You should not 20 detain people that simply defended themselves that 21 are not wrongdoers. 22 Commissioner, you're exactly right and 23 that turns on, in my situations, African American 24 males who are guilt -- who are dealing with that 25 implicit bias from police officers going, you

1 77 know, "I'm not going to give you that benefit of 2 3 the doubt." And that police officer should be sued 4 simply because he now is detaining Trayvon Martin, 5 should he have shot George Zimmerman, saying, 6 "Well, I'm not going to -- you're a black man in a 7 8 hoodie I'm not going to give you that same 9 defense." 10 The police should be sued when they are 11 detaining and arresting people that are not 12 wrongdoers. 13 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: The third area 14 where I saw, again, getting off track and acting 15 as if, you know, we're talking about stand your 16 ground when in fact the argument that is being made would apply to self-defense generally was 17 with the civil liability area. 18 19 You know, it's massively more important 20 that, like, when people are exercising their right 21 to self-defense just in an ordinary case where 22 stand your ground wouldn't be involved, you've 23 still got the problem of mistaken self-defense. 24 You know, if the gun goes off and hits a third 25 person or they were mistaken in the first place,

1	
2	they shoot someone reasonably believing that they
3	are under attack, but wrong.
4	And, you know, I teach torts in law
5	school. One of the cases in my book is Crovocia
6	(phonetic) versus Raymond. It's not a stand your
7	ground case. It's an old Colorado case from the
8	early part of the 20th century where someone
9	exercising self-defense reasonably, but
10	mistakenly, they end up shooting someone and that
11	person was not actually attacking them.
12	The law has been that as long as you're
13	acting reasonably you're not liable. It doesn't
14	strike me that we're really talking about
15	something different here.
16	Now you can argue about whether or not
17	that's good law. You know, maybe maybe it
18	should be better policy to say that you're not
19	criminally liable for use of self-defense, but if
20	it turns out that you made a mistake, even if it
21	was a reasonable one then you should be liable for
22	civil damages.
23	If I am not mistaken, in ancient Rome
24	that was what the law was. You had a right to
25	self-defense as to criminal liability, but if you

1	
2	got it wrong and you shot somebody even though it
3	was reasonable and it turns out to have been wrong
4	you were civilly liable. And some people have
5	advocated such a rule.
6	But that's really quite detached from
7	the basic stand your ground issue. In a given
8	state could choose to make civil liability
9	available for mistaken use of self-defense that is
10	nevertheless reasonable or they could choose not
11	to. But it's not it's not the core issue we're
12	concerned with and I think we make a mistake when
13	we start analyzing particular states statutes here
14	and have they been drafted the best way possible.
15	As a federal commission we should be more
16	concerned with is the concept of stand your ground
17	a good concept or not. And, you know, if any of
18	you have a comment on that?
19	SENATOR SMITH: Ma'am, I would disagree
20	when you talk about the civil liability because
21	you keep getting to reasonableness and under prior
22	common law and course law case law even when
23	you're talking about civil liability you say
24	reasonableness. But under stand your ground and
25	stand your ground specific, you don't even get to

1 reasonableness because it's a blanket, a blanket 2 3 of -- of absolution of liability, you don't even get to reasonableness. If you're asserting stand 4 your ground you never get to anyone determining 5 whether you were reasonable. And me trying to 6 7 defend myself against you and I just start 8 shooting everyone. You don't get there because 9 the statute written in Florida absolves you of any 10 liability, even reckless -- reckless liability --11 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: But my point is we're a federal commission, we don't like, you 12 know, nickel and dime the state statute. If you 13 don't like that aspect of the statute then the 14 15 Florida legislature gets to change that. But 16 that's not the basic concept of stand your ground, the basic concept of stand your ground is 17 different from that. 18 19 You know, if South Carolina has a 20 different statute and a different approach to civil liability. And Virginia, or Minnesota, or 21 22 South Dakota have different approaches to that, 23 this is not a commission convened to fly speck the -- the Florida statute. That's not the core 24 25 concept of stand your ground.

1	
2	SENATOR SMITH: I thought this is a
3	commission on human rights and if there is a
4	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Civil rights.
5	Civil rights.
6	SENATOR SMITH: Civil rights. If there
7	is a statute in a state in this nation that
8	encourages people to act recklessly, and even
9	though it may be nickel-and-diming in Florida, and
10	I would hope that Florida would change that. But
11	if Florida doesn't have the fortitude to do the
12	right thing by its people I would hope that this
13	commission would at least speak to giving Florida
14	that fortitude to say "you know, what this statute
15	is wrong because it encourages people to be
16	reckless
17	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: But the
18	constitution doesn't actually work that way. We
19	don't have authority to tell Florida how to
20	SENATOR SMITH: encourage
21	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: we have
22	certain
23	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Order. Order
24	here. We're talking over one another. The
25	record's not going to be clear.

1	8
2	But in the interest of time if I could
3	ask Representative Smith to just wrap up what
4	you're saying.
5	And Mr. Abuznaid, did you have anything
6	to respond to on this? Otherwise, I'll when
7	then I'll move onto the next commissioner. But,
8	if you have when he's done if you have
9	something to say, then we'll move on to
10	Commissioner Kirsanow in the interest of time.
11	Mr Representative do you want to
12	finish your statement?
13	SENATOR SMITH: no, no
14	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay.
15	Mr. Abuznaid.
16	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: Yeah, I'd
17	just like to say that I hope that I wasn't
18	implying that there's something wrong with
19	self-defense. I actually think if self-defense
20	was so good we should have left it that way. And
21	so I don't think, for me, I get the Castle
22	Doctrine, I get why that was important. I think
23	that's why there was a distinction made that the
24	Castle Doctrine would empower American citizens to
25	protect their home. But stand your ground said,

1		83
2	"You know what, the castle is your entire world	
3	now. The castle is the movie theater, the castle	
4	is your child's school."	
5	There was a Broward County case where a	
6	kid got arrested for assault and battery and the	
7	I think it was in the Fourth Judicial Circuit,	
8	the case was overturned because of stand your	
9	ground. And so the reality is, it's irresponsible	
10	law. Self-defense is great, stand your ground is	
11	not.	
12	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. We're going	1
13	to move on to Commissioner Kirsanow followed by	
14	Commissioner Kladney.	
15	Commissioner Kirsanow, are you there?	
16	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: I am. I'm here	•
17	Thank you very much. Can you hear me okay?	
18	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Yes.	
19	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Okay. I think	
20	that the impetus for this hearing largely was the	
21	Trayvon Martin case. And I just want to be sure	
22	that we have on the record at least if one of the	
23	witnesses is aware of this and I'm not sure which	
24	one might be aware of it, but, Mr. Rutherford, do	
25	you know whether or not Trayvon Martin invoked	

1		84
2	stand your ground defense?	
3	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: George	
4	Zimmerman. My understanding is he did not invoke	
5	that, although	
6	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: I'm sorry,	
7	George Zimmerman.	
8	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: although	
9	law enforcement would have known about the	
10	existence of it. My understanding is that George	
11	Zimmerman did not invoke it, no.	
12	SENATOR SMITH: Can I answer that? Can	
13	I	
14	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Was it part of	
15	the charge to the jury?	
16	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Yes.	
17	SENATOR SMITH: There were two if I	
18	can chime in. There's two there's two things	
19	of the stand your ground. There's the procedural	
20	aspect of stand your ground which is invoking it	
21	and having the procedural hearing in front of a	
22	judge to invoke stand your ground.	
23	George Zimmerman did not avail himself	
24	of that procedural aspect of stand your ground.	
25	But when you talk in Florida stand your ground is	

1	8
2	self-defense. And within the jury instruction
3	that was used by George Zimmerman's case and any
4	other self-defense case in Florida there's no
5	separation between stand your ground and
6	self-defense.
7	And so although he did not avail himself
8	of the procedural aspect of stand your ground, he
9	certainly availed himself of the substantive
10	aspect of stand your ground. It was used in the
11	Trayvon Martin case.
12	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Second, I'd like
13	to ask in terms of there's been a lot of
14	discussion about, you know, someone shooting
15	straight, or shooting recklessly, or shooting
16	negligently, I guess I'll pose this to
17	Mr. Rutherford who sounds a little bit like me. I
18	hope for your sake very sincerely Mr. Rutherford
19	that you don't look like me.
20	But the well, let me put it this way.
21	I live I'm a black male living in what is
22	generally considered in Cleveland a high crime
23	neighborhood. And in the last, I'd say, three
24	decades I've probably been in situations three,
25	possibly four times where I could have invoked if

1 it were available stand your ground defense. 2 But 3 what strikes me is something similar to what Justice Holmes said over -- more than 90 years 4 ago, when he said, "The law does not demand 5 detached reflection in the presence of an uplifted 6 knife." 7 8 Mr. Rutherford, in the circumstances 9 where you've defended people invoking a stand your 10 ground defense, how quickly do these circumstances 11 evolve? I mean, when someone is attacked do they 12 have time to think about the consequences of their 13 actions or is this life and death? REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: In the 14 15 situations where I've been involved it has been 16 life and death. And I think you bring about a great point as I have failed to see the 17 distinction between stand your ground and 18 19 self-defense except that stand your ground says 20 that you don't have a duty to retreat outside of 21 your home. 22 And that is one of the biggest 23 distinctions, and truly the only distinction, and 24 the one that I would say is archaic. 25 I do look like you except I'm not a

1 black male living in Cleveland, I'm a black male 2 3 living in South Carolina. And I have not had the -- and fortunately, had to defend myself anytime 4 recently. But I would suggest that anyone that 5 does is simply acting on common sense and 6 self-defense and still faced with the test of 7 8 reasonableness. Reasonableness does not go out of 9 the window based on stand your ground. 10 And there are a number of cases where 11 people have tried to use stand your ground 12 procedurally and been turned down from doing so. 13 Stand your ground was used as a jury 14 charge in the George Zimmerman case, but it was 15 used to say that he did not have a duty to retreat outside of his home. 16 17 But, again, I ask who among us asserts that you should have to retreat outside of your 18 19 home. Why are we encouraging thugs to approach 20 people and telling people that they have a duty to 21 retreat before they act on it. 22 Why are we saying that people must run, 23 retreat, turn your back. It was stated in Florida 24 it said "safely retreat." That was not the law in 25 South Carolina, it was retreat. And in many other

1		88
2	places where stand your ground was passed.	
3	What we are saying is that you have a	
4	an opportunity and a duty to defend yourself, to	
5	defend others, and in acting on that you will not	
6	be prosecuted. You will receive procedurally	
7	immunity from prosecution.	
8	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you. And	
9	one last question. I heard, and I didn't know	
10	which witness that it was, indicate that the U.N.	
11	Human Rights Commission found stand your ground	
12	incompatible with the notion of right to life.	
13	Did I hear that correctly?	
14	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: Yep, that's	
15	correct.	
16	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Whoever	
17	testified to that do you know when the Human	
18	Rights Commission the U.N. Human Rights	
19	Commission made that statement?	
20	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: Yep,	
21	absolutely. It was during the review of the	
22	ICCPR. It was held in March of 2014.	
23	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: So this would be	:
24	the same Human Rights Commission that has those	
25	human rights and pro-life exemplars such as	

1	3
2	Russia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and
3	Uganda, correct?
4	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: Could you
5	repeat the question, please?
6	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Is this the same
7	U.N. Human Rights Commission that has the human
8	rights exemplars on the commission such as Russia,
9	Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and Uganda?
10	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: Are you
11	asking if those are the people that sit on the
12	committee or are those the people
13	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Yes.
14	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: No, I believe
15	the committee was made up of, you know, Israel
16	several other states, but I don't remember Russia
17	being one of them, but it was several nations. I
18	believe also that information could be found
19	online.
20	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: I think it can.
21	Thank you.
22	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,
23	Commissioner Kirsanow.
24	Commissioner Kladney.
25	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you,

1	
2	Mr. Chairman. My my question seems to revolve
3	around procedure due process. I don't I
4	don't understand this I think it's
5	Representative Rutherford who's talking about
6	people shouldn't have to be arrested.
7	Well, in process today in criminal law
8	police don't have to arrest anybody. They can
9	investigate. They can turn their information over
10	to the district attorney. The district attorney
11	can decide whether to charge or not. And at least
12	that's the process in my jurisdiction, it may not
13	be that way in South Carolina.
14	But it seems to me and I think this
15	is a question for the entire panel. That when you
16	put a police officer who is trained to be an
17	investigator, not a decision maker, in charge of
18	making a decision, then his investigation, once he
19	makes that decision in his mind is all angled
20	toward that decision that he has made. And
21	therefore, I assume when you have this immunity
22	hearing he is going to be on the witness stand
23	defending his decision, where in the past the
24	police officer the neutral, would come to court
25	in a preliminary hearing, which I assume would be

1	ç
2	akin to an immunity hearing. And a neutral judge
3	would make a decision as to whether there was
4	probable cause or there was self-defense.
5	Although I do understand that many
6	criminal defendants refuse to provide at any
7	case, in a preliminary hearing.
8	So if someone if you all could
9	discuss this kind of aspect to in relationship
10	to the law I would appreciate it. Try and
11	enlighten me a little.
12	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: In South
13	Carolina you are a preliminary hearing, where a
14	hearing is determined is held to determine
15	whether the case proceeds to the grand jury is not
16	a right and can be taken away by a prosecutor who
17	simply seeks to indict.
18	At a preliminary hearing in South
19	Carolina a defendant is not avail he cannot
20	put up any evidence it is only put on by the
21	state.
22	And a law enforcement officer who
23	arrests someone unlawfully should be sued. A law
24	enforcement officer that arrests someone who
25	should not have been detained or arrested should

1 92 2 be sued anyway. 3 I think this statute only makes it clear -- it does that in Florida, it doesn't 4 necessarily do that in South Carolina. 5 But, again, procedurally, what this does 6 7 is allow someone, in my cases, African American 8 males to avail themselves of the judicial system 9 in front of a general sessions judge, what people 10 on the street would call a big court judge. I 11 don't know if they're Supreme Court judges or 12 circuit court judges in Florida. But they would be a general sessions judge who has the ability to 13 give them immunity. Taking that decision solely 14 15 away from law enforcement where it has -- where it 16 was invested all up until this point. There's no one that can tell me --17 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: But, but, you're 18 19 the one who says that the old self-defense law was 20 -- it was case law, it was all over the place. REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: In South 21 22 Carolina, yes. COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: When in fact I 23 24 would assume that you had jury instructions 25 explaining exactly what the elements of

1		93
2	self-defense were.	
3	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: If you did	
4	not meet with the elements of self-defense in	
5	South Carolina you did not get a jury charge to	
6	that effect.	
7	So a judge had to determine that you	
8	could even that he would even give that charge	
9	before he would do so.	
10	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So excuse me.	
11	So what's where does stand your ground then	
12	become different than self-defense? If it is	
13	different from self-defense outside of	
14	procedurally, explain it to me.	
15	I mean, you have to be in fear of	
16	harm	
17	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Outside	
18	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: you get to	
19	defend yourself. And the charge to the jury is	
20	the definition of the law.	
21	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Right.	
22	Procedurally self-defense differs from stand your	
23	ground because stand your ground is going to give	
24	you an immunity hearing. So procedurally it	
25	differs that way.	

1	9
2	Outside of that it differs because it
3	takes the common law doctrine, the common law
4	Castle Doctrine and extends that to wherever you
5	may be. You never had a right to you never had
6	a duty to retreat in your home. Now that duty to
7	retreat goes away when you're outside of your home
8	as well. It says that you have the right to live
9	unmolested.
10	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So you you
11	really are saying if someone starts angering me
12	and I get angry and I throw a punch, he can take a
13	gun out and shoot me. Is that correct?
14	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: I'm saying
15	that if someone angers you
16	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Is that correct,
17	yes or no? Yes or no, sir? Yes or no, if I throw
18	a punch at someone can they take a gun out and
19	shoot me?
20	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Yes. You
21	should not throw a punch at someone.
22	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you.
23	That's fine. Thank you.
24	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Yes. The
25	general assembly has consistently found in states

1	
2	where they've enacted this that you should have a
3	right to live unmolested. That you should have a
4	right to expect to be left alone with your home,
5	your business, and your vehicle, and wherever you
6	may stand. And this assertion that you should be
7	able to walk around, whether it's a commissioner
8	or anybody else, punching people in the face
9	without the without them having the ability to
10	defend themselves, to me, just does not make
11	sense. We negate the fact that
12	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: you've never
13	been in an alcohol-fueled situation and you've
14	never seen a fight occur like that?
15	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: I've never
16	been in a what?
17	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Alcohol-fueled
18	situation where alcohol is driving the parties?
19	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: I don't
20	drink, but I have been in a number of situations
21	where people were fueled by alcohol and doing
22	wrong.
23	In South Carolina we also allow you to
24	carry your gun into a bar ifthe bar owner
25	does not put up a sign and prohibit you from doing

2	

3 However, in doing that we mandate that 4 concealed weapons permit holders that are going 5 into a bar can have absolutely no alcohol. So if a concealed weapons permit holder in South 6 7 Carolina was in a bar and had a weapon on them and 8 was, as in your scenario, punched in the face, 9 would they have a right to defend themselves? 10 Absolutely. 11 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: But if the gun's 12 concealed --13 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Would anyone else 14 on the panel like to comment --REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: -- the bar 15 16 owner would have a sign on the door saying "No concealed weapon permits allowed." And the 17 concealed weapons permit holder has a duty --18 19 having a concealed weapons permit must check the 20 sign on the door before he goes in. 21 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Here's what I'm 22 going to do. We're technically out of time, but I 23 want to -- two commissioners -- Commissioner 24 Kladney you need to wrap it up, I've got two 25 commissioners who want to ask two brief questions,

1		97
2	Yaki and Narasaki.	
3	So Commissioner Kladney if you could	
4	just finish your questioning and then I'll go to	
5	Commissioner Yaki and then Commissioner Narasaki	
6	and then we'll conclude the panel.	
7	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I would just	
8	Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to let the other	
9	panelists comment on Representative Rutherford and	L
10	my question if they could do so briefly.	
11	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: This is	
12	Ahmad Abuznaid. I would just like to say that the	9
13	issue here isn't concealed carry permits, the fact	
14	of the matter is even without that provision	
15	requiring concealed carry permit holders to not	
16	drink alcohol the gentleman could just step	
17	outside of the bar and then unload a clip into,	
18	you know, whatever person he was deemed afraid of.	
19	So I think that, you know, we can get	
20	lost in discussing permits and whatnot, but the	
21	issue here is stand your ground and the fact that	
22	it's unreasonable.	
23	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: That would	
24	be neither stand your ground nor self-defense.	
25	You cannot walk out and shoot	

1		98
2	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: But	
3	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: that would	
4	not be stand your ground.	
5	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: but if the	
6	altercation spilled out to the exterior of the bar	
7	and you were in fear of your life	
8	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: if you're	
9	still getting beat up and assaulted outside of a	
10	bar, from the inside all the way to the outside,	
11	you should probably defend yourself.	
12	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: But also	
13	stand your ground doesn't require that you're beat	
14	up. So the gentleman could be walking towards	
15	your direction yelling obscenities at you	
16	REPRESENTATIVE RUTHERFORD: Why is it	
17	that we are required	
18	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner Yaki	
19	has a question and then we'll go to Commissioner	
20	Narasaki and conclude the panel. Thank you.	
21	Commissioner.	
22	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Yes, thank you very	
23	much. I remain I guess I remain troubled by	
24	some of what has been said here today. I don't	
25	think I think we do actually have an obligation	

T	9
2	to nickel-and-dime some of these statutes because
3	we're here because Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis
4	were victims of these statutes and those people
5	were not nickel-and-dimed.
6	I'm not going to ask a question I'm just
7	going to make a very brief statement.
8	Mr. Rutherford, I appreciate your passion. I
9	understand that you believe that what you're doing
10	is in the best interest of African Americans who
11	live in fear of walking the streets. But what we
12	have here is data that shows that in all states
13	that have stand your ground homicide rates go up
14	rather than go down.
15	The data shows that if you are an
16	African American claiming stand your ground
17	defense you are much less likely to get it granted
18	than if you are a white person claiming it and if
19	your victim is black.
20	You talked about whether or not Trayvon
21	Martin would be able to have used that, but
22	Trayvon Martin is dead. And he was not able to
23	say "I was acting in self-defense," when George
24	Zimmerman approached him.
25	The problem with all this is that people

1 2 are dying. More people are dying than would have 3 died before. In your situation that you talked about if someone throws a punch at me I have the 4 right, according to you, to take out a gun and 5 shoot him. 6 Now if the person -- if I think the 7 8 person's gonna throw a punch at me I have the 9 right to take out a gun and shoot him. If I -- if 10 the person threw a punch at me and missed and we 11 walk outside and I see him walking toward me I can 12 take out my gun and shoot him. 13 In all of these cases someone gets hurt, 14 someone dies. And you're essentially giving 15 someone who is not trained like a police officer, 16 as Mr. Kladney was saying. Does not understand 17 how to judge a situation, has not taken proficiency courses in shooting so as to minimize 18 19 casualties to civilians, and yes, you're right, 20 cops do sometimes miss and they shoot the wrong 21 people. But for the most part they're trained, 22 and we have an expectation that they should be 23 trained to not sort of spray their gun anywhere. 24 And you're essentially giving ordinary 25 citizens the right to draw and fire wherever they

1 2 may be at any specific place and time. 3 That's the problem with stand your ground is that the castle is no longer the castle. 4 The question of reasonableness when someone breaks 5 into your house is a lot different than when 6 you're in an open theater or in an auditorium such 7 8 as this, the judgments are a lot different and 9 the result is that someone dies. 10 And the stats show people die. More 11 people are dying -- more people are dying because 12 of this. And as great as you are as an attorney 13 and as expensive as you are of an attorney -- even 14 though you forgot your tie today -- to, you know, 15 in terms of defending people who you believe were 16 asserting their rights -- and I agree that they 17 should be able to assert their rights if it was Stand your ground is different from 18 self-defense. 19 self-defense because the way it works, the way --20 the situation in which it occurs, the environment 21 in which it happens is much different than if 22 you're inside your home or if you're in absolute 23 imminent fear of someone else taking a gun at you 24 and the gun is out there and you have to do 25 something.

1	1
2	Those are the exceptions that prove the
3	rule of the old common sense Castle Doctrine. But
4	stand your ground takes that and perverts that to
5	an extent that I am concerned about. And
6	especially for African Americans who do not get
7	the benefit of it as white defendants do. Who are
8	the victims of it more than whites are. I think
9	those are the things that I'm concerned about.
10	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,
11	Commissioner Yaki.
12	Commissioner Narasaki, you have the last
13	question.
14	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Thank you.
15	I just really want to thank all of the
16	panelists for the discussion, it's been very
17	illuminating. And it's clearly a very passionate
18	subject for everyone.
19	So my understanding, and I appreciate
20	Commissioner Heriot's efforts to try to untangle
21	the issue of how stand your ground is different
22	from the Castle Doctrine. I want to make sure I
23	understand it correctly.
24	So my I understanding is (A), that it
25	gives you more leeway to escalate, it doesn't

1 103 2 require equal force, but you can more quickly 3 escalate. (B), you don't have to be in your home 4 or in the vicinity of your home so that makes it 5 more likely that innocent bystanders, in fact, 6 will be around and more likely to therefore be 7 8 collateral damage. 9 Three, my understanding is that there is 10 more subjectivity to the fear that's allowed. 11 That it's not a reasonable person standard. But 12 in the case of -- so there was a case of a guy who shot a Chinese American neighbor. The Chinese 13 14 American neighbor was actually going to his own 15 home next door. And the guy who shot him said, "Well, I was in fear of my life because all 16 Chinese know Karate and can kill me." 17 So that would be his subjective fear. 18 19 But I hope most of us would not think that was a 20 reasonable person's standard -- meet that 21 standard. 22 So if this is all -- so I want to (A), 23 ask Mr. Abuznaid, is this a correct understanding? 24 And (B), the argument seems to be 25 because we're here -- the reason the commission is

Ţ	
2	looking at this is because there's a question
3	about equal protection under the law and whether
4	in fact these laws are victimizing African
5	Americans, are being applied differently in a way
6	that hurts minority communities.
7	But the argument that seems to be being
8	made by some is that in fact it is helping African
9	Americans, so I want to know since you are clearly
10	not in support of the law where how where's
11	the conflict in that?
12	How is it that it helps does it help
13	enough to change your mind?
14	MR. AHMAD NABIL ABUZNAID: So to your
15	first question, that list did seem accurate. And
16	I would just add in addition that stand your
17	ground eliminated the duty to safely retreat,
18	which is what we had in Florida. And I think for
19	people that had issues with self-defense that
20	would have been the change that I would have
21	advocated for, just simply require someone to
22	safely retreat if possible.
23	To your second question I think, you
24	know, with everything going on in Ferguson, with
25	everything going on in the State of Florida, young

_

1	
2	black and brown men and women don't feel safe.
3	Now whether that is because of police brutality
4	and excessive force, or vigilantes, or people like
5	Michael Dunn who don't like thug or quote-unquote
6	"thug music," which is hip hop.
7	People are being subjected to being
8	threats of society when they really just want to
9	live. They really just want to prosper peacefully
10	in their communities. Trayvon Martin was walking
11	to his father's home. I mean, if we are to accept
12	that in any day in today's society a kid can get
13	gunned down walking to his father's home simply
14	because another man has the right to stand his
15	ground, I think we've lost all faith in our
16	society.
17	I think that, you know, the example was
18	drawn up by the commission member about being
19	punched in the face, now, what would you teach
20	your child is what I would implore folks to think
21	about. Would you teach your child to punch back
22	or to fire their gun off? Or do you teach your
23	child, "You know what the person that punched you
24	was wrong, we're a society that does not condone
25	violence, we condemn it. And we'd like to have a

1		106
2	peaceful society."	
3	Now maybe that's Utopian and could not	
4	exist, but I I just say that we've seen it now	
5	bubble into our schools. People are in fear of	=
6	their lives and they deserve better and we should	
7	do better.	
8	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,	
9	gentlemen for a very engaging panel, we appreciate	
10	it. We went over a little time, but it was very	
11	informative.	
12	Yes, Senator.	
13	SENATOR SMITH: Mr. Chair, just two	
14	quick things if I can	
15	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Quickly.	
16	SENATOR SMITH: very brief.	
17	Commissioner Heriot brought up a great point,	
18	there is a thin line between stand your ground and	
19	common law self-defense and we're getting blurred	
20	in that line.	
21	My only point would be that with the	
22	invocation of stand your ground and cases that	
23	subsequent you're going to see more and more of	
24	these cases. Between 2005 and Trayvon Martin	
25	there are very few cases. But now people have in	

1	
2	their mind, at least in Florida, that they have
3	this great "get out of jail free card." So we're
4	working towards stopping what's coming not what
5	has happened.
6	And lastly, the point that was made
7	earlier about data collection and if that's
8	something that you can address that would be
9	tremendous, of maybe requiring these states to do
10	data collection. Although I want other changes to
11	stand your ground, but God bless you if you can
12	get states to at least keep the data and that will
13	help your job and my job as we go forward.
14	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,
15	Senator. That will be an excellent
16	recommendation.
17	Thank you all and we appreciate your
18	time. So as this panel cycles off we ask panel
19	two to begin to come forward.
20	Commissioners will take a five minute
21	break as the panel begins to assemble.
22	(Midmorning recess was taken. End of
23	Volume I, proceedings resume in Volume II.)
24	
25	

1	
2	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	
4	
5	STATE OF FLORIDA
6	COUNTY OF POLK
7	
8	I, Kathy Wescott, Certified Shorthand
9	Reporter, do hereby certify that I was authorized to
10	and did report in Stenotypy and electronically the
11	foregoing proceedings and evidence in the captioned
12	case and that the foregoing pages constitute a true and
13	correct transcription of my recordings thereof.
14	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed
15	my hand this 28th day of October, 2014, at Lakeland,
16	Polk County, Florida.
17	
18	Kathy Wescott, CSR
19	Court Reporter
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS BRIEFING ON STAND YOUR GROUND Place: The Rosen Hotel 9700 International Drive Orlando, Florida 32819 9:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. Date: October 17, 2014 Reported by: Kathy Wescott, CSR (Volume II, Pages 1 through 99, a.m. session, Panel Number 2)

1	
2	
3	Present:
4	Commissioner Michael Yaki
5	Commissioner Roberta Achtenberg
6	Marlene Sallo
7	Commissioner Marty Castro (Chairman)
8	Commissioner Karen K. Narasaki
9	Commissioner Patricia Timmons-Goodson
10	Commissioner Gail Heriot
11	Dr. Sean Goliday
12	Appearing by phone:
13	Commissioner David Kladney
14	Commissioner Peter Kirsanow
15	Commissioner recer Arisanow
16	
17	Panel Number 2:
18	David Harris
19	William Krouse
20	John Roman
21	Arkadi Gerney
22	Attorney Benjamin Crump
23	Katheryn Russell-Brown
24	

1	3
2	
3	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: If we can get the
4	commissioners to come back up to the podium,
5	please.
6	Okay. I'm going to call the second
7	panel to order. Let me briefly introduce the
8	panelist's in the order in which they will speak.
9	Our first panelist is David Harris, Law
10	Professor at the University of Pittsburgh.
11	Our second panelist is William Krouse
12	from the Congressional Research Service.
13	Our third panelist is John Roman of The
14	Urban Institute.
15	Our fourth panelist is Arkadi Gerney of
16	the Center for American Progress.
17	Our fifth panelist is Benjamin Crump
18	who is just taking his seat now attorney for
19	Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis, and the Michael
20	Brown families.
21	And our sixth and final panelist is
22	Katheryn Russel-Brown, Law Professor at the
23	University of Florida Law School.
24	I will now ask each panelist to swear or
25	affirm that the information that you are about to

1	4
2	provide to us is true and accurate to the best of
3	your knowledge and belief. Is that correct?
4	PANELISTS: Yes.
5	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. As you know
6	you'll have eight minutes, each of you. So
7	Professor Harris, please proceed.
8	MR. DAVID HARRIS: Thank you very much.
9	I want to tell the commission I appreciate you
10	having this hearing. And appreciate your
11	invitation.
12	Stand your ground laws are the most far
13	reaching changes we have had to self-defense law
14	in this country in many, many decades.
15	The bottom line for these laws is that
16	they lower the potential legal cost of using
17	deadly force. There's a lot of talk already about
18	the empirical evidence and there will be more. I
19	won't go into that right now.
20	I've been asked to come here to talk
21	about implicit bias, which was mentioned earlier
22	by Commissioner Yaki and some others.
23	I want to ask what role, if any, would
24	implicit bias have in magnifying, changing,
25	focusing, the effect of stand your ground laws?

1			5
2	Unconscious, un:	intended, but very real bias, how	
3	would that play	into stand your ground laws in	
4	practice?		
5	Let's	first start by defining implicit	
6	bias. When we	think about racism, typically, we	
7	think about, so	rt of, the old school, in your	
8	face, calling na	ames sort of racism. But the last	
9	20 years of rese	earch into the way people think has	1
10	really changed t	the whole way that we should be	
11	thinking about a	racism as well.	
12	What	this has told us, this research	
13	over the last 20) years, is that what scientists	
14	call "implicit B	bias" is actually far more common	
15	than any kind o	f old school sort of racism.	
16	When	we talk about implicit biases, what	
17	we are talking a	about is unconscious favorability	
18	or favoritism to	owards whites and a negative	
19	feeling toward b	placks, just to use the same binary	7
20	that we've been	using here all morning.	
21	It is	unconscious, these biases are not	
22	known to the peo	ople in whom they operate. They	
23	operate and exis	st even in people who have	
24	perfectly strong	g egalitarian conscious beliefs and	l
25	would articulate	e them to you.	

1	6
2	They operate without the knowledge of
3	those who have them and they do they can affect
4	actions.
5	So how do we know this? I'll tell you
6	just a little bit about it, try to put it in a
7	nutshell. We've been there's a lot of research
8	on this subject, but by far the most prominent
9	research involves a test called "The Implicit
10	Association Test" or IAT.
11	This test involves a use of a computer
12	and the viewing of partial pictures of faces along
13	with positive words and negative words.
14	When I say "partial pictures of faces,"
15	I do have a little sample here. I've got copies
16	I'm sort of old school myself, so no PowerPoint
17	on this I'm afraid. I'll be glad to pass them
18	around.
19	You can see it's from the base of the
20	forehead, the eyes, the nose, and just below the
21	nose. It's enough of the face so that it's
22	clearly recognizable whether the person being
23	pictured is either African American or European
24	American.
25	What happens here is that test takers

7 1 2 see on the screen, they see a face and a word and 3 they are asked to make associations by clicking on a computer key. It's really not that complicated. 4 At first they are -- please -- at first they are 5 6 asked to associate a white face with a positive word or concept. And a black face with a negative 7 8 word or concept. 9 And when they click the computer is 10 measuring the speed at which they click and the 11 differences might be in milliseconds, but a 12 computer is perfectly capable of measuring things 13 at that level. They are then asked, the test takers 14 15 are, to click when you have an association between 16 a white face and a negative concept, a black face 17 and a positive concept. After all of the clicking and testing is 18 19 done what you end up with is sort of a measurement 20 of the strength of associations in this particular 21 person's thinking. The test has been taken by millions of 22 23 people. I think the last thing that I read was 13 24 or 14 million. You can take it online. I have. 25 And your data is used as part of the overall

1	8
2	results. You are asked for demographic data about
3	yourself, but you are not identified.
4	The results are that you get a
5	measurement of the test taker's thinking. Does it
6	take the test taker longer to click on
7	associations between black and positive words than
8	it does white and negative words, and vice-versa.
9	And it produces a measurement of the
10	degree of bias that a person has toward whites,
11	toward blacks, positive or negative.
12	The results of these tests this
13	testing I think always surprises people a little
14	bit before they've heard of it before.
15	75 percent of all test takers over these
16	millions of tests taken exhibit a bias to one
17	degree or another against blacks and for whites.
18	It is this bias toward whites, against blacks
19	shows up in 88 percent of all white test takers.
20	But, also, interestingly in about 40 percent of
21	all African American test takers.
22	Now this does not mean, I want to be
23	clear. This does not mean that racism is somehow
24	excused because it's unconscious. It does not
25	mean that because everyone shares these

1	9
2	characteristics, it's fine. Or that the victims
3	are somehow to blame for racist treatment. And it
4	certainly does not mean that the impact of
5	whatever racist treatment there might be is any
6	less because it comes from an unconscious place.
7	What it does mean is that racial biases
8	need to be understood as being much more common
9	and found in many more people than we used to
10	think. Even if they're unaware of it the effects
11	can be the same.
12	Now let's talk briefly about effects in
13	the remaining time. Can this affect conduct, and
14	especially within the context of something like a
15	stand your ground law. And the answer to it is,
16	yes. Even though these biases are unconscious
17	they operate.
18	Implicit excuse me. Implicit bias,
19	the research on this ties neatly into work done by
20	social psychologist's about what are called
21	heuristics. Heuristics is just a fancy word for
22	rules of thumb. We all use rules of thumb and in
23	psychology the researchers think of this as ways
24	to make quick decisions. Have a rule that allows
25	you to make very quick decisions in an environment

1	1
2	with very low information at a very high rate of
3	speed and to preserve your cognitive resources.
4	So we use heuristics all of the time to make
5	decisions as human beings.
6	When you combine the idea that there is
7	implicit bias and heuristics what some of the
8	research has shown especially research by
9	Philip Atiba Goff of UCLA, is what he has called
10	the "suspicion heuristic." You have a negative
11	view of blacks for the most part, implicit. This
12	leads to beliefs that blacks are prone to
13	criminality. That they are violent. And there is
14	a lot of other research besides Mr. Goff's that
15	goes in this same direction.
16	So what you get is an automatic very
17	rapid association between blacks, that is not just
18	about negativeness, but also about violence and
19	criminality.
20	Now in the specific context of stand
21	your ground laws what this will mean is that more
22	people will think of black people they meet as
23	dangerous, as criminal, and as violent. And that
24	is going to result in more blacks being the
25	victims in stand your ground shootings. It also

1	1
2	has the other effect of when a white person or
3	somebody goes to court and says, "I stood my
4	ground," and the victim is black, the jury
5	harboring those very same biases will be more
6	inclined to acquit when the victim is black.
7	Thank you very much for your time. I
8	look forward to your questions.
9	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Mr. Krouse, you're
10	next.
11	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Thank you for
12	having me. I have the privilege to work as the
13	Legislative Analyst at the Congressional Research
14	Service housed within the Library of Congress.
15	CRS provides nonpartisan research to Congress.
16	I need to make a small disclaimer here.
17	The views, ideas, and the information that I'm
18	about to present are my own and cannot be
19	attributed back to the Library of Congress or CRS.
20	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: We understand
21	that. Thank you.
22	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Thank you. Also
23	this live presentation is not in any way intended
24	to be an evaluation of stand your ground laws.
25	Rather what I'm about to present to you are some

1	1
2	very basic baseline statistics. We have data on
3	murder and non-negligent homicides and also on the
4	justifiable homicides.
5	The data are imperfect and are
6	incomplete, but it does tell us some things and it
7	cannot be ignored. So I want to discuss briefly
8	data limitations and definitions and then murder
9	and then justifiable homicides. And I want to
10	stress that this is principally about justifiable
11	homicides by private citizens and not law
12	enforcement officers, also I may give you some
13	preliminary data on both. And then I want to look
14	at interracial and intraracial justifiable
15	homicides that involve blacks and whites.
16	So my two data sources are the Uniform
17	Crime Reports, the FBI vets this data every year
18	and publishes it in the Uniform Crime Reports or
19	Crime in the United States. It's available on the
20	FBI website.
21	Whenever they get a report on a homicide
22	they also go back to the state and local reporting

22 they also go back to the state and local reporting 23 agencies and ask for supplementary information on 24 those homicides and that's published in the 25 supplementary homicide reports.

1		13
2	That information isn't isn't	
3	available as the Uniform Crime Reports, however,	
4	but through the efforts of certain academics it	
5	has been - FOIA'd and it's available on	
6	the University of Michigan Website.	
7	The Supplementary Homicide Reports	
8	suffer from certain very serious limitations.	
9	One, Florida does not report in a manner that is	
10	accepted by the FBI. I think it has to do with a	
11	technicality on the offender/victim relationship,	
12	familial relationship. And it's just on that	
13	point alone according to the Bureau of Justice	
14	Statistics that the data is not compatible. So	
15	that seems to me something that could be fixed	
16	possibly.	
17	Other states and localities more	
18	importantly do not participate, do not participate	
19	fully, and/or only participate intermittently in	
20	this Supplementary Homicides Reports Program.	
21	Making things more difficult these	
22	reports do not always reflect the final	
23	disposition of these cases. Like the UCR, federal	L
24	and travel (phonetic) law enforcements do not	
25	report to the Supplementary Homicides Report	

Program.

1

2

3 So I just wanted to give you the definitions here. I have one slight mistake here, 4 it should be instead of "murder and non-negligent 5 manslaughter" it should be "non-negligent 6 homicide." At the time I was preparing these --7 these slides there was a good deal of debate about 8 9 what exactly non-negligent manslaughter meant or 10 non-negligent homicide. 11 A non-negligent homicide will be a 12 homicide that's not accidental, it's the willful 13 killing of another human being. And then justifiable homicides by a police officer, will be 14 15 a killing done in the line of duty. And then for

16 private citizen it would be the killing of a felon 17 during the commission of a felony.

That's the FBI definition. And so what 18 19 I'm about to tell you is that when you look at 20 these cases, case by case, you can often make 21 distinctions of your own on whether these definitions would fully meet those cases or not. 22 23 In the UCR, the justifiable homicides 24 are tabulated separately from murder and 25 non-negligent homicides. So they're two -- in two

1	15
2	different data presentations. However, in the
3	Supplementary Homicide Reports it's all merged
4	together but it's coded so that you can separate
5	them out.
6	So I'm presenting this graph here just
7	to give us the big picture backdrop on murder and
8	non-negligent homicide victim rates. As we can
9	see we had some bumps in the '70s, '80s, and '90s.
10	And then violent crime in murder and firearm
11	related murders trailed off with a couple of bumps
12	in the 2000's.
13	Then I give you the raw data as
14	published by the FBI and Justifiable Homicides.
15	One would think that law enforcement agencies
16	reporting on these matters would be fairly
17	reliable. And it also has it by weapon.
18	We're less confident about the
19	reliability of the data for justifiable homicides
20	as reported by law enforcement agencies, by
21	private citizen. However I want to say that the
22	data that I'm about to present to you on
23	justifiable homicides involving blacks and whites
24	with firearms consists of about 80 to 90 percent
25	of the incidents that are included in this table.

1 1 2 So just for comparison sake I thought 3 I'd line up justifiable homicides with murders and non-negligent homicides. And this is for 1987 Δ through 2011, you can see that they trended 5 6 somewhat similarly in the first part of that time period. And then when the murders trailed off the 7 8 justifiable homicides continued to go up. 9 It has been suggested to me that this 10 one possibility could be, that this is more 11 zealous reporting by law enforcement. And so I 12 just gave it for the shorter time period which is 13 covered more recently with regards to the stand your ground laws. 14 15 And notice how the bumps in the murders 16 go up tremendously when you shorten your time 17 period. But, again, the justifiable homicides in either category continue to go up. 18 19 And then these are murders. We can see 20 that most murders are intra -- intraracial when 21 they involve blacks and whites. And that in a small number of cases they're interracial. And 22 23 these are the justifiable homicides with firearms 24 involving blacks and/or whites. And we can see 25 that blacks and whites avail themselves of

1 17 2 justifiable homicide almost on -- in equal З numbers. However, in white-on-black incidents Δ it's a ratio of about 6 to 1, to black-on-white 5 justifiable homicides. That ratio remains about 6 the same, this is the stranger on stranger murders 7 8 in this slide. And when we look at the ratio of 9 justifiable homicides, white-on-black versus 10 black-on-white, that ratio stays about the same at 11 6 to 1. 12 And we're looking at in any given year 13 white-on-black justifiable homicide incidents they range about from 25 to 30 with a slight increase 14 15 in the latter five year period. 16 So -- and we see again the cluster of 17 white-on-black along with black-on-black and white-on-white justifiable homicides there. 18 19 So I wanted to sum this up by saying 20 that if you go to Gary Kleck in Point Blank, he 21 estimates that we under-report justifiable homicides by private citizens by about two, three, 22 23 maybe four-fold. So you're looking at, over this 24 10 year period, about 250 cases or 25 cases a year 25 of white-on-black justifiable homicides.

1	1
2	And in the interest of determining what
3	sort of circumstances are going on here I would
4	suggest that you might want to look at each one of
5	those cases on a case by case basis. But if you
6	were to look at comprehensive data you might be
7	looking at anywhere between 50, 75, to 100 cases
8	per year. So if you did it for a 10 year period
9	that'd be a thousand cases.
10	I have 10 seconds left and I just want
11	to
12	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: You've gone over,
13	but it's all right. Just wrap it up real quickly.
14	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Okay. The
15	Supplementary Homicide Reports data is available
16	as I said on the University of Michigan website.
17	And that concludes my presentation. Thank you.
18	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,
19	Mr. Krouse.
20	Mr. Roman, you have the floor.
21	MR. JOHN ROMAN: Thank you very much. I
22	want to thank the commission for accepting my
23	testimony today. I want to apologize to the
24	commission that my tie did not make it down here
25	with me

1	:
2	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: What is it with
3	the ties is there a tie thief around here?
4	MR. JOHN ROMAN: I apologize for the
5	lack of decorum. And the ties in the lobby by the
6	way are totally inappropriate.
7	So I work for The Urban Institute which
8	is a non-partisan non-profit social and economic
9	policy research organization. We were founded in
10	the '60s to try an add evidence to debates about
11	important social welfare questions.
12	I've worked in the crime and justice
13	center at The Urban Institute since for 17
14	years. So this is exactly the kind of issue that
15	we would like to weigh in on and bring data to the
16	question to see if we can facilitate a better
17	understanding of what we're trying to accomplish
18	here.
19	I'm going to talk about the same data
20	that Bill talked about, we used it in our
21	analysis, so I thank you very much for using four
22	minutes of your testimony that I don't have to
23	explain what the data are.
24	But, I want to I want to make a point
25	before I get into our analysis, which we did a

1 2 couple of years ago, and that we've revisited a 2 3 couple of times since then and it seems to be very stable and shows some of the things -- many of the Δ things that Bill suggests. 5 6 And that -- that is the idea here that I think is under-reported, which is that the goal of 7 8 a stand your ground law is to solve a social 9 problem. And the social problem it portends to 10 solve is that people are getting convicted for 11 killing people when they were actually acting in 12 self-defense. 13 There is no evidence to support the idea 14 that that is actually ongoing. If you look at the 15 exoneration literature you cannot find -- you 16 might be able to find a couple of cases where 17 somebody has been exonerated when they act in self-defense, but that's not why people are 18 19 wrongfully convicted, they're wrongfully convicted 20 for lots of other reasons. 21 So we set out to solve a problem that we 22 don't even have any evidence was ever a problem to 23 solve. So our first question of the day is, does 24 stand your ground achieve its objective? Do more 25 people who commit a crime are they found to have

1 21 been justified in committing that homicide? 2 3 So we asked that question. And then we asked the question, is there an unintended 4 consequence of these laws that people who act in 5 self-defense or found to have acted as 6 justifiably, ah, committing homicide, if there's 7 racial discrepancies in the rates at which those 8 9 justifiable homicide findings occur. 10 And then we want to ask if there are 11 characteristics of people that differentiate them. 12 Characteristics of the case that differentiate 13 them with respect to the finding that a homicide is justifiable. 14 15 And I just want to make a couple of 16 comments on the Supplementary Homicide Data. We 17 used the same data that Bill talked about, 2005 to 2010, is our primary report. We've revisited it 18 19 since then and added new data as it's become 20 available and the findings don't really vary that much. So the one that we've documented the best 21 is the 2012 studies. And that's what I want to 22 23 talk about today. 24 In the 2005 to 2010 study there were 25 83,000 homicides in that six year period. In

1 2 2 order to say anything about the race of the victim 3 and the race of the offender, of course we have to know something about the offender. And we don't 4 always know who did it so we can't always say 5 6 that, so we end up with the data set of about 53,000 people. 7 8 The Supplementary Homicide Data are 9 limited in some important ways that are worth 10 discussing. One is that, like Bill said, we have 11 to rely on how local law enforcement codes these 12 things and we have no way to independently 13 validate whether what they've -- the decisions 14 that they've made before a verdict occurs are 15 accurate or not. So we sort of have to trust 16 them. 17 There's a lot of missing data like I said. And then there's some very important 18 19 caveats to be made about context that I want to 20 revisit at the end, which will be in four minutes. 21 So what we find is that in two and a half percent of cases where there's a homicide, 22 the homicide is ruled to be justified. 23 One 24 comment I do want to make is when we talk about 25 white-on-white, white-on-black, black-on-white, or

1 black-on-black, I received a lot of criticism 2 about using those definitions because of course 3 Mr. Zimmerman has some Hispanic origins and people 4 said that that's an important matter. 5 The FBI 6 data are coded according to the guidelines from the census bureau and so there is no ethnicity in 7 there, there's just simply race. So he would have 8 9 been coded as white. 10 There are other important matters in the 11 Supplementary Homicide Report that we wanted to 12 control for when we did our more expansive 13 statistical analysis like whether a firearm was 14 used, whether there were multiple victims and 15 offenders, whether these people were strangers or 16 not, gender, age. So what do we find? So -- my apologies. 17 So we find some really interesting things, so what 18 19 we find is -- the first question is, is stand your 20 ground effective at doing what it intends to do, which is to increase the rate at which homicides 21 are ruled to be justified. And it turns out that 22 23 it is. 24 So the overall rate at which homicides 25 are ruled to be justified in the data that we look

1	2
2	at is two and a half percent. It's 3.7 percent in
3	stand your ground states. And 2.1 percent in
4	non-stand your ground states.
5	And I just want to make one quick caveat
6	about what I mean by a stand your ground state.
7	We looked at 6 years of data and lots of states
8	went from being a non-stand your ground state to
9	being a stand your ground state during the period
10	that we examined. We think about each year and
11	state independently.
12	So if a state is a non-stand your ground
13	state in 2005 and 2006, passes a law in 2007, in
14	those first 3 years it's in the non-stand your
15	ground grouping. And in the last 4 years it's
16	3 years it's in the stand your ground grouping
17	because I think that issue has come up when people
18	have been critical of this study.
19	Okay. And then we get into the
20	unintended consequences of whether there are
21	racial disparities that are associated with this
22	change whether there are racial disparities
23	with the application of the finding of justifiable
24	homicide and then whether it changes over time.
25	The first question is is what is the

1	2
2	rate at which black-on-black homicides are ruled
3	to be justified? It's 2.4 percent. The overall
4	average is 2.5 percent. It's no difference.
5	White-on-white it's 2.2 percent, compared to 2.5
6	percent, basically no difference.
7	In homicides where the shooter is black
8	and the victim is white, those are ruled to be
9	justified 1.2 percent of the time. In cases where
10	the shooter is white and the victim is black those
11	are ruled to be justified 11.2 percent of the
12	time. Ten times more likely if the shooter is
13	white and the victim is black, than if the shooter
14	is black and the victim is white.
15	If you look at the data before and after
16	a state becomes a stand your ground state you see
17	those same discrepancies. You see white-on-black
18	homicides are justified 9.5 percent of the time.
19	And black-on-white homicides are justified 1.1
20	percent of the time.
21	After a state becomes a stand your
22	ground state the disparity gets even bigger.
23	Black-on-white homicides are ruled to be justified
24	at about the same rate they were in non-stand your
25	ground states, 1.4 percent compared to 1.1.

1	2
2	White-on-black homicides are ruled to be
3	justified 16.8 percent of the time, where they
4	were 9 percent before.
5	So I just want to say that we ran a
6	bunch of really complicated statistical analyses
7	that I won't bore you with to try and make sure
8	that we weren't confusing the effects of other
9	things like the type of firearm used, or their
10	age, or the, you know, other things, and we find
11	the exact same thing. When we add additional
12	years to the data, we find the same thing.
13	So if you know, so the question on
14	the table is, in 9 seconds is this, do these
15	disparities could these disparities be
16	explained by processes other than racial
17	discrimination? And the answer is if you look at
18	other racial disparities across the system is
19	these disparities are so much bigger than other
20	disparities in terms of sentencing, and death
21	penalty, and arrest rates, and stop and frisk's
22	that it's really hard to believe that that is
23	true.
24	Thank you very much. I look forward to
25	your questions.

1	27
2	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,
3	Mr. Roman.
4	Mr. Gerney.
5	MR. ARKADI GERNEY: Thank you. First of
6	all I'd just like to thank the commission for
7	having me here today and accepting my testimony.
8	My name is Arkadi Gerney, I'm with The
9	Center for American Progress, a think tank, based
10	in Washington.
11	My testimony is going to focus on the
12	intersection of stand your ground laws with lax
13	laws around concealed carrying of firearms that
14	put guns in the hands of people who have prior
15	criminal histories or run-ins with law
16	enforcement.
17	And I'm going to start by illustrating
18	one particular case.
19	In 2005 a young Florida man was went
20	to a bar with a friend of his. His friend was
21	arrested for underage drinking and and that man
22	became agitated according to police reports, and
23	pushed a police officer and was ultimately charged
24	with two felonies.
25	Those felony charges were ultimately

1	
2	reduced and then later waived when the defendant
3	entered a court-ordered alcohol education program
4	and a court-ordered anger management class.
5	One month later he had a issues with
6	his fiancée and that led to another run in with
7	law enforcement. And ultimately a temporary
8	restraining order filed against this person.
9	Under federal law, had the court issued
10	a permanent domestic violence restraining order
11	this man would have been barred from purchasing or
12	possessing a firearm. But it was a temporary
13	order and in most states that is not a bar to
14	purchasing a firearm. And this man in fact did
15	purchase a firearm. And in 2009 obtained a gun
16	carry permit from the State of Florida.
17	Let's jump ahead to 2013. In 2013 this
18	same man had an incident where according to police
19	reports he threatened his estranged wife with a
20	firearm. She ultimately declined to press
21	charges. Two months later in 2013 the same man
22	was arrested and charged with felony assault for
23	pointing a shotgun at another woman, his
24	girlfriend at the time, during an argument.
25	And then just last month this same man

1	2
2	got in an argument with a driver and threatened to
3	kill him. That driver called the police, but
4	ultimately also declined to press charges.
5	This man did one other thing during this
6	period which is, on February 26, 2009 he shot and
7	killed an unarmed teenager named Trayvon Martin.
8	So George Zimmerman's history with
9	firearms, run-in's with the law, are interesting.
10	However none of these incidents resulted in a
11	criminal conviction for Mr. Zimmerman. And under
12	federal law this pattern of incidents is not
13	sufficient to bar Mr. Zimmerman from possessing
14	firearms.
15	But remarkably, none of these incidents
16	and not these incidents in their totality have
17	rendered George Zimmerman ineligible to have a
18	special license from the State of Florida to carry
19	a concealed firearm. A license that he has to
20	this day.
21	In some states the temporary restraining
22	order, the lengthy history of run-ins with the
23	law, of the shooting of Mr. Martin would have been
24	sufficient for that license to be revoked or never
25	have been issued in the first place. But not in

Florida.

1

2

3 So the trial -- Mr. Zimmerman and his acquittal, I think leaves some -- has certainly 4 raised questions about stand your ground laws. 5 6 And as John, and others on this panel and the panels that you'll hear before you will talk 7 about, I think, particularly two potential effects 8 9 of stand your ground laws. And there's a growing 10 body of evidence behind those effects, which is 11 that they seemed to increase lethality and there 12 seems to be a racially disparate impact in how they're applied. 13

But this other body of law -- this body of law that put the gun in Mr. Zimmerman's hands in the first place, this body of law that made him feel authorized to be a self-appointed armed community watchman is something that demands examination as well.

20 And in Florida we know that in stand 21 your ground cases 63 percent of the defendant's 22 used firearms to kill their victims. Stand your 23 ground doesn't only apply to firearms. You can 24 defend yourself under stand your ground laws or 25 claim self-defense under stand your ground laws

1	
2	through any means, but we know from all kinds of
3	evidence that firearms increases the lethality of
4	that attempt at self-defense.
5	And we know that in Florida 1 in 3
6	people who committed a homicide using and used
7	the stand your ground defense had previously been
8	charged with committing a violent crime. So the

8 charged with committing a violent crime. So the 9 archetype of the good guy with the gun, which does 10 appropriately apply to most concealed carry permit 11 holders, most concealed carry permit holders do 12 not have prior run-ins with the law. Most 13 concealed carry permits do not have a record like 14 Mr. Zimmerman's, does not apply to all concealed 15 carry permit holders.

And different states have very, very
different processes for evaluating who should get
this special license to carry a gun.

19In the strongest laws the states have20given the licensing authority, typically a local21law enforcement agency, very broad discretion to22determine based on the arrest record and other --23and other indicators whether or not someone should24get a concealed carry permit.

25 Additionally some states provide some

1	
2	limited discretion to the licensing authority to
3	issue or revoke a permit based on a certain
4	certain narrower categories of discretion. And
5	most states apply some additional categorical
6	prohibitions that go beyond the federal
7	prohibitions on gun possession.
8	A number of states, at least, exclude
9	people convicted of misdemeanor, crimes of
10	violence, at least, if those convictions were
11	recent. But not all states do that.
12	And what we know and or what I would
13	leave you with is that it's not you know, the
14	question before you is not whether someone should
15	have a right to self-defense. We've had that
16	right through common law for hundreds of years in
17	this country. The question before us is not
18	whether Americans should be able to get a permit
19	to carry a concealed firearm.
20	In 1980 there are 18 states had no
21	concealed carry, today all 50 states have some
22	process for issuing concealed carry permits and
23	some capacity for people to get them. All 50
24	states.
25	The question is, what should the scope

1	3
2	of the self-defense law be? Does it need to go
3	beyond the traditional scope? And who should get
4	that permit to carry a concealed gun?
5	Because when you put it together and
6	you're putting guns in the hands of people who
7	have clear a clear pattern and practice that
8	suggests that they may create a risk to public
9	safety, and you're reducing the threshold to use
10	lethal force, more people are going to die.
11	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,
12	Mr. Gerney.
13	Mr. Crump.
14	MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: Thank you to the
15	commission for allowing me to testify this
16	morning. And I apologize that my testimony is not
17	in PowerPoint presentation. My staff has been
18	very busy up in Ferguson, Missouri. So please
19	accept my apologies for that, but we will submit
20	the testimony that I present to you in a very
21	short fashion.
22	I want to talk as the attorney for
23	Trayvon Martin, as well as Michael Giles, two real
24	individuals. Real life individuals. Young
25	African American men who have been severely

1	3
2	affected by the stand your ground laws.
3	And I want to talk about, as an
4	attorney, the application of those laws. And I
5	want to talk about it from three frames of
6	reference.
7	Number one, from a constitutional
8	perspective. Number two, from a judicial
9	perspective. And number three, from a societal
10	perspective.
11	But I want to begin by borrowing what
12	Mr. Roman said about stand your ground, because as
13	I've said in many, many, occasions stand your
14	ground was a solution looking for a problem.
15	There was nothing wrong with self-defense. It had
16	operated for over 200 years just fine. There was
17	no need, and to this day, still there's no need
18	for the stand your ground law.
19	So we start with the constitutional
20	application of how this law has been arbitrarily
21	applied. Before the law's passage there was an
22	average of 12 justifiable killings per year.
23	Since stand your ground passed that average has
24	grown to 36. To date 32 states have passed
25	similar laws boosted by the National Rifle

1	
2	Association and the conservative corporate backed
3	American legislative exchange counsel Alec
4	(phonetic).
5	Since the shooting of Trayvon Benjamin
6	Martin the law's constitutionality is being
7	questioned.
8	Now the argument is that one has the
9	right to defend oneself in the face of imminent
10	danger and is treated as constitutional in nature.
11	I, along with Miss Lucia McBath, who was supposed
12	to appear before you, have joined forces with some
13	other lawyers to bring a constitutional challenge
14	in the State of Georgia to stand your ground.
15	And what we are looking at in the
16	simplest sense of the word, is that the law is
17	unconstitutionally vague and warrants its
18	enforcement prohibited by a legal injunction.
19	Because what's at issue is what constitutes a
20	reasonable fear?
21	It is without question that the
22	determination of reasonableness of ones fear and
23	the implication of self-defense will differ an
24	application if the decedent is an unarmed, elderly
25	white woman as opposed to an unarmed young black

1 3 2 man, our complaint states. З Does the reasonable person stand up with regard to the use of self-defense when an 4 individual is standing one's ground offers 5 different levels of protection to individuals 6 based upon their race. 7 And I don't want to read our whole 8 9 complaint, but I'm picking out parts that I think 10 are pertinent. 11 By not defining what actions create a 12 reasonable perception justifying the use of deadly 13 force the act potentially deprives all of Georgia's citizens of the right to life without 14 15 due process of law and contravention of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution, as 16 17 the law is so vague as to not apprise a person of common intelligence of the bowels of lawful 18 19 behavior. 20 By creating a right to kill based upon an individuals reasonable fear without defining 21 what circumstances would demonstrate reasonable --22 23 the act will potentially deprive individuals of 24 their lives without due process of the law, as 25 reasonable is not defined there is no way for an

1	3
2	individual to comport his actions within the
3	confines of the law and that's to prevent being
4	slayed due to reasonable fear of another.
5	I submit to you ladies and gentlemen of
6	this commission, it has been longstanding in the
7	courts of America we go back to Bernard Goetz
8	in New York, and the People-v-Goetz, cite 68 New
9	York 2nd District. Courts around the country have
10	accepted that race of an individual is relevant
11	evidence in determining the reasonableness of a
12	claim of self-defense.
13	So what do parents, American citizens,
14	of little black and brown children tell them when
15	they are confronted with people like Bernard Goetz
16	or anybody else as it relates to the
17	reasonableness of you being a threat.
18	You better fear the courts have said
19	that you can that is a factor. And so I move
20	on to the judicial application in consideration of
21	my time.
22	Stand your ground is a pretrial motion.
23	A pretrial motion. When you look at how it was
24	applied in the Zimmerman case, they said, "We're
25	not going to argue stand your ground." We're not

1 going to bring it up -- first they said they 2 3 would, and then they said, "No, no, we're not going to argue it." Because if it's applied the 4 way that it's supposed to be applied you bring it 5 6 up as a pretrial motion and it's before the trial ever begins. If you win it, you win it. You go 7 8 home, there is no civil immunity attached to you 9 or anything, you are completely exonerated. 10 But if you lose it you cannot bring it 11 up again during the course of the trial. You 12 can't wait 'til the jury instruction and say, "Oh, 13 you have a right to stand your ground." That's why it's unconstitutionally vague from a judicial 14 15 perspective. Thirdly, and lastly, what my grandmother 16 17 says is, "The real life perspective of how we apply these laws." 18 19 Trayvon Benjamin Martin didn't get the 20 benefit of stand your ground. Marissa Alexander 21 in Jacksonville, Florida who had an altercation with a documented domestic violent spouse, shot 22 23 one of the shots in the air is facing 60 years in 24 prison. 25 Michael Giles, even more extreme. Α

1 39 young 25 year old military officer serving his 2 3 country. Has served twice in the middle east, was down in Tampa, Florida, came up to Tallahassee Δ visiting his college friends, there was an 5 6 altercation not involving him at all. The people in the altercation, by their testimony, attacked 7 him. While he was being hit and kicked he pulled 8 9 the licensed gun that he had a permit to carry, 10 shot him in the leg. Glazed his leg, the gentleman 11 was out the next day. He's says, "Stand your 12 ground it doesn't work for black people." He was 13 sentenced to 25 years in prison. 14 Because of time I don't have the 15 opportunity to go into the facts of how egregious 16 Michael Giles' case is. But he is sitting in prison now for 25 years and Trayvon Martin's 17 killer is walking around free. 18 19 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you, 20 Mr. Crump. Professor Russel-Brown. 21 MS. KATHERYN RUSSEL-BROWN: 22 Thank you 23 for the opportunity to meet and speak with this 24 revered and august group with a 57 year history. 25 I want to note that I'm also here in my

1	4
2	capacity as the Director for the Center for the
3	Study of Race and Race Relations at the University
4	of Florida.
5	Next year 2015 marks the 150th
6	anniversary of the passage of the 13th amendment,
7	the amendment that abolished slavery. Section two
8	of that amendment empowers Congress to uphold this
9	amendment by legislating what would have been
10	deemed badges and incidents of slavery.
11	And I would suggest that in some ways
12	what we're talking about here today, what the
13	argument is with regard to the impact of race, and
14	in particular ah, I'll look at the stand your
15	ground law, is about these these legacies and
16	about badges and incidents of this legacy of
17	slavery in this country.
18	I'd like to offer a few recommendations
19	for the commission to consider with regard to
20	addressing issues of racial bias.
21	First of all the need for racial impact
22	statements. Many have written about this, Mark
23	Mower at the Sentencing Commission excuse me,
24	at the Sentencing Project in particular, has
25	written eloquently about the need for racial

1 41 impact statements. And what I would make the case 2 3 for is that they shouldn't be limited to one particular type of -- or piece of the justice 4 system, not just with regard to sentencing for 5 6 example, but that racial impact statements should be required for any new laws. Anything that has 7 to do with sentencing in the criminal justice 8 9 system that there should be some attempt to look 10 at what the outcome will be when these laws are 11 adopted. And a few jurisdictions, a few states 12 have in fact passed racial impact -- or passed the 13 requirement for racial impact statements, 14 including Iowa was the first. 15 And so we're obviously at a point now 16 where we have stand your ground laws, at least, in 17 33 jurisdictions. At least half of the states have statutes on stand your ground laws so this is 18 19 -- the law has already -- these laws have already 20 been passed. So what we're really talking about 21 now is post-implementation assessment of the racial impact of these laws. 22 23 And so I would suggest that at a minimum 24 that any states that are considering stand your 25 ground laws should have to have some kind of --

1	
2	should have to have some kind of do some kind
3	of racial impact statements for them.
4	In some ways talking about stand your
5	ground and I'm glad that I'm the last person on
6	the panel in some ways because what has come
7	before has been that what we're talking about
8	goes beyond just one particular aspect of the
9	criminal justice system, we're not just talking
10	about stand your ground, because stand your ground
11	doesn't operate in a vacuum. We're also talking
12	about policing. We're also talking about race.
13	We're also talking about images of race. We're
14	also talking about history.
15	And so it's important to keep in mind
16	that we're talking about pre-arrests. We're
17	talking about arrests. We're talking about what
18	happens within the justice system about the
19	decision to charge. All the steps along the
20	continuum of the criminal justice system to
21	sentencing to post-sentencing. So all of this
22	matters in terms of needing to take, really, a
23	criminal justice racial census. Needing to
24	consider what the bigger picture is.

25 Earlier this year there was a bill

1 introduced, the Justice Integrity Act of 2014, 2 3 HR-3907. And this bill is designed to -- it was designed to increase public confidence in the 4 justice system. And address any unwarranted 5 6 racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal 7 process. 8 Now this goes into, obviously, detail 9 into the bill, but that racial -- establish a 10 pilot program on racial and ethnic data, 11 defendants and victims. That this information 12 would be gathered and a look at whether or not --13 and to what degree race impacts outcome in cases 14 and it would end in a report by an advisory group 15 which, I'm sure members of the commission know 16 that this group would include someone from -- from 17 the commission. So I would argue for making this justice 18 19 integrity, judicial -- Justice Integrity Act Law.

19 Integrity, judicial -- Justice Integrity Act Law. 20 That Congress should pass it. That the states 21 should have similar laws and that minimally that 22 there should be some racial impact, racial impact 23 statements should be made for any proposed 24 criminal legislation.

25 Second, we need to have more than a

1 2 conversation on race. There's a general ignorance 3 about the role that race has played in the development in history of this country. You can Δ graduate from high school in this country without 5 6 ever learning about seminal aspects of U.S. history involving African Americans in particular, 7 about slave patrols, about black codes (phonetic), 8 9 about the Klan, about white race riots, about 10 lynching, sundown towns, the Tuskegee Syphilis 11 Experiment, redlining, freedom riders, white 12 Flight, mass incarceration. These are things that 13 young people can graduate from high school and 14 really never have had any detailed discussion, 15 conversation, reading about.

16 And this points to a large scale failing 17 in our system of public schooling. And I think we missed an opportunity to teach on race. So every 18 19 year or so we experience a major racial incident, 20 typically, a criminal one involving the killing of 21 someone African American or some language used 22 indicating racial hatred. And so there's really 23 -- in some ways a kind of an epic race fail. 24 And we seem to come back to the same 25 place that we're talking about, images of race, in

1	45
2	particular images of African Americans that the
3	perception is that black somehow equals deviants,
4	somehow equals crime, what I call the "criminal
5	black man," one word. And that this is this is
6	this is where we are.
7	I'd like to point out that in the State
8	of Florida there is a mandate that there's
9	supposed to be some history taught on race in the
10	K through 12 curriculum. And that this should
11	include the history of African Americans,
12	including the history of African people before the
13	conflicts that led to the development of slavery,
14	the passage to America, the enslavement
15	experience, abolition, and the contributions of
16	African Americans to American society.
17	Well, why is this important? Because we
18	can't wait for incidents and be reactive to these
19	incidents involving race, involving images of
20	race, addressing issues of implicit bias after
21	they've happened. We have to do something about
22	what people know about, what they experience with
23	regard to race.
24	So let me just say in conclusion that
25	with regard to one last recommendation and this

1		4
2	supports what has been said already by Professor	
3	Harris and that is more data, more information on	
4	implicit bias. And I would just also like to add	
5	that in some of the research there have been	
6	have included studies including police officers	
7	who have shown that they too make the connection	
8	between race and something negative about African	
9	Americans in that association.	
10	Thank you for your time.	
11	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you,	
12	Professor. At this point I'm going to open it to	
13	commissioners for questions.	
14	And, Commissioner Yaki.	
15	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Yes, thank you very	
16	much, Mr. Chair.	
17	I have a question for the panel. I	
18	think I think it's fairly simple but it	
19	probably isn't. If you are one of the	
20	rationales for stand your ground has been that it	
21	will enhance the protection of people in society.	
22	And my question sort of goes to the heart of why	
23	we're here today. And that is, if you're an	
24	African American are your protections enhanced by	
25	stand your ground laws?	

1 MR. DAVID HARRIS: I know that others 2 3 are going to testify Commissioner about the empirical evidence and some already have, but I 4 think -- there is no evidence that this is 5 protecting -- that it makes anybody safer in a 6 sense because homicides increase in states with 7 8 these laws. And it does not, as was also 9 advocated, in the initial run up to these laws, 10 they do not seem to stop other kinds of serious 11 crime either. 12 So I think that there's no -- there's 13 certainly no evidence that this is making anyone safer. And as far as whether it makes African 14 15 Americans safer, just go back to Dr. Roman's research, there's real evidence that this 16 introduces a level of bias into the system. It 17 increases the bias that might already be there, 18 19 because as a number of people said this morning, 20 there is already background bias in the system but 21 it makes it -- it just makes it more so. 22 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner 23 Heriot --24 COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: I think he 25 asked the panel --

1 4 2 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Oh, I'm sorry. З MR. JOHN ROMAN: So I'd like to say something about that as well. I think that -- so 4 I testified earlier that the evidence is that if 5 6 you look at these cross-race patterns of victims and offenders that the stand your ground 7 ___ application of a stand your ground law in any 8 9 state increases the likelihood that any cross-race 10 victim offender combination will be more likely to 11 be found justified except for black-on-white 12 homicides, which don't change. 13 So I think two things are going on there 14 that are really important. One thing that is 15 going on there is that this law is in fact 16 increasing the number of times that people are 17 found to be justified for taking somebody else's life without any prior evidence that that was a 18 19 problem. 20 One, that people were being wrongfully 21 convicted. And that applies to whites shooting whites, or killing whites. Blacks killing blacks, 22 23 and whites killing blacks -- but not to blacks 24 killing whites. 25 So it's making a disparity that's

1	2
2	already pretty big even bigger. And the other
3	thing that it's doing that we haven't talked much
4	about here is it's doing it in a really haphazard
5	manner. So if you believe that that we've
6	increased the number of justifiable homicides
7	homicides that are found to be justifiable and you
8	don't see any prior evidence that there was a
9	problem with wrongful convictions in these cases
10	then basically what you've done is doubled the
11	number of times that justice isn't served. And
12	you've doubled the number of times that justice
13	isn't served, but not for blacks when they're
14	involved in a homicide with whites.
15	So it just seems to make the disparities
16	more haphazard and less just.
17	MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: No.
18	MR. JOHN ROMAN: That's a better answer
19	than mine.
20	MS. KATHERYN RUSSEL-BROWN: No. No,
21	there's no empirical evidence to support the
22	claim. It's something that comes up whenever
23	there's new criminal legislation that because
24	blacks are disproportionately victimized by crime,
25	by serious crime, that they will benefit if the

1	5
2	law is harsher, but there's no there's no
3	support for that.
4	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner
5	Heriot.
6	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Thank you,
7	Mr. Chairman.
8	Mr. Krouse, I need to understand a
9	little better about the data collection that you
10	were talking about for justifiable homicides. I'm
11	feeling a little lost particularly when you said
12	that justifiable homicides may be massively under
13	reported.
14	I assume that's not true of actual
15	homicides. I mean, the homicides the ones that
16	are classified as murder and voluntary
17	manslaughter for that matter involuntary
18	manslaughter.
19	So could you tell me how this works? At
20	what point do police departments report a
21	homicide? I mean, sometimes I assume a homicide
22	occurs, they don't know whether it is a
23	justifiable homicide, a murder, or a manslaughter.
24	How does this work?
25	At what point do they report it? If

1	5
2	they report it early do they then go back and
3	amend and say, "Okay, this was justifiable or this
4	one was murder." How often do they do that?
5	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Well, there's no
6	fixed procedure it's by agency by agency and they
7	fill out a form for the FBI. And it can be at any
8	process they decide they're going to report on it.
9	So these reports reflect data collection at
10	various stages of an investigation. But, you
11	know
12	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Are they
13	constantly being amended? I mean, I'm really
14	quite lost here
15	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: No, they're not
16	constantly being amended. So they send in the
17	report
18	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: So something could
19	be reported there's a murder that turns out to
20	be a justifiable homicide and it never gets
21	recorded, right?
22	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: There's a
23	possibility that there are justifiable homicides
24	that are recorded that are later found to be
25	murders and vice-a-versa murders that are later

1 5 found to be justifiable homicides. And neither 2 З the UCR nor the SHR reflect that. COMMISSIONER HERIOT: So my Δ understanding is that when it comes to justifiable 5 homicides that there's no requirement that -- that 6 7 police departments be doing that, and perhaps over time we've seen more and more police departments 8 reporting those and that that could drive these 9 10 statistics -- you suggested that in one of your 11 charts. 12 MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Well, I find it 13 interesting that you used the word requirement because this is one of the -- one of the 14 15 fascinating things about America and the FBI and 16 state and local law enforcement, this is all 17 grassroots. This is state and locals coming to the FBI, and the FBI saying, "Yeah, it's a good 18 19 idea to collect this data. And to the extent that 20 you'll provide it to us we'll be happy to compile 21 it for you." Same with criminal history records. 22 And I don't want to get into the legalities of 23 Congress or the federal government requiring states to do certain things, but in general we 24 25 don't require them to submit these records, they

do it on their own.

1

2

3 However, as I pointed out, it's somewhat intermittent. We're much more confident about the 4 just straight up murder and non-negligent homicide 5 6 data than we are on the justifiable homicides. We're much more confident about the justifiable 7 8 homicides by law enforcement. But Gary Kleck in 9 Point Blank has estimated, and I think this is --10 has stood to some academic scrutiny, that the 11 justifiable homicides carried out by private 12 citizens are under reported in both the UCR and 13 the SHR.

14 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: So -- and over 15 time I take it, you know, if it's true that we've 16 had more and more agencies reporting this then we 17 would get, probably, a bias in the stats that 18 would make it look like the number of justifiable 19 homicides is going up. Is that --

20 MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: It's been -- it's 21 been suggested that that might be the case. Might 22 be.

23 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: If I -24 MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: But, we have no
25 firm evidence that that is the case.

1	
2	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: But the chart that
3	you showed I think sure the chart you showed
4	was limited to a certain time period and I didn't
5	get a chance to see it. How long a period was
6	that?
7	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: It's 2001 through
8	2010.
9	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: So do you have any
10	information about whether or not there has been an
11	increase or a decrease or or you know, are
12	more and more agencies reporting this or is that
13	not true?
14	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: I didn't have an
15	opportunity to glean that from the SHR data but
16	that could be done.
17	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Mr. Roman.
18	MR. JOHN ROMAN: So, it's a great
19	question, right. I mean, these data are flawed.
20	They're fundamentally flawed and I think you did a
21	wonderful job earlier of describing how they're
22	flawed. And it's it's voluntary reporting, you
23	know, it's what we have.
24	But I think what's really important in
25	understanding these data is that it's not the

1	5
2	overall increase in the number of places that are
3	reporting and the overall number of homicides that
4	we have some understanding of, what matters is
5	really, do the proportions change. Right?
6	If we go from, you know, two and a half
7	percent justified to almost four percent
8	justified, it sort of doesn't matter if we're
9	getting better compliance or less compliance or
10	whatever it is, what matters is that that
11	proportion of the number of justify homicides
12	that are found to be justified is increasing
13	regardless of whatever
14	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: In the stand your
15	ground states you're talking about there?
16	MR. JOHN ROMAN: Right. That's correct.
17	Yes.
18	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. I'm going
19	to ask a couple of questions, and we're going to
20	have Commissioner Narasaki, Commissioner
21	Achtenberg.
22	We're also going to want one of our
23	staff members Dr. Goliday to ask some questions
24	and then any other commissioners who indicate so.
25	My two questions the first one is one

1	
2	that I asked the earlier panel. Well, you know,
3	as we are really talking about this in the
4	black/white binary and I know there are
5	limitations on the data that's being reported, but
6	do you all have any information on the impact of
7	these laws on Latino's or other ethnic minorities
8	or religious minorities such as Muslim and Arab
9	Americans?
10	Anybody?
11	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Well, sir, I can
12	tell you that I've spent the past year very
13	carefully looking at multiple victim murders in
14	the wake of Newtown, and that's a very complicated
15	question because I've went back and I've
16	identified the names of the victims and the
17	offenders in those incidents where four or more
18	people were shot to death.
19	And when you look at that it's very
20	difficult to tell. If you're Hispanic, that's a
21	matter of ethnicity, it's not a matter of race.
22	So you can be a black Hispanic, you can be a white
23	Hispanic, for that matter you can be an American
24	Indian Hispanic.
25	And when you look at people who are of

1 57 Middle Eastern descent they're usually always 2 3 considered white in the UCR. So there are limitations. And this all goes back to an OMB Δ (phonetic) Circular. And it's the way that we 5 6 collect data on race and ethnicity in the United 7 States. And I can't remember the exact year, but 8 9 we haven't always collected data in the UCR or the 10 SHR on ethnicity. It's a fairly recent thing, 11 within the last decade or half. 12 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. Thank you. 13 Mr. Roman, I don't know if you've had 14 the chance to -- I don't know if any of you have 15 had the chance to see the written testimony of 16 other witnesses that have appeared or will appear, 17 but in the afternoon panel we have John Lott of the Crime Prevention Research Center. And in his 18 19 written remarks -- I don't know, have you seen 20 those, Mr. Roman? MR. JOHN ROMAN: I have not. 21 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: I'm going to read 22 23 you an excerpt and I'd like to hear your thoughts 24 on it. He actually, specifically, addresses your 25 report -- The Urban Institute Report.

1 5 2 He says, "In contrast to the Tampa Bay 3 Tribune data a recent Urban Institute study by John Roman claims to have found stand your ground Δ laws appear to exacerbate those racial differences 5 6 as cases all over are significantly more likely to be justified in stand your ground states than in 7 non-stand your ground states." 8 9 "Roman acknowledges that his data lacks 10 details available in the Tampa Bay Tribune data. 11 The data here cannot completely address this 12 problem because the setting of the incident cannot 13 be observed. Indeed Roman's estimates contain virtually none of the information available in the 14 15 Tampa Bay Tribune Report data set." 16 "For example, his data has no 17 information on whether any eyewitnesses saw the confrontation or whether there existed physical 18 19 evidence. And it has no information on who 20 initiated the confrontation, where the attack 21 occurred, or the type of case." "Nevertheless even using the limited 22 23 information Roman draws the wrong conclusion from 24 his analysis to the extent to which the Urban 25 Institute Study proves anything," he says, "It

1 59 proves the opposite of what Roman claims." 2 З Could you address those concerns? MR. JOHN ROMAN: Sure. I would be Δ delighted to. So I think -- so there's a couple 5 of things going on here. So, you know, there's an 6 old saying in statistics, "All statistical models 7 8 are wrong, and some are useful." 9 And the question is, which of these 10 statistical models are most useful? So the Tampa 11 Bay Tribune analysis is really what we would call 12 in the social science a convenience sample. They 13 just got what they could get. And if you want to understand the whole 14 15 of the stand your ground issue, and the whole of 16 the justifiable homicide you want to go to as 17 broad a sample as you can obtain. Or if you want to go to a small sample that you want to dive 18 19 really deeply into, you want to make sure that 20 it's a random selection so that you can say things 21 about the cases that you didn't get data on. So this is the choice that we have. 22 23 So the Supplementary Homicide Report 24 data does not contain information about the 25 context. That's a very important limitation of

1	6	5
2	the data, and I think that we acknowledged that in	
3	the report. But it does contain it's not	
4	it's not it's not a sampling strategy, it's	
5	every single homicide that occurred in this	
6	period it's a census.	
7	So on one hand we have information about	
8	every single case that happened. On the other	
9	hand the Tampa Bay Trib looked at a couple hundred	
10	cases that they could get data on and try to draw	
11	some inferences from it. I think it all sort of	
12	helps to paint the picture.	
13	But, you know, I mean, I teach	
14	statistics at the University of Pennsylvania and,	
15	you know, I would prefer that my students would	
16	work with data that's more of a census, and if	
17	they can't get that then sort of a random	
18	probability sample. And if they can't get that	
19	then a convenience sample like what the Tampa Bay	
20	Trib did would probably be the last resort for me.	
21	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you.	
22	MS. KATHERYN RUSSEL-BROWN: And related	
23	to that I just want to go back to the question	
24	that you asked earlier about moving past the	
25	black/white binary area. That in that data, that	

1	6
2	the Tampa Bay Times collected they do have
3	information on Hispanic's as victims and as
4	offenders using stand your ground.
5	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Right. Ma'am,
6	thank you. I did see that. And it's an
7	interesting paradox there if I understand that
8	correctly that Hispanic's are more likely to not
9	be convicted when they're using the stand your
10	ground laws, but they are also more likely to be
11	the victims of shootings involving white shooters.
12	So I guess I'll ask Mr. Lott a question
13	about that in the other panel, unless some of you
14	have the answer to that, but
15	So at this point I'd like to cede the
16	floor to Commissioner Narasaki, then Commissioner
17	Achtenberg, then Dr. Goliday.
18	Commissioner.
19	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Thank you. So I
20	have a few questions that some of you can answer.
21	I'm interested in whether there is implicit bias
22	research about Asian's, Latino's, Native
23	American's, and Arab American's that should cause
24	us concern in relationship to the stand your
25	ground laws?

1	6
2	I'm also interested in hearing about
3	we've talked a lot about the data deficiencies,
4	I'm interested in any recommendations you think we
5	should consider about how do we address the gaps
6	that exist?
7	Should the federal government, for
8	example, consider tying a grant for law
9	enforcement support to better data collection on
10	the state level?
11	And then third so, this morning we
12	had a member of the state legislature in South
13	Carolina say, "Well, it may be true that
14	eventually someone will be able to prove that they
15	acted in self-defense and be able to clear
16	themselves. That the challenge is that until that
17	time they're held in jail, they have to spend
18	funds defending themselves, and in some states you
19	could be held for a very long time deprived of
20	your freedom."
21	And in his view I think he's a
22	defense attorney it sounded like. In his view
23	stand your ground has helped people in those
24	situations who should be free, be free up front,
25	instead of having to try to get themselves through

1		63
2	what can often be a challenging criminal system.	
3	And then my final question is to Crump,	
4	which is, you talked a lot about the	
5	unconstitutionally vague notion of reasonable	
6	perception. So this morning we had this debate	
7	about how different is stand your ground from the	
8	traditional self-defense laws. And so this notion	
9	of reasonable fear if you could explain that	
10	difference because we had a lot of debate about	
11	that this morning.	
12	Thank you.	
13	MR. DAVID HARRIS: Commissioner, I'll	
14	try on your first two questions. If you go to the	
15	existing website for the implicit association	
16	operations I think it's now called Project	
17	Implicit ProjectImplicit.org. You will see a	
18	number of different implicit association tests. I	
19	haven't been to that site in a little bit myself,	
20	but I remember that there are now implicit	
21	association tests about testing biases in all	
22	kinds of situations.	
23	I do remember I think at one point	
24	there was one involving Asian populations, and	
25	another involving Muslims. There are gender ones.	

1 6 2 There are same sex relationship ones. So there's 3 quite a variety of this and it's there for looking -- and the test taking, whether this would be a 4 concern whether those kinds of implicit bias would 5 6 be a concern in any stand your ground state, I 7 would say, yes. The question is going to be whether you have any particular population in the 8 9 stand your ground state that you're focusing on 10 that is going to end up using the statute -- or as 11 the victim in a shooting. 12 And if you have a substantial enough 13 population I would think that these questions of 14 implicit bias would apply in those cases too. 15 Your second question about tying federal funding to data collection, I think that that is 16 an idea that has a lot of merit. And I would 17 simply point out that the federal government not 18 19 having the ability to tell local law enforcement, 20 "You will do this, you will do that," or to tell 21 states you're going to have certain kind of law. That's obviously what the Constitution says, but 22 23 the power of the purse rules. 24 When in a misguided attempt, perhaps one 25 remembers, to have a 55 mile an hour speed limit,

1		65
2	remember those days? The federal government said,	
3	"Well, you don't have to, but no more highway	
4	money." And guess what happened?	
5	They had there was a controversy	
6	about the legal limit for drunk driving. The	
7	federal government wanting it to come down to .08	
8	in states that did not have that limit. "Well, you	
9	don't have to do it, but if you want that highway	
10	money think about it." And guess what happened?	
11	So this is something that Congress has	
12	done, the Executive Branch has been part of for	
13	many, many years, and many different	
14	circumstances, and I think that this is one where	
15	they should do it too.	
16	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: I have just a	
17	couple of things to add insights there. One,	
18	Congress does have power of the purse but the	
19	discretionary plot is shrinking with every passing	
20	year.	
21	Two, the amount of money that we devote	
22	to state and local law enforcement has shrunk	
23	particularly in light of 9/11, and it's now in the	
24	Homeland Security bucket, if you will.	
25	And third, the state and local law	

1 6 2 enforcement grant program has a number of ties 3 added on to it already, penalties for this, penalties for that to encourage states, if you 4 will, through a carrot and stick type process to 5 6 do this or that. I would suggest possibly is that one of 7 these things is a priority that can be set for the 8 9 FBI to just strengthen, to encourage the states 10 that we need better data, that our data has 11 somewhat diminished over the years and we could 12 use better data. They oversee this and there's a 13 compact that everyone enters into. So it's one of 14 the great things about America, it's grassroots. 15 But if you don't have strong leadership, and the 16 National Academy of Sciences has two books on this 17 and I recommend them to you on foreign related violence and the statistics that are available, 18 19 and also what's happening in the Bureau of Justice 20 Statistics, you might want to take a look there 21 for different insights and pathways you might be 22 able to take to encourage better data collection. 23 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: If I can ask one 24 more question. Because you explained the 25 challenge with Hispanic data -- ethnic data,

1	67
2	right, but Asian is a race category
3	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Yes, Asian Pacific
4	Island
5	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: yeah, so
6	right. So is there data available on how stand
7	your ground laws effect them on both sides of the
8	equation?
9	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Not specifically.
10	I mean, you'd have to go and you'd have to look
11	at, you know, Asian Pacific Islanders that were
12	involved in justifiable homicides, you know?
13	From there you'd have to make a
14	determination by looking at the reporting agency
15	and the month and the date of the incident to
16	determine what the circumstances were and
17	determine whether stand your ground, Castle
18	Doctrine, or some other factors were at play.
19	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: But the data's
20	there, just somebody has to look at it
21	MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Yes. It's there
22	but it's incomplete and you would be looking at a
23	very, very fine cuts from a percentage point of
24	view.
25	MR. JOHN ROMAN: Can I can I just

1	6
2	offer two thoughts on that? So so, I mean, I
3	have the data here for so for the 6 year
4	period, in Hawaii for instance there were 77
5	homicides. Four were ruled to be justifiable. In
6	the Virgin Islands there were 15, there were none.
7	So, I mean, we have all the data, we
8	have the code, we could certainly do it. I'm much
9	I'm much more comfortable, I think, in the
10	quality of the data because I don't because
11	the thing to remember is, is the quality of the
12	data changing in some way related to justifiable
13	homicides over time?
14	The quality of the data may be changing,
15	the volume of the data may be changing, but
16	there's nothing that would make you think it has
17	anything to do with justifiable homicide. Which
18	is, you have to understand this data set is, you
19	know, 80 variables. And the variable that we're
20	talking about is 1 value 80, you know, in a list
21	of 80 different circumstances. Right?
22	And so the idea that somehow the
23	reporting is changing as a function of this 1
24	value of this 1 variable with 80 levels, it's just
25	it's impossible for me to believe.

1	
2	The other thing I would say is, and the
3	other I would take slight objection to is, I
4	think that you either have to mandate the data
5	collection or it won't happen.
6	In the late 1990's, back when I was a
7	young man. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
8	embarked on an exercise to create the NIBRS,
9	National Incident-Base Reporting System, which is
10	basically the Supplementary Homicide Report data,
11	it's actually even more complete than that for
12	every kind of crime. And they pushed it out to
13	the states, and they asked the states to do this,
14	and the states wouldn't do it. Right?
15	They got partial compliance in 8 or 9
16	states and total compliance in just a couple of
17	others. We live in a completely different IT
18	world then we did in 1998, and 1999, and 2001 when
19	this thing really basically petered out. Right?
20	The cost to local police agencies to
21	comply with this kind of data collection
22	requirement is so trivial compared to what it was
23	in 1998 that I just don't see it as being a huge
24	ask. And it would inform last thought, I'm
25	sorry it would inform so many different

1	
2	questions beyond just what we're talking about
3	today that are really important in reforming these
4	criminal and juvenile justice systems.
5	MR. ARKADI GERNEY: Just to add, we
6	released a report in September of last year which
7	had a number of recommendations, and one of them
8	basically mirrored what Mr. Krouse just said,
9	which is to have a year long process to work with
10	the states to improve the data collection around
11	justifiable homicides, but at the end of that if
12	it didn't improve to withhold some portion of
13	discretionary burn justice assistance grant money
14	which is the principle justice department grant
15	funding streamed to the states.
16	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Anybody else?
17	Mr. Crump.
18	MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: I think that she
19	asked a question about reasonable fear and so I
20	can address that. I'll refer to the academic,
21	great data, and this is a fascinating
22	conversation. I thank the civil rights commission
23	for doing this, but I want to point specifically
24	as it relates to the reasonableness of the fear.
25	I did get an opportunity to talk about Michael

Giles, so hopefully I can interject that in my response.

1

2

3

Michael Giles, 25 year old African 4 American, never convicted of a crime his whole 5 life. Mother and father, military. Brother, 6 military. He's in the military. A good citizen. 7 8 From everybody's standpoint this bar fight that he 9 has nothing do with, he's attacked, the testimony 10 is the guy was looking for the next person he saw 11 to knock out. His testimony is that he lunged at 12 him with the full weight of his body trying to 13 knock him out. While he's on the ground and 14 people are kicking and hitting him he takes the 15 permit -- the gun that he has a permit in his 16 ankle, and shoots the guy in the leg. He is -scratches his leg. He's let out of the hospital 17 in a matter of hours. 18

19He goes to court, stand your ground, if20it should apply to anybody it's him. I mean,21let's be real when you think about what happened22to Trayvon, somebody's following you and say they23all get away -- Mr. Gerney broke it down very24clearly the history of Trayvon's killer.25You look at the history of Michael

1 7 2 Giles, there's nothing there. But when you come 3 to the reasonableness of fear and how this law's been applied, it's startling because the testimony Δ was first based on attempted murder. The victim 5 got on the stand and said, "No, he wasn't trying 6 7 to kill me. If he was wanting to kill me he could have shot me." So the prosecutor had to drop 8 9 that. But the prosecutor still insisted on going 10 forward on the case, on aggravated battery. 11 And so what you have -- what happened, 12 the jury came back because they thought "Well, aggravated battery is lesser and they don't have 13 14 to deal with the sentencing." And they convicted 15 him not knowing that he was going to get 25 years. 16 So I know I'm going a little around your 17 question but I want to bring it back because you look at Marissa Alexander, you look at Georgia, 18 19 you look at all of these things and you say, 20 "Well, if Mr. Giles would have been a white male 21 would he have got greater stand your ground consideration?" If Marissa Alexander had been a 22 23 white female would she have gotten greater stand 24 your ground consideration? 25 And I'm sorry I don't have all of the

1 2 data because as I understand it they don't really 3 want the data. They don't want to present it out there because I know the Congressional Black Δ Caucus asked that question about, "Well, who are 5 6 the victims of stand your ground and who are the beneficiaries of stand your ground?" And they 7 asked the state and the state didn't get anything 8 9 back. As it relates to the -- representative --10 State Representative from South Carolina, you look 11 at that and you scratch your head and you say, 12 "Well, we do want it to be an important thing when somebody decides to take somebody's life." When 13 14 you decide to kill somebody, that you don't want 15 it to just be so arbitrary that we have a law that 16 says you don't have to try to solve it with 17 conflict resolution, you don't have to try to resolve it peacefully, just take your gun out and 18 19 shoot them because remember --- we have 20 self-defense." Under self-defense, you know, the 21 law is different you have a duty to retreat if 22 it's reasonable and safe that you can do so. But 23 under stand your ground you have no such duty. So 24 we have a lot to do with the application, what's 25 real and how it's being applied. So I would hope

1 7 that as far as collecting the data is important, 2 3 but looking at how these courts around America, not just in Florida, but around America -- in 4 Louisiana we have stand your ground cases all the 5 time I'm involved in. Arizona -- and when the 6 victim is black or brown they are criminalized and 7 the implicit biases are put on thick. The person 8 9 who's dead on the ground as an excuse to justify 10 what the killer has done. 11 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. So I'm 12 going to go to Commissioner Achtenberg, followed by Dr. Goliday, followed by Commissioner 13 Timmons-Goodson. And do any of the commissioners 14 15 on the phone want to get on the list? COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Peter Kirsanow 16 17 here, I think I may have a question. COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay, Commissioner 18 19 Kirsanow. 20 Commissioner Achtenberg, you have the 21 floor. COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: Thank you, 22 23 Mr. Chairman. I have in the great tradition of my 24 colleagues, I have two questions. 25 My first question is to

1		75
2	Dr. Russell-Brown. You say in your written	
3	testimony that if there were ways to make implicit	
4	bias explicit that might have some salutary effect	
5	on all of these matters.	
6	Could you further describe ways of	
7	making implicit bias explicit that might be things	
8	for this commission to consider when we get to	
9	recommendations should we conclude that implicit	
10	bias is actually an equal protection or due	
11	process problem when it comes to the	
12	administration of justice and the racial	
13	disparities that may that the statistics may	
14	suggest exist.	
15	MS. KATHERYN RUSSEL-BROWN: The point	
16	that I'm the point that I'm making there is	
17	that we need to I guess it's always play the	
18	piano with all ten fingers. Right? That we need	
19	to consider implicit bias. We need to look at it.	
20	We need to see what impact it has on people's	
21	perceptions of fear, calculating fear, the	
22	empirical research, the sociological research,	
23	criminological research, supports that whites see	
24	African Americans as symbols of fear, that there	
25	are these direct associations and indirect	

1 7 associations made. So the implicit bias and the 2 3 perceptions of what race means, that's there. But in terms of, sort of, nuts and bolts, you know 4 making the connection to what's actually going on 5 6 in the criminal justice system I think that we -and that's why I made the recommendation about the 7 racial impact statement. We have to take a look 8 9 at what's actually going on on the ground. 10 Now at the same time that -- that this 11 needs to happen we're also talking about needing 12 to have -- the idea of having some kind of 13 national data base to gather information. So in addition to, if there is new 14 15 legislation related to criminal laws that there 16 should be some racial impact statement. There also needs to be -- there also 17 need to be databases that gather information so we 18 19 can evaluate what's actually going on. 20 So the idea here is that we need to be 21 mindful of the fact that there is something about race -- that race does matter in the 22 23 administration of justice. And that people's 24 attitudes about crime, attitudes about race, then 25 in turn impact what does actually happen.

1	77
2	So we need to look at these different
3	places. And that's the main point.
4	COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: Thank you very
5	much.
6	And, Mr. Crump, I'm intrigued by the
7	issue of the case that you filed in Georgia
8	questioning the constitutionality of the Georgia
9	stand your ground law. Is that the context?
10	MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: Yes, ma'am.
11	COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: Could you
12	articulate more extensively the rationale that
13	you're proffering there and could you make some
14	suggestions if you will for issues that this
15	commission might consider addressing as it relates
16	to the constitutional principles at issue in your
17	Georgia case?
18	MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: Absolutely. The
19	biggest inference, I guess, if you want to try to
20	frame it, by creating a right to kill based on an
21	individuals reasonableness, fear without defining
22	circumstances with demonstrate reasonable
23	the act that potentially deprives individuals of
24	their lives without due process. And once you do
25	that the cost of that infringes on the fundamental

1 due process right of life. It must be reviewed 2 3 under strict scrutiny. And I think that's where this commission can speak very robustly on that Δ issue because I think stand your ground, it's 5 6 always been this sort of question whether this is 7 constitutional on so many levels. But this whole thing of just the 8 9 reasonableness, like, how do you qualify that to 10 make it uniform and not be arbitrary so we have 11 everybody getting equal justice and it's not one 12 thing in this court, and South Florida one way in 13 this court, and North Florida one way, and Georgia 14 one way, and Arizona one way, and Arkansas one 15 way, and South Carolina, because when you start 16 looking at it being applied like those things --17 being applied like that, but yet you go back to the Constitution of the United States -- and 18 19 saying -- where is a Constitutional privilege to 20 Americans being deprived here. Being, I think, 21 you can bring it to uniformity of everybody in the state saying we're not saying you can't have a 22 23 stand your ground law, but your stand your ground 24 law gotta be un-vague, it has to be clear, it has 25 to tell people what and when they can take

1		7
2	somebody's life and it be uniform.	
3	You can't say just because it's a black	
4	person I think, "Oh, those those black men are	
5	more dangerous than white men so we can give you a	
6	little extra discretion to shoot a black man."	
7	And that's troubling on so many levels.	
8	And as we look at this lawsuit we we it's	
9	about a 40 page complaint so I can't give you all	
10	of the details, but I'm glad that you all provided	
11	me with a lot of experts to choose from when we go	
12	before the Georgia Supreme Court.	
13	But it is one of the things I'll say	
14	in conclusion and where is it is here in	
15	conclusion, when we talked about the Castle	
16	Doctrine it was objective as my classmate Miss	
17	(Inaudible) you know, we got taught in law	
18	school, the Castle Doctrine it was objective	
19	because you were in the house. And so if the	
20	person had a mortgage or they had a lease and	
21	stuff, it was real objective. Didn't have to gues	S
22	about whether the person whether it was their	
23	house and there was an issue of self-defense. It	
24	was their house and why are you in their house	
25	threatening them.	

1 8 2 It gets a lot more subjective when you 3 say, "I'm walking down the street in Sanford, Florida, in a gated community and I think 4 somebody's not supposed to be there, and I go 5 confront them, and I make sure that when I shoot 6 -- because that's the message that we're sending, 7 that the person is dead because if they live --8 9 Marissa Alexander -- it's a lot harder to win your 10 stand your ground argument when somebody can argue 11 that "I wasn't a threat to your life." 12 So when you look at that it becomes very 13 subjective. And when it becomes that subjective it becomes too vague and it doesn't pass the 14 15 constitutional muster. And that's what we're 16 raising to the stand your ground law has been 17 unconstitutional. We haven't got a writ of certiorari yet, 18 19 but we're hoping that the court is going to let us 20 argue it, we're waiting. The commission can speak 21 to that issue and help so much this group of lawyers and parents who are crying out to say "We 22 23 can't bring our children back but let's try to do 24 something for their legacy so it won't happen to 25 your children."

1 COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: 2 So the 3 subjectivity is in the place where this defense can now be proffered as well as the fact that it 4 used to be an objective standard and now it's a 5 6 subjective standard. We heard in the prior panel the State Representative from South Carolina 7 8 acknowledged that if I -- if somebody punches me 9 in the face, and I'm in public I can take my gun 10 out and shoot them. And he went on to say that if 11 I think the person is going to punch me in the 12 face and my -- you know, there's no -- there's no 13 reasonable standard that's applied to that. If I 14 think the person is going to punch me in the face 15 and I pull my gun out and shoot him that's 16 justifiable under their stand your ground law. 17 Is that your understanding of the way the law operates? 18 19 MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: Absolutely. 20 Miss Achtenberg you brought up a very important 21 point and that's the third prong. In self-defense 22 you have a duty to retreat if it was reasonable 23 and safe that you do so. And who could argue with 24 that being a bad law, that you don't kill 25 somebody, if you can get away you have a duty to

1 8 do so if it's reasonable and it's safe. Now if 2 3 it's not reasonable and safe you can defend yourself. But if it's reasonably safe you can do 4 it. 5 6 In the Castle Doctrine said you don't have to retreat if you're in your house, but 7 8 self-defense says you can. So now stand your 9 ground, just as you said -- say -- even if I think 10 you're going to be a threat to me, if you say a 11 word to me and I think that you can follow through 12 with the threat I can just kill you. I don't have 13 to say, "Let me get in my car and drive away." 14 You know, we have -- there have been 15 cases where people in the car could easily drive 16 away, but they shot the person. "I felt 17 threatened, and why did I have to run." -- think about the matter in Texas with the young man 18 19 breaking in the neighbors house. The police tell 20 him, "Don't go over there." He goes over there 21 anyway, says, "I know my rights, I can stand my 22 ground." 23 Where does it end? The theater with the 24 popcorn. You know, I thought that he was a threat 25 to my life. And so it's so subjective, so now

1		83
2	there are three prongs that tag it	
3	constitutionally. One is on the reasonableness of	
4	the fear. The second is on this subjective	
5	criteria, now that it is no longer with the Castle	
6	Doctrine self-defense. And the third is	
7	certainly that no duty to retreat at all,	
8	whatsoever, just take a gun out and shoot the	
9	person.	
10	COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: Thank you.	
11	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Mr. Crump, if you	L
12	don't already know him Jerry Gonzalez of our State	
13	Advisory Committee in Georgia is sitting in the	
14	third row back there, you might also want to talk	
15	to him.	
16	Next we have Dr. Goliday, Commissioner	
17	Timmons-Goodson, Commissioner Kirsanow,	
18	Commissioner Yaki, and then we'll be close to	
19	finishing up on this panel.	
20	DR. SEAN GOLIDAY: Thank you. Many of	
21	my questions have been addressed but I do have	
22	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Could you speak up)
23	a little louder in	
24	DR. SEAN GOLIDAY: many of my	
25	questions have been addressed but I do have just a	

1 8 2 couple of questions for Mr. Krouse and Mr. Roman. 3 Given the methodological issues you (inaudible) with the existing data sources, what 4 would be a likely data source to kind of help us 5 6 address some of the unanswered questions regarding conclusions currently being made about justifiable 7 homicides? 8 9 And the second part of the question is, 10 how can we work to bring that to scale or at least 11 if not to scale, in theoretically important states 12 -- that just kind of start looking at this issue beyond the federally sponsored data collection 13 efforts. 14 15 MR. JOHN ROMAN: Those are hard 16 questions. So with respect to the first question, 17 you know, you could potentially reverse engineer some of this stuff, right? And we're talking 18 19 about in most places where there just aren't that 20 many homicides a year. You could potentially, you 21 know, fund a study that could go and look at the 22 conda (phonetic) newspaper report legal filings 23 about the nature of some random sample of these 24 reports, learn something about the context about 25 them, and try an answer this really critical

1		85
2	question, right? Which is, are homicides of	
3	whites-on-blacks different than homicides of	
4	blacks-on-whites. Right? If one is more likely	
5	to be in context of self-defense than the other	
6	then the racial disparity is appropriate.	
7	The racial disparity is so, you know,	
8	gargantuan that it's hard to believe that would be	
9	true. But you could potentially do that. There	
10	are some confidentiality issues there that I would	
11	be a little concerned about. Beyond that I don't	
12	know what else you could do.	
13	The bigger issue here and we face this	
14	throughout the criminal/juvenile justice system is	
15	that states know what they spend and they have no	
16	idea what they buy. And they don't know what	
17	they're buying in terms of law enforcement. They	
18	don't know what they're buying in terms of	
19	community placements for juveniles, or sentencing,	
20	or corrections, they don't think about outcomes,	
21	they don't share data, they don't share knowledge.	
22	And a lot of what's going in the world	
23	that I inhabit these days is trying to get to	
24	force states, counties and local governments to	
25	articulate what it is they're trying to accomplish	

1 8 and that means making them share data. 2 3 If you share data it forces you to see all of your worts. And I think any 4 effort that this commission can make to force 5 local, county, and state jurisdictions to -- to 6 collect, analyze, share and think about data 7 8 around these kinds of issues will force other 9 reforms that are also really important as well as 10 to help us articulate the answers to the questions 11 that we can't today. 12 MR. DAVID HARRIS: If I could interrupt 13 just a second. I apologize to the commission I'm going to have to depart for an airplane. 14 I'm 15 thankful for the opportunity to testify here and I'd be glad to answer any questions in writing. 16 17 Thank you. COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you, 18 19 Professor. 20 Yes, Mr. Crump. MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: I just -- I got a 21 22 response from Lucia McBath and she again wanted to 23 apologize, but they just sentenced the killer of 24 her son, Michael Dunn, to 105 years on top of a 25 life sentence. She asked me to share this with

1 the commission. 2 З COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you. Any other responses to Dr. Goliday's Δ questions? 5 MR. WILLIAM KROUSE: Well, I agree with 6 Dr. Roman that we need better data. There's a 7 8 need to improve our crime statistics. And if I 9 lived in a perfect world and I could dedicate 10 myself to this issue I would go and I would look 11 at each one of those SHR records and contact the 12 reporting agencies and try and find out what the 13 circumstances were. 14 I mean, you're looking at 15 stranger-on-stranger, white-on-black, firearm 16 related justifiable homicides over that 10 year period there's 250 in the SHR. Then I would try 17 and do a literature search to get some sort of 18 19 reading on the error rate there as to how many 20 weren't reported. And that would give me some idea of the prevalence, because right now I don't 21 22 think that we can be too confident about the 23 prevalence of private citizen justifiable 24 homicides in general when that filters down to 25 every other category.

1 8 So that's what I would work on. 2 And 3 that's what I've been doing for the past year on mass shootings and it's -- it's astounding what 4 you find. And in this country where we put such a 5 6 primacy on self-defense you would want to know where those numbers are falling I would think. 7 And you'd want to have confidence in those 8 9 numbers. 10 And the Bureau -- I've had discussions 11 with the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the NIBRS 12 Program is advancing where we can start to do data 13 samples on different questions and do some 14 statistical sampling, but that's on a nation-wide 15 basis that's not state by state. 16 And so I would hope that, you know, we'd 17 start to look at these things a little more carefully in the future and at some point I will 18 19 given the time and resources. 20 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. Professor 21 -- I'm sorry. Commissioner Timmons-Goodson. COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Yes. 22 23 Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I had this 24 question for Professor Harris, but I'd like for 25 those that are present if you'd like to take a

1 89 2 stab at it I'd appreciate it. З As I listened to Attorney Crump and others talking about reasonableness, objective Δ standards, subjective standard, in describing fear 5 6 it just seemed to me that it was extremely relevant that implicit bias is extremely relevant. 7 It leads me to ask that given that 8 9 people often don't recognize and can't easily 10 eliminate implicit bias I was wondering whether 11 any of you might see anyway in which we might 12 alter our stand your ground laws to both take into 13 account this very valuable research information that we now have the benefit of, and take 14 15 advantage of it in a way that will both allow us to protect those that fear, attack, and also to 16 17 avoid the unnecessary deaths of the alleged attackers. Any takers? 18 MR. ARKADI GERNEY: Well, I think, you 19 20 know I would say, and I think Mr. Crump spoke to this earlier to a degree, I think one of the 21 problems with stand your ground laws and the great 22 23 burden it places on jury's, but also the shooters 24 themselves at the moment they're making their 25 decision and to act reasonably is the great

1 9 2 increase in the gray area and the uncertainty that 3 it creates. So when it was only the Castle Doctrine and you had this location restriction it Δ made it easier for people who were applying stand 5 6 your ground laws in the course of shooting someone in their home -- or self-defense laws in the 7 course of shooting someone in their home, but also 8 9 for a jury that would go look at it later to try 10 to figure out what happened. It was a narrower 11 set of circumstances, the scope of what could be 12 reasonableness, this gray area was much narrower. 13 And then when you bring in the, you 14 know, the work of Mr. Harris and others and 15 implicit racial bias, when you have an enormous 16 scope of what possibly could be reasonable, the 17 scope of what could be biased is much larger. The rule -- there are not bright lines here. 18 19 And the consequences of not having 20 bright lines can -- can -- can hurt people either 21 way. That can mean wrongful convictions because 22 these very vague laws are applied very differently 23 depending on what particular jury you happen to 24 get. What particular defendant you happen to get. 25 And the uncertainty itself is a huge part of the

1	
2	problem.
3	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Any other
4	responses?
5	MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: The only thing that
6	I might add to that is when you think about the
7	Castle Doctrine as opposed to what we have now
8	with the stand oh, I'm sorry, self-defense as
9	to what we have now with stand your ground, and in
10	many of these cases the objectiveness was, can the
11	jury say "Did you have a duty to retreat? Was it
12	safe?" But that's just thrown out now. And so it
13	makes it that more subjective. I just fear them.
14	So the only issue is, how can you prove fear in
15	somebody and if it's a genuine fear or if it's a
16	fear that I go back to Trayvon. I just thought
17	that black people walking in my gated community
18	weren't supposed to happen based on there was a
19	robbery by a black person months before. If you
20	remember the trial, which definitely couldn't
21	understand why that was allowed to come into
22	court. But because of that it somehow justified
23	him stopping to detain any young black person
24	walking in his gated community.
25	And so you go from that very objective

1 fact -- that self-defense saying, "hold on," but 2 3 if you had no duty to engage him and you could have got away then the jury can say you're guilty Δ because this wasn't self-defense. But now with 5 6 stand your ground is just such much gray --7 there's no bright line as Mr. Gerney said for the 8 jury -- to help the jury understand it. 9 MS. KATHERYN RUSSEL-BROWN: To answer 10 your question or my comment -- or to answer your 11 question is to retain the reasonable fear aspect, 12 that it should be an objective standards, that it 13 just shouldn't be that a person indicates that 14 they, themselves, were fearful. I mean, the law 15 should work in an objective way. 16 I think Pennsylvania, which has a stand 17 your ground law as well, has included that in it there must be some showing of a weapon. There 18 19 must be something objective about this fear. 20 MR. BENJAMIN CRUMP: And, Mr. Chair -if I could -- also remember that the initial 21 22 aggressor aspect of it. Most states say that you 23 can't be the initial aggressor and still claim self-defense. But I submit to you if the person 24 25 is dead on the ground how can you prove who was

1 93 2 the initial aggressor? 3 MR. ARKADI GERNEY: Or if you're in -there are some states that allow invocations of Δ stand your ground if you're in the commission of a 5 6 crime. So, for example, if you're in the process of dealing drugs and that confrontation arises and 7 you fear for your life you can legitimately claim 8 9 a stand your ground defense in some states, 10 not in others. 11 So I think all of those would be things 12 that would narrow the circumstances. 13 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. So Commissioner Kirsanow, and then Commissioner Yaki. 14 15 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, 16 Mr. Chair. I'm very interested in this notion of implicit bias, but unfortunately Professor Harris 17 I understand has left. It seems to me that the 18 19 implicit bias is a possible contributing factor 20 for racial disparities in stand your ground confrontations where the attacker is black. 21 Interested in kind of disaggregating the 22 23 contributing factors, it seems to me that it could 24 be likely another contributing factor to 25 disparities in stand your ground confrontations,

1 2 could be that someone reasonably may believe that 3 they had to defend themselves where an attacker is armed with a gun as opposed to being unarmed or Δ where someone is being confronted in their home or 5 6 there's a home invasion as opposed to being on the 7 street. So I kind of wonder if, maybe, this is best put to Mr. Roman. In that context, isn't it 8 9 true that the Tampa Bay Tribune data show that the 10 blacks killed in stand your ground confrontations 11 are 26 points more likely to have been armed with 12 a gun as opposed to whites killed in stand your 13 ground, in nearly 3 to 1 margins are blacks more 14 likely to be killed in home invasions and 15 burglaries as opposed to whites killed in stand 16 your ground confrontations? 17 MR. JOHN ROMAN: Sure, I'm happy to take

18a crack at that. So -- so two thoughts on that.19One is to say supposing that those data that you20just quoted are exactly right and reflect the21reality that we live in. The -- the -- and that22blacks who are killed are 3 times more likely to23be, you know, involved in a felony.24The fact is that, is a white shooter of

a black victim is 10 times more likely to have

25

1 95 that be ruled justified than if it's a black 2 3 shooter of a white victim. So even if you belive the 3 to 1 is correct, there's still -- or what Δ remains is an enormous racial disparity that's a 5 little hard to understand. 6 I'd also point out Mr. Crump left, which 7 is unfortunate, so I can't say this -- but we were 8 9 interested in trying to get to the other data that 10 you just asked about -- (inaudible) -- and think 11 about what are the other attributes of these 12 incidents that we can observe in the data that 13 tell us something about the likelihood that a 14 shooting is ruled to be justified. And in 15 addition to the cross race stuff, if the shooter 16 is older than the victim the likelihood that it's 17 ruled justified goes way up. If they're strangers it goes way up. If it's a firearm it goes way 18 up. If it's a member of law enforcement it goes 19 way up. To the point where if you were to create 20 -- and it's a very small number of cases across these six years. But if you were to create a fact 21 22 pattern that mirrored the Trayvon Martin/George 23 Zimmerman incident where you had two strangers, a 24 firearm was used in a homicide, the shooter is

1 9 white, and as we discussed Mr. Zimmerman would be 2 3 classified in the state as being white. The victim is black, the shooter is older than the Δ victim, you would find that in those cases it's 5 ruled to be justified a little more than a third 6 of the time. 34 percent of the time compared to 7 8 2.5 percent overall of all homicides. 9 So in the fact pattern in the Trayvon 10 Martin/George Zimmerman case, you know, that is 11 actually the fact pattern that we can observe in 12 the data that is most likely to yield a 13 justifiable homicide. And even if you believe this sort of 3 14 15 to 1 ratio, which may very well be true, you know 16 like I said they had a convenience sample --17 cases. It's hard to generalize from that, but if it's true, boy, you know, 34 percent compared to 3 18 19 percent when the facts are reversed is still an 20 enormous disparity. COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner Yaki, 21 you have the last question. Your mic's not 22 23 working. There you go. 24 COMMISSIONER YAKI: This is for 25 Mr. Gerney. Doesn't the presence, availability,

1 97 2 access to a gun make the problems of implicit bias 3 in stand your ground cases even more problematic? I mean, it's one thing to say, "I may 4 have an unconscious reflexive action against 5 someone because of their race." It's another 6 7 thing when you have that unconscious reflexive action when you have a Smith and Wesson strapped 8 9 to your hip. 10 MR. ARKADI GERNEY: Yes. And it's 11 another thing when, in an increasing number of 12 states, concealed carry permit holders can bring those guns into bars. 13 So, I think, yes, I think that's exactly 14 15 right. And when you look at, you know, generally 16 at crime data in the United States you find that 17 the United States is in the middle range in terms of highly industrialized countries in terms of 18 19 crime. And in terms of violent crime there is one 20 place where it's way out of the normal range which 21 is murder and where it's 45 times higher. Firearm murders, you know, 10 times higher. 22 23 And so, yes, a gun changes the equation. 24 And if we're, you know, if we're going to have a 25 -- if we're going to have a society where guns in

1 9 2 bars are the norm and we have stand your ground 3 laws, and we have extremely lax standards for who can get a permit to carry a gun you're going to 4 have confrontations. I think there was a 5 reference to the alcohol-fueled confrontations 6 that happen all of the time in bars and other 7 8 venues that will have lethal consequences and 9 obviously that's bad for everybody involved, 10 whether it's determined to be a justified shooting 11 or an unjustified shooting, you've basically got 12 two lives ruined at the end of that equation. 13 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Well, thank you. We want to appreciate all of the information that 14 15 you all provided us this morning. And thank you 16 for appearing, we're now going to take a brief break for lunch. We will reconvene at 1:50, that 17 is 10 minutes to 2:00 back here in this room. 18 19 Thank you, everybody. 20 (End of Panel Number 2, Volume II. Lunch recess, 21 Proceedings will continue in Volume III.) 22 23 24 25

1	
2	
3	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
4	
5	
6	STATE OF FLORIDA
7	COUNTY OF POLK
8	
9	I, Kathy Wescott, Certified Shorthand
10	Reporter, do hereby certify that I was authorized to
11	and did report in Stenotypy and electronically the
12	foregoing proceedings and evidence in the captioned
13	case and that the foregoing pages constitute a true and
14	correct transcription of my recordings thereof.
15	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed
16	my hand this 28th day of October, 2014, at Lakeland,
17	Polk County, Florida.
18	
19	Kathy Wescott, CSR
20	Court Reporter
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS BRIEFING ON STAND YOUR GROUND Place: The Rosen Hotel 9700 International Drive Orlando, Florida 32819 9:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. Date: October 17, 2014 Reported by: Kathy Wescott, CSR (Volume 3, pages 1 through 100, p.m. session, Panel Number 3)

1	
2	
3	Present:
4	Commissioner Michael Yaki
5	Commission Roberta Achtenberg
6	Marlene Sallo
7	Commissioner Marty Castro (Chairman)
8	Commissioner Karen K. Narasaki
9	Commissioner Patricia Timmons-Goodson
10	Commissioner Gail L. Heriot
11	
12	
13	Appearing by phone:
14	Commissioner David Kladney
15	Commissioner Peter Kirsanow
16	
17	Panel Number 3:
18	Elizabeth Burke
19	John Lott, Jr.
20	David LaBahn
21	Ilya Shapiro
22	
23	
24	
25	

1 1 2 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Are Commissioner's 3 Kirsanow and Kladney on the phone. Δ COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Just talking 5 6 baseball. 7 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. Good. COMMISSIONER YAKI: Go Giants. 8 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: It is 1:57 and we 9 10 are coming back from the lunch recess for our afternoon panel. So just housekeeping for the 11 12 panelists that are here, I assume many of you were 13 probably here this morning, but in case you weren't you'll each have 8 minutes to speak. 14 That 15 will be governed by the series of warning lights here. Green mean starts. Yellow's going to be 16 17 your two minute warning to begin to wrap up, and 18 three is, please conclude. There will be an 19 opportunity to elaborate when we as commissioners 20 begin to ask you questions. 21 So let me briefly introduce the 22 panalists in the order in which they will speak. 23 Our first panelist is Elizabeth Burke 24 from the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. 25 Our second panelist is John Lott, who's

1	4
2	right there the Crime Prevention Research
3	Center.
4	Our third panelist is David LaBahn from
5	the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.
6	And our fourth panelist is Ilya Shapiro
7	from the CATO Institute.
8	Our fifth panelist was not able to make
9	it, Ronald Sullivan, who was from Harvard Law
10	School. Well, I presume we'll get his statement
11	for the record.
12	I'll now ask each of the panelists to
13	swear or affirm that the information that you are
14	about to provide us is true and accurate to the
15	best of your knowledge and belief.
16	Is that correct?
17	PANELISTS: Yes.
18	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. Thank you.
19	Miss Burke, please proceed.
20	MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: Thank you. And I
21	would like to
22	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: You need to speak
23	into the mic, please.
24	MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: Thank you so
25	much

1	10
2	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: A little closer.
3	MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: So I didn't forget
4	a tie today but I did bring a small electric fan
5	that I had intended to place here, but I didn't
6	want to set anything off.
7	In all seriousness
8	COMMISSIONER YAKI: you just insulted
9	our host air conditioning so
10	(Laughter)
11	MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: I'd like to thank
12	the commission for convening these panels to study
13	the legality and appropriateness of the stand your
14	ground laws.
15	As you know my name is Elizabeth Burke
16	and I'm an attorney with the Brady Center to
17	Prevent Gun Violence. And I'm a litigator with
18	our Legal Action Project.
19	The Brady Center was at the forefront of
20	opposing Florida's enactment of stand your ground.
21	Which we called at the time, appropriately, a
22	"shoot first" law.
23	The tragic shooting deaths of Trayvon
24	Martin and Jordan Davis really realized our fears
25	about these laws. If a law is found to have a

2 pernicious and disparate impact on certain groups 3 in our society it must certainly be identified and 4 challenged. 5 Any law that creates a more dangerous society should be viewed with suspicion and 6 subjected to the kind of thorough review that 7 we're doing here today. 8 So to go back a bit. Before stand your 9 10 ground in order to justify the use of force in defense of self it was under the longstanding 11 12 Castle Doctrine, which was derived from common 13 law, a person was entitled to stand his ground in 14 his or her home where nobody else had the right to 15 be. In public places, however, where 16 17 everyone has the right to be, there the law 18 imposed a reasonable requirement to avoid conflict 19 if possible. 20 The law also required that a defendant 21 prove that he believed force was necessary for his 22 defense and he needs to prove his force was 23 reasonable. 24 Those were part of the tenets of 25 common law of -- self-defense. There was logic to

1	9
2	those requirements, that a defendant should show
3	that his fear was reasonable, after all we
4	shouldn't allow someone to unnecessarily shoot
5	someone else simply because the shooter sort of
6	wrongly perceived himself to be in harms way.
7	Self-defense law was intended to
8	minimize conflict and preserve life. And those
9	are objectives that one would hope everyone could
10	agree on.
11	Stand your ground did away with these
12	sensible requirements. At its core the law allows
13	people to treat public spaces as their castles,
14	thereby attempts to eliminate the duty to avoid
15	conflict when possible.
16	As Trayvon Martin's killer George
17	Zimmerman knew about stand your ground laws it
18	could well be that these laws emboldened him to
19	continue to follow Trayvon even after the 911
20	dispatcher told him to stay in his car.
21	Additionally, under certain cases of
22	stand your ground the law's now give a stand your
23	ground shooter the right to use deadly force and
24	they are presumed to have a reasonable fear.
25	In other words, they don't really even

2 have to put in evidence that they were in fear if 3 they shoot on their property or in other limited 4 cases, but the fact is that in those cases the stand your ground defendant is the only surviving 5 person available to testify and therefore the 6 presumption is going to carry the day in those 7 cases, and it can result in an innocent verdict in 8 what would actually be a non-justified homicide. 9 10 We've heard a lot about quotes from Brown versus U.S., Justice Harlan. And there's 11 12 another case that's cited a lot in the stand your 13 ground proponents' testimony. 14 I think it's important to know the facts 15 of those cases. One is Beard. In the Beard case those actually -- on Mr. Beard's property, three 16 individuals came on to his property in order to 17 18 steal his cow. And they told him "We're coming to 19 steal your cow or take your cow, and if you get in 20 our way we will kill you." 21 The three of them were approaching on 22 him, on his property, one of them looked as if he 23 was drawing a gun, and Mr. Beard hit them on the 24 head. One of them died.

So that is one stand your ground case

25

1 2 that has been used to prop up stand your ground 3 and say this isn't really a departure from self-defense, when in fact it is, because those 4 are pretty stark circumstances, I think everyone 5 agrees, if you're on your own property being 6 attacked by three people you have a right to 7 8 defend yourself. 9 Similarly in Brown -- in the Brown case 10 that Justice Harlan, we heard that famous quote 11 from Justice Harlan. In that case Mr. Brown had 12 been attacked by this other person twice before and had been told that he was going to be killed 13 14 by him. So he had a gun at the ready. 15 And when that person came on to his work 16 site he, unfortunately, had to use the gun. Even 17 though he saw the person, was able to go get the gun, came back and defended himself. 18 19 And the Supreme Court said at that 20 point, "You don't have to wait to be attacked." 21 Although, in that case Mr. Brown was being 22 stabbed. 23 So that's just background as we hear 24 these important quotes that are held up as well, 25 the law supports stand your ground. In fact, this

2 is a departure. So when we review changes to the 3 self-defense doctrine, it's important to look at them in the context of our current gun laws and 4 realize that any consideration of relaxing 5 self-defense laws should be viewed in the context 6 of an increasing arming of American citizens. 7 There's been, as Mr. Gerney mentioned in 8 the last panel, a recent revision to who can carry 9 10 a concealed weapon in public. And as you know now 11 we have concealed carry's the law of the land in 12 almost every state. Many states have a 13 shall-issue regime in that there really isn't even 14 an opportunity for police to say "this is a 15 dangerous individual who should not have a gun." 16 More and more, even in constitutional 17 carry states, a person who's allowed to own a gun 18 can carry it anywhere they don't even have to have 19 a permit. They don't have a make an application. 20 And there's actually no point of contact for 21 police to try and prevent tragedy. 22 Finally, and I see my time is running 23 short. So when you look at stand your ground laws 24 within the combination of sort of the lax 25 concealed carry laws and the increasing

1 9 militarization and lethality of the weapons, and 2 3 then you combine that with the civil immunity discussion we were having earlier where the stand 4 your ground laws shift the cost of violence. 5 They take away the potential risk to a shooter by 6 giving him civil immunity. And they -- therefore 7 8 they eliminate the generally accepted American 9 rule and leave really only the wealthy individuals 10 able to bring actions against shooters in an 11 effort to bring change to society. 12 So this -- this combination of shifting 13 immunity and lax concealed carry laws are 14 combining to make a very dangerous situation in 15 states that have also enacted stand your ground. 16 So, again, as I said we're very 17 interested in continuing the discussion on this. And I'd like to get back quickly if I 18 19 could to the dramatic testimony about someone 20 punching you and you being able to then shoot 21 them. If we think about that in a land with 22 concealed carry, someone -- you know, a drunken 23 stranger punches you and you shoot them and you've 24 now taken a life, and I contend that's no small 25 matter for either party, right?

2 If you don't have a gun with you -- if 3 you don't have concealed carry allowed everywhere, 4 someone punches you, you have a black eye, and a 5 complaint for assault. You know, and that's really what we need to think about when we put in 6 place laws that relax self-defense, but at the 7 same time increase access to guns we're just 8 9 creating a more dangerous society. 10 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thanks, Miss Burke. Thank you. 11 12 Mr. Lott, you have the floor. 13 MR. JOHN LOTT: Well, thank you very 14 much Mr. Chairman and commissioners for inviting 15 me here today to talk. I'm -- have a PowerPoint here that I 16 17 think may help a little bit. Let me just make a 18 couple of quick comments before I get into that. 19 And that is, people many times today have talked 20 about Florida as starting some new law, in fact, 21 there have been stand your ground type rules even 22 in common law going back to some states since 23 they've been part of the Union. California, for 24 example. In other states have essentially had 25 this is not some new experiment that's going on

for the first time here.

1

2

3 You know, there's a reason why states have adopted stand your ground laws, it's not 4 something that just sprung up. There's issues 5 about certainty for the person who's using a gun 6 7 defensively when you go and you say that people 8 have to, you know, reasonably retreat as far as 9 possible you create doubt in people's minds. How 10 far should I actually have to retreat? And as the 11 appendix in my testimony to you all goes through a 12 number of cases where there's been real issues 13 about prosecutors bringing cases when, you know, 14 there's been differences, you know when --15 somebody's been knocked down three times and the prosecutor said, "you still could have gotten up 16 17 and tried to run away a fourth time." And the person thought that the third time he had been 18 19 knocked down, at that point he pulled out the gun 20 to go and defend himself.

Now, if we look at the Tampa Bay Tribune
data which has been talked a lot about today.
They have cases from -- that were brought from
2006 to 2014. Blacks make up about 16.7 percent
of Florida's population. They make up about 34

2 percent of the stand your ground cases. So 3 they're -- they're much more likely than the 4 average Floridian, blacks are, to go and use stand 5 your ground. And they're more successful when they do use it. Blacks who use stand your ground 6 are 4 percentage points more likely not to face --7 not to have criminal charges than a white in that 8 same situation. 9 Earlier today among, for example on the 10 first panel -- he pointed out that -- what was 11 12 mentioned a couple of other times is that if you 13 look at the Tampa Bay Tribune data 67 percent of 14 those who killed a black faced no penalty, but 15 only 57 percent of people who killed whites faced

17 It appears to be discrimination going on 18 there. But what you have to take into account is 19 that it's primarily blacks who kill blacks, and 20 whites who kill whites in these stand your ground 21 cases.

no penalty.

16

22 So for example, if you look at the Tampa 23 Bay data, a little bit over 76 percent of the 24 cases for blacks involve a black killing a black. 25 In the case of whites, it's slightly over 80

percent of the time there.

1

2

3 And when you take that into account what you find is that even though you're not likely to 4 you get a conviction when a black is killed, it's 5 because it's blacks who are killing blacks. 6 And 7 in fact, blacks who use a stand your ground 8 defense are more successful in -- in bringing it than whites are. Hispanics are actually the 9 10 highest in terms of success for doing that.

11 So, here's the bottom line. If you want 12 to go and declare discrimination in terms of 13 differential rates, in terms of who the vic -- who was shot, why isn't it also discrimination in 14 15 favor of blacks and Hispanics in terms of the ones 16 who are the ones who shot in that case. I would 17 argue that it's pry not discrimination in either of the cases. 18

19If you look at the Tampa Bay Tribune20data one of the things that really doesn't get21talked is all the other differences across these22cases. So blacks who were killed were 2623percentage points more likely to be armed with a24gun than a white who was killed. Blacks were also2525 percentage points more often than whites to be

2 in the process of committing a robbery, home 3 invasion, or burglary. 4 You know these types of things as well 5 as other things suggest that maybe there was a reason that they were shot. That there was a 6 7 reason why, you know, the black victim or whoever, shot these individuals in order to protect 8 themselves. 9 And these differences continue to exist 10 even when you look at the, you know, blacks or 11 12 whites doing the shooting. Now I run some 13 regressions that I show you because the 14 overwhelming discussion here is just looking at 15 simple averages. And as I say there's huge differences in 16 these cases. You know, whether the person who's 17 18 being shot had a gun for example, you'd think 19 would be important. Whether there were witnesses 20 there. Whether there was forensics evidence that was involved. 21 22 You had -- there's lots -- it's a very 23 rich data set. There's lots of things you can try 24 to account for. And the thing is once you account 25 for those things there's no statistically

1 9 2 significant difference between either on the 3 victim's side or the people who are using the stand your ground defense between whites and 4 blacks, they're essentially exactly the same in 5 terms of how the law is treated. Once you control 6 for all of the differences in the cases there. 7 8 Now one thing we've heard a fair amount 9 today about are justifiable homicides. And 10 there's some real problems with the data. First 11 of all the number of states and number of 12 jurisdictions that are reporting this have increased fairly significantly over time. 13 I'll just show you. Here's just a 14 15 number of states. Basically it goes from, you 16 know, 29, 28 at the beginning, up to as high as 36 towards the end of the period. If you weight 17 those states by population it's actually even more 18 19 of a dramatic of an increase. 20 Plus you have to realize that for a lot 21 of these states you may only have one police 22 district in the entire state that's reporting the 23 data. 24 On average you end up having some place 25 between about 14 and 18 percent of police

2 departments in the country reporting justifiable 3 homicides. And it's been changing too in terms of 4 the composition. You're getting police departments for more heavily minority areas 5 reporting towards the end of the period than you 6 did at the beginning. So if I see an increase in 7 justifiable homicides in total or if I see an 8 increase in justifiable homicides involving 9 10 minorities, a large part of that, if not all, is simply due to the fact that you're having more 11 12 places reporting. And more places reporting for 13 areas where minorities are living.

14 Now I'm not going to go through Roman's 15 stuff right now, but I'll just mention the Texas A & M study for a minute. Even they, in their 16 17 paper, recognize that there were many states that 18 had stand your grounds before 2005, but yet they 19 don't include any of them in their sample. 20 There's no explanation for why they include no states before 2005. There's no explanation in 21 22 their paper for why they don't include crime data 23 or anything else before 2000.

24Those are -- all seem like important25things. There's no explanation why they don't

1 9 include stand your ground cases which have been a 2 3 result of court decisions that were there. And there have been other issues. Brady Campaign, 4 others have mentioned other gun control laws like, 5 6 right to carry, you argue it's very important in 7 terms of interpreting these laws whether you take 8 into account stand your ground rules. 9 This Texas A & M study had no other gun 10 control laws that were involved there. So there 11 are other problems that I could point to with 12 regard to it. 13 What happens when you try to look at the whole period of time -- I have data that goes back 14 15 to '77. From '77 through 2012 for all of the 16 states that changed their laws during that entire 17 period of time. And I try to account for other gun control laws. 13 in fact said -- ah, right to 18 19 carry laws. And when you try to do that this is 20 the change that you see in terms of murder rates 21 for example. I also have evidence there, you 22 know, before and after, so the line there is year 23 zero when the different states adopt the laws and 24 you can see how murder rates are falling in the 25 states that adopt stand your ground rates -- laws,

2 relative to the states that don't and how it was 3 beforehand. I appreciate your time. Thank you very Δ much. But the bottom line is that the most 5 vulnerable people in our society are the ones who 6 are taking the greatest advantage of the stand 7 your ground laws and using it most successfully. 8 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you. Doctor 9 -- I'm sorry, Mr. Labahn. 10 11 MR. DAVID LABAHN: Thank you Chairman 12 Castro and members of the commission for the 13 opportunity to testify before you today. 14 My name is David LaBahn and I'm the President and CEO of the Association of 15 Prosecuting Attorneys. We're a private nonprofit 16 17 whose mission is to support and enhance the 18 effectiveness of prosecutors in our effort to 19 create safer communities. 20 APA is the only national organization to 21 include and support all prosecutors, whether 22 appointed or elected, as well as their deputies 23 and assistants. 24 On behalf of APA I'm pleased to have the 25 opportunity to address the issues surrounding the

1 9 vast expansion of self-defense referred to as 2 3 stand your ground or Castle Doctrine laws. In our materials we use the phrase Castle Doctrine 4 because we feel this legislative expansion 5 6 includes more than merely stand your ground, as 7 the expansion has taken the common law right to 8 protect ones home to any place that one has a 9 right to be. 10 As prosecutors we seek to do justice for 11 victims and to hold offenders accountable for 12 their actions, especially in cases where a life has been violently ended whether by a firearm or 13 14 other deadly means. 15 During my tenure as the Director of the 16 American Prosecutors Research Institute we 17 convened a symposium of prosecution, law 18 enforcement, government, public health, and 19 academic experts from a little over 12 states. 20 This 2007 symposium was summarized in a 21 2008 report co-authored by my Vice-President, 22 Steven Jansen. In it we expressed serious 23 reservations about the potential impact of the 24 expanded legislation on youth aged 14 to 18. 25 Quoting from the report, "Specifically,

2 law enforcement considers this age group to be 3 particularly desensitized to violence and more 4 prone to quote "unprovoked violence" as a result of being quote "disrespected." The Castle 5 expansion will not have a deterrent effect on 6 juveniles and young adults claiming to be 7 "disrespected" as a reason for occurrence of 8 assaults, but instead could create a legal shield 9 10 from criminal and civil immunity." 11 This concern from 2007 has been borne 12 out in the application of an otherwise neutral 13 statute because of the subjective nature of stand 14 your ground. Disparities in age, race, religion 15 and other cultural factors create situations where the subjective perceptions of being in imminent 16 17 danger are due to disparities between individual 18 and now lead to senseless violence including the 19 taking of another's life. 20 Since 2009, APA has been tracking the 21 legislative progression of stand your ground and

assisted prosecutors who have been working to
enforce these expansive new laws. I have attached
to my testimony APA's Statement of Principles
regarding stand your ground laws as these laws

have raised a number of troubling and dangerous concerns.

1

2

3

Prosecutors and their professional 4 associations have overwhelmingly opposed stand 5 6 your ground laws when they were in their 7 respective legislatures. The concerns expressed 8 include the limitation or even -- I'm sorry, the limitation or elimination of prosecutors' ability 9 10 to hold violent criminals accountable for their 11 acts.

12 However, even with this opposition, many states have passed stand your ground laws. 13 Many of these laws include provisions that diminish or 14 15 eliminate the common law "duty of retreat," 16 changed the burden of proving reasonableness to a presumption, and provide blanket civil and 17 criminal immunity. By expanding the realm in 18 19 which violent acts can be committed with the 20 justification of self-defense. Stand your ground laws have negatively affected public safety and 21 22 undermined prosecutorial and law enforcement 23 efforts to keep communities safe. 24 These measures have undermined standard

25 police procedures, prevented law enforcement from

2 arresting and detaining criminals, and have 3 stymied prosecutors deterring them from prosecuting people who claim self-defense even while killing someone in the course of unlawful activity.

4

5

6

In some states, courts have interpreted 7 the law to create an unprecedented procedural 8 hurdle in the form of an immunity hearing which 9 effectively transfer the role of the jury over to 10 the judge. Moreover, because these laws are 11 12 unclear, there have been inconsistent applications 13 throughout the states and even within respective 14 states. Prosecutors, judges, police officers, and 15 ordinary citizens have been left to guess what behavior is legal and what is criminal. 16

17 Even with the best efforts to implement 18 these broad measures, defendants, victims' 19 families and friends, investigators, prosecutors, 20 defense attorneys, trial courts, and appellate 21 courts have been forced into a case-by-case 22 analysis with no legal certainty as to what they 23 can expect once that life has been taken. 24 Stand your ground laws provide safe 25 harbors for criminals, prevent prosecutors from

1 2 bringing cases against those who claim 3 self-defense, even after unnecessarily killing others. For example, in 2008, Florida case, a 29 4 year old drug dealer named Tavarious China Smith 5 killed two people in two separate incidents. 6 The first was drug-related, and the second was over a 7 8 retaliation for the first. Though he was engaged 9 in unlawful activity in both instances prosecutors 10 had to conclude that both homicides were justified 11 under Florida's stand your ground law. 12 Unfortunately, this example is not an 13 anomaly. A recent study concluded that the 14 majority of defendants shielded by stand your 15 ground laws had arrest records prior to the 16 homicide at issue. 17 Stand your ground began here in Florida in 2005. And it is our position that the common 18 19 law did sufficiently protect people's rights to 20 defend themselves, their homes, and others. The 21 proper use of prosecutorial discretion ensured 22 that lawful acts of self-defense were not 23 prosecuted, and I've not seen any evidence to the 24 contrary. 25 After reviewing the legislative history

2 of the Florida provision, the very case used to 3 justify this broad measure, it involved no arrest 4 or prosecution. The law enforcement community responded properly to the shooting and the 5 homeowner was never arrested or charged in his 6 lawful exercise of self-defense. 7 Because the provisions of stand your 8 ground measures vary from state to state, I'll 9 attempt to summarize some of the provisions which 10 have caused prosecutors difficulty in uniformly 11 12 enforcing the law. 13 First, the meaning of "unlawful 14 activity" needs to be clarified. Many states have 15 extended stand your ground laws to people who are in a place where they have a right to be -- and 16 17 you have a right to be and non-engaged in unlawful 18 activity. Can a drug dealer defend his open air 19 drug market? I believe we already had that 20 discussion earlier. If the individual is a felon, 21 does that felon have a right to possess and kill 22 another with a firearm? 23 Secondly, immunity is rarely granted in 24 criminal law, with the few exceptions existing in 25 order to encourage cooperation with law

1 9 enforcement and the judicial system. 2 The 3 legislatures should remove the immunity provisions and clarify that self-defense is what it's always 4 been under common law, it's an affirmative 5 defense. 6 Third, the replacement of the 7 8 presumptions with inferences eliminate -- would 9 eliminate many dangerous effects. This coupled 10 with an objective rather than a subjective 11 standard will improve accountability while 12 protecting the right to self-defense. And that's 13 subjective versus objective is a huge issue which you've heard about today. That -- that is a key 14 15 provision that this commission should examine. 16 And finally, the statutes should be 17 amended to prevent the initial aggressor from claiming self-defense. Some laws allow a person, 18 19 including Florida statute, to attack another with 20 deadly force and later use stand your ground to 21 justify the killing of the person he or she 22 attacked if that person responds with like force 23 and the initial aggressor cannot escape. 24 Taken together, I believe these reforms 25 to the various stand your ground laws will help

2 minimize the racial disparate and detrimental 3 effects and restore the ability of investigators 4 and prosecutors to fully enforce the law and 5 promote public safety, while continuing to respect 6 the rights of law-abiding citizens to protect 7 themselves and their families.

8 On behalf of the APA and the prosecutors 9 we represent, I want to thank you for holding the 10 hearing on the legislation -- and the key with 11 this legislation -- that this is legislation and 12 we would like to see things which promote --13 promote safe communities rather than promote the 14 use of deadly force.

15 The final issue that I'd like to address 16 would be the Jordan Davis case. In my opinion, 17 the Jordan Davis case is the loss of two lives not 18 one. Jordan, obviously was shot dead. This was 19 the loud music case. He was shot dead because 20 they were listening to rap music and because he 21 disrespected Mr. Dunn. At the same time, Dunn is 22 now, and we just heard today, is going to serve 23 105 years to life. His life is also gone. He was 24 celebrating, I believe, his son's wedding, he's now 25 going to spend the rest of his life in prison.

1	9
2	Because of stand your ground he felt he
3	had that right and he's on tape saying, "I'm the
4	victim here." That he had the right to take a gun
5	and shoot dead another individual because, in the
6	case of Dunn, he had been disrespected.
7	Thank you, sir.
8	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Mr. Shapiro.
9	MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: Chairman Castro and
10	distinguished commissioners, thank you for this
11	opportunity to discuss stand your ground laws and
12	potential racial disparities in the constitutional
13	right to armed self-defense.
14	It's most appropriate that we're having
15	this hearing in Orlando, which is so close to the
16	tragic incident that ignited the current
17	incarnation of this public policy debate.
18	Indeed, since George Zimmerman was found
19	not guilty of killing Trayvon Martin stand your
20	ground laws have been under attack. President
21	Obama injected race into the discussion, claiming
22	that the outcome would have been different had
23	Martin been white.
24	Attorney General Holder then claimed
25	stand your ground laws undermine public safety and

2	sow dangerous conflict in our neighborhoods. Both
3	want these enhanced self-defense laws reviewed,
4	which of course means repealed.
5	In my written statement I reviewed some
6	of the alleged racial disparities in the
7	application of these laws. Since I'm a
8	constitutional lawyer rather than a criminologist,
9	however, I'll leave that statistical analysis here
10	to my panel colleague John Lott. And also
11	PowerPoint's unconstitutional in most uses.
12	Instead let me provide you a legal
13	overview of stand your ground so everyone's on the
14	same page.
15	Not withstanding recent efforts to
16	politicize the issue there's nothing particularly
17	novel, partisan, ideological, racist, or otherwise
18	nefarious about these laws. All they do is allow
19	people to defend themselves without having a
20	so-called duty to retreat a concept that's been
21	part of U.S. law for over 150 years.
22	About 31 states now have some type of
23	stand your ground doctrine. The vast majority in
24	common law before legislators took any action.
25	Some, like California and Virginia, maintain stand

1	
2	your ground without any legislation.
3	Of the 15 states that have passed stand
4	your ground since 2005, the year that Florida's
5	model legislation was enacted, a majority had
6	democratic governors. Leading progressives who
7	signed such bills include; Jennifer Granholm,
8	Janet Napolitano and Kathleen Sebelius(phonetic).
9	Louisiana and West Virginia passed them
10	with Democratic control of both state houses.
11	Even Florida's supposedly controversial law passed
12	the state senate unanimously and split Democrats
13	in the State House.
14	When Illinois strengthened its stand
15	your ground law in 2004 State Senator Barack Obama
16	joined in unanimous approval.
17	Conversely, many so-called "red states"
18	do impose a duty to retreat in public. And even
19	in more restrictive states such as New York courts
20	have held that retreat isn't required at home or
21	when preventing serious crime like rape or
22	robbery.
23	Indeed, it's a universal principle that
24	a person can use force when she reasonably
25	believes it's necessary to defend against an

imminent use of unlawful force; Where there's no duty to retreat, as in most states, she's further justified in using deadly force if it's necessary to prevent forcible felonies. That's the norm throughout the country. Deadly force may be used only in cases of imminent death or great bodily harm that someone reasonably believes can only be prevented by using such force.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 It's not an easy defense to assert. In 11 almost all states it's a defense. It's not some 12 sort of immunity like Mr. LaBahn said. It's not a 13 get out of jail free card that you play and then 14 you're scot-free. And it certainly doesn't mean 15 that you can shoot first and ask questions later.

Everyday criminals assert flimsy self-defense claims that get rejected by judges and juries regardless of whether the given state has a stand your ground law. These laws aren't a license to be a vigilante or behave recklessly. They just protect law-abiding citizens from having to leave a place where they're allowed to be.

In other words, in most states, "would be"
victims of violent crime don't have to try to run
away before defending themselves. That's why the

1 9 debate over stand your ground--the real one, not 2 3 the phoney war that we've been having lately, is nothing new. That's been going on back and forth 4 for centuries. In ancient Britain, when the 5 deadliest weapons were swords, a duty to retreat 6 greatly reduced violent incidents and blood feuds. 7 8 Firearms were also not as widespread in Britain 9 until recently. So British law continues to 10 reflect the historic deference to the 11 constabulary, by which the King owes a duty of 12 protection to his subjects. 13 That's obviously not part of our 14 tradition. In this country at any given time 15 about half the states have had stand your ground 16 So today's split is well within historical laws. 17 norms. Despite what gun prohibitionists claim, the no retreat rule has deep roots in American law. 18 19 As Miss Burke alluded at the Supreme 20 Court stand your ground dates to the unanimous 21 1895 case of Beard verus the United States, in 22 which the great Justice John Marshall Harlan the 23 sole dissenter in Plessy (inaudible) v-Ferguson affirmed the 24 right to armed self-defense. 25 In places with a duty to retreat crime

victims can be imprisoned just for defending themselves. And among those who often lost out under that old rule were domestic violence victims who turned against their assailants. Feminists pointed out that "you could have run away" may not work well when faced with a stalker or someone you live with.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Stand your ground laws are thus designed 10 to protect law-abiding citizens. They're less 11 controversial in the context of a home. It's bad 12 enough to have your home burglarized but to then 13 have to hire an attorney and fend off a misguided 14 prosecutor or a personal - injury lawyer defending 15 an injured criminal is too much to ask.

16 That's how we have the Castle Doctrine -17 recognized by all states -- which holds that you 18 don't need to retreat when your home is invaded. 19 When you extend that doctrine to public spaces - as 20 again, most states do - that's where you get stand 21 your ground.

22 What's been overlooked in the current 23 debate is that these laws only apply to people 24 under attack. So as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 25 wrote for again a unanimous Supreme Court in

1 Brown versus United States, "Detached reflection 2 3 cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." And the facts of those cases, while 4 interesting, don't detract from what the legal 5 principles they stand for. Nearly a century later 6 7 and regardless of ones views on the scope of the 8 Second Amendment I don't think we can demand more 9 of crime victims trying to defend themselves. 10 Of course any self-defense rule bears 11 the potential for injustice. For example in a 12 two-person altercation one may be dead and the 13 other dubiously claim self-defense. These cases, like, Trayvon Martin's 14 15 implicate the self-defense justification generally 16 rather than the existence of a duty to retreat. 17 If George Zimmerman was the aggressor then he committed murder and has no self-defense rights at 18 19 all a whether the incidents took place in a stand 20 your ground state or not. 21 If Martin attacked Zimmerman the only 22 question is whether Zimmerman reasonably believed 23 that his life was in danger, not whether he could 24 have retreated. And if Zimmerman provoked the 25 confrontation, even if Martin eventually

2	overpowered him, he lost the protection of stand
3	your ground law.
4	And it's not even clear, whether he knew
5	about that law or that people that do
6	invoke it sure, their defense attorneys might,
7	but it's not that common that, people on
8	the street know that with any specificity.
9	Of course the Martin/Zimmerman
10	altercation is but one case and a high profile
11	incident where stand your ground didn't actually
12	play a part, so we shouldn't draw any policy
13	conclusions from it.
14	Hard, emotionally wrenching cases make
15	not only for bad law but for skewed policy
16	debates. While demagogues have used Trayvon
17	Martin's death to pitch all sorts of legislative
18	changes, what they really seem to be targeting, as
19	it were, is the right to armed self-defense.
20	With stand your ground laws, yes,
21	prosecutors may need to take more care to show
22	evidence to counterclaims of self-defense, not
23	simply argue that the shooter could have
24	retreated. So it's not surprising that a
25	prosecutor's organization would be against the law,

1	
2	and it makes prosecutors work harder sometimes.
3	For those who value due process in
4	criminal justice, which should emphatically
5	include members of historically mistreated
6	minority groups, that's a feature not a bug.
7	Thanks again for having me. I welcome
8	your questions.
9	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you.
10	Mr. Labahn, is your opposition due to
11	the fact that you don't want to work harder?
12	Could you elaborate on
13	MR. DAVID LABAHN: Not at all. Thank
14	you for asking me that question. It's not an
15	issue of working harder or not, the question is
16	what is right and just. And to sit here and
17	listen to things like, the Trayvon Martin had
18	nothing to do with stand your ground is completely
19	irrelevant.
20	Trayvon Martin had everything to do with
21	stand your ground legislation. In fact it could
22	not be more stark when one of the jurors was
23	interviewed and said, "I I We had to
24	reconcile this." Again, that subjective belief
25	that he was under attack. That Zimmerman's head

2 was being pounded, and the fact that he could use the deadly force. That is right out of Florida's 3 4 stand your ground legislation. And even more particularly Florida is dead on point that they 5 provide the use of force by aggressor within their 6 statute. 7 So again to sit here and listen that 8 aggressors cannot use stand your ground in Florida 9 is completely irrelevant and not accurate. 10 11 Thank you for allowing me to respond. 12 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: You're welcome. 13 Commissioner Yaki. 14 COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you very much, 15 Mr. Chair. A couple of comments. One, I was struck 16 17 by Mr. Shapiro's reference to worrying about bad 18 law coming out of sensational cases when in fact 19 the stand your ground law was based on a 20 sensationalized case involving two people in their 21 RV in 2004, which was whipped up wildly in the 22 media. And as several articles show or it was 23 misrepresented quite amazingly to legislators. 24 But I wanted to talk -- ask Mr. LaBahn 25 something and that is, you point out the

1 2 difficulties in the prosecutor aspect of this but 3 isn't there another way to look at this is -isn't this in some ways a delegation of your 4 authority, the jury's authority, a judge's 5 authority, a cop's authority, to a private 6 7 individual to make decisions in a split second on 8 whether or not to take the life of someone? 9 MR. DAVID LABAHN: Yes. Yes, it is. 10 And that is something that -- it's the -- this is 11 the only place that I know that you could have 12 immunity where your activity is itself potentially 13 criminal. 14 So what you just said and the decision 15 to take a life is an incredible solemn decision. 16 I've had plenty of opportunities in my career to carry a firearm, I've chosen not to do it because 17 I'm not willing to take that responsibility 18 because taking another's life I -- I don't know 19 20 that there is another decision that is that grave. 21 But what you've done with this law by 22 putting immunity in here, not an affirmative 23 defense, but literally immunity, you're telling 24 somebody that they can make a decision to do an 25 otherwise criminal act and then seek this hearing,

2 as we've heard earlier in the panel "I want to get 3 out real quick. I want to take a life. I want to 4 stand behind -- it cannot be properly investigated. I cannot be detained. And I want 5 to be able to walk free on a life and death 6 decision." It is -- I don't know how to express 7 it, it is so extraordinary. 8 COMMISSIONER YAKI: I mean it sounds 9 10 like something where -- where an officer receives hours, and hours of training on the use of deadly 11 12 force, on the use of determining whether someone 13 poses a threat to them or not, and here we are in 14 a situation where, essentially, in a public space 15 where there could be any one of us standing 16 around, you're giving the power to a single individual with very little guidance on what 17 18 constitutes reasonable, what constitutes a threat, 19 what constitutes deadly, and letting them make a 20 decision. 21 MR. DAVID LABAHN: And thank you for the 22 comparison between the law enforcement individual, 23 which is only quasi immunity, and absolute 24 immunity for a private citizen.

25 So if a law enforcement officer takes

1 9 another life, first it must be within the course 2 3 and scope of the employment, that law enforcement's employment. And in addition to that 4 it is an objective standard. Would a reasonable 5 officer in the same or similar circumstances have 6 been required to use deadly force. 7 8 So, yes, from -- this is extraordinary 9 to say without training, as you talk about very 10 little guidance, that's what I tried to say in my 11 statement. The courts here in Florida have 12 bounced all over the place trying to figure out 13 what this statute means, but with very -- with no 14 training you get absolute immunity. 15 COMMISSIONER YAKI: And let me just take 16 this one step further. And it goes to -- and in 17 the context of a law enforcement officer committing such an act we have remedies within the 18 19 department of justice to examine the behavior of a 20 police department and whether or not in exercising 21 that they're doing it in a way that has -- that 22 has an unfair or disparate impact in terms of 23 race. 24 When you take that out -- out of that 25 equation and you're doing into a situation where

2 we have -- we're trying to get statistics that may 3 or may not get reported or -- you can't get to 4 that analysis about whether or not there is any 5 racial -- any -- any overall racial animus involved to the extent that you can -- when a 6 7 police officer had -- by reporting for an entire department justice can come in and determine 8 whether or not that person or that department is 9 10 acting in a way that is contrary to equal protection. 11 12 MR. DAVID LABAHN: Yes. And that would 13 be the comparison here between the -- if you want 14 to call it the Zimmerman case or the Trayvon 15 Martin case and what's going on right now in 16 Ferguson. Because in Ferguson you're seeing all that. You've got an officer under investigation 17 18 on that and you have the justice department 19 looking at the 1983 action, potentially, yes. 20 COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you. 21 MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: If I could just 22 give you a quick quote from the President of the 23 National District Attorneys Association when he was asked -- he stated that the stand your ground 25 laws basically give citizens more rights to use

24

1	
2	deadly force than we give police officers and with
3	less review.
4	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Did you want to
5	say something, Mr. Lott?
6	MR. JOHN LOTT: Yeah. You know, with
7	regard to training, police have a much more
8	difficult job than civilians do. If you're ever
9	going to take a concealed carry class in Florida
10	one of the things that they're going to emphasize
11	is that you're not the police. The reason why
12	you're being given a gun is to maximize the
13	distance between yourself and the attacker there.
14	Police, when they come to a crime scene
15	can't simply brandish a gun and watch the criminal
16	run away. Police have to be willing to pursue the
17	individual and to come into physical contact with
18	them. And that's the vast majority of what police
19	training involves is, how do you deal with
20	somebody when you're coming into physical contact.
21	When you're talking about a woman who's
22	dealing with an attacker, or an elderly person,
23	the large strength differential that's going to
24	exist there is going to mean once you're in
25	physical contact you've completely lost control of

2 the situation at that point. 3 So to go and make comparisons between 4 the amount of training and -- that civilians and police have, I think, is misleading. 5 I want briefly to say something about 6 the Zimmerman case. Everything that David was 7 just referring to in the case, you know, an 8 aggressor, the different statements that he made 9 10 were already true under the pre-existing self-defense law in Florida. What changed was 11 12 whether or not there was a duty to retreat. The 13 duty to retreat was never brought up in 14 Zimmerman's case. In fact, even the prosecution 15 basically conceded that Zimmerman was on his back, there was no place for him to go and retreat at 16 17 that point. 18 That was the change in the law. And to 19 go and reference the parts of the stand your 20 ground law that were already in effect there, and 21 I'm sure Ilya can probably say more about this 22 too, but it doesn't seem to me to be exactly on 23 target there.

24 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Mr. LaBahn did you25 want to respond?

1 MR. DAVID LABAHN: I don't see how you 2 3 separate one from the other. So when you put in the inferences, the subjective, the no duty to 4 retreat and the very next section that -- that --5 you know, as he said, "Well they didn't -- they 6 didn't amend that." How do you say, "Well, we 7 8 gave all these new benefits and we expanded it, 9 yet we didn't limit the ability of the aggressor 10 to use force and so we didn't intend for 11 aggressors to use force," to me is absolute 12 nonsense. 13 I spent ten years in the legislature working on a lot of different statutes, it is an 14 15 entire package. And the other thing that I think 16 is continually misleading is to say it's not a 17 stand your ground case because they didn't have a stand your ground hearing. 18 19 There is a lot more to it than just a 20 stand your ground hearing. It's the -- it's 21 subjective, objective, presumptions, you can't 22 wrap an entire bill package and just say "This is 23 the only one we want to talk about, it's all included." 24 25 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Miss Burke, did

2 you want to say something? 3 MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: Yeah, and just --4 I just wanted to bring up an additional point on sort of historical self-defense coming -- growing 5 out of common law and then being sometimes 6 codified in state law. But there was always a 7 first aggressor limitation in, sort of, historical 8 self-defense law, in that you could not be the 9 first initiator of violence and then later turn 10 around and invoke self-defense. 11 12 And I think that's extremely important 13 when we're reviewing the Trayvon Martin case. I 14 mean, let's face it this was a very bad result on every level. And the stand your ground laws in 15 Florida are clearly at issue in that case. 16 17 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner 18 Narasaki. 19 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Thank you, Mr. Chair. 20 21 So my question is to Mr. Lott and 22 Mr. Shapiro. It's a series of questions that are 23 connected. So first is, I'm interested to 24 understand whether you agree that it's important 25 to have accurate comprehensive data to determine

1		9
2	whether in fact equal protection is affected or	
3	not affected by this new law.	
4	I know that that Mr. Lott is very	
5	critical of some of the analysis so I'm interested	
6	in particular whether the federal government	
7	should require data collection for connected to	
8	being able to get federal law enforcement funding,	
9	and if not, what would you do to correct the data	
10	situation?	
11	Second is, do you support clarifying the	
12	law that shooters who want the benefit of stand	
13	your ground should not be pursuing the person that	
14	they are shooting, that once they begin to pursue	
15	them they become the aggressor, that they lose	
16	protection of the law?	
17	The third is, I'm interested in	
18	understanding whether you believe that people	
19	should be able to claim immunity for civil	
20	liability when a person accidently kills someone	
21	who's an innocent bystander?	
22	And whether you have concerns about the	
23	fact that now that you've increased the area and	
24	circumstances under which someone can start	
25	shooting other people, whether that in fact is an	

2	increased danger.
3	And the last is, are either of you
4	concerned by the that fact Mr. Zimmerman, given
5	his history seemed to have legal access to a gun?
6	MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: I'll start.
7	And I'll defer the very first question about data
8	to John, because that's clearly his bailiwick.
9	And I'll start with the last question
10	because it goes to show how a lot of the
11	questioning I think conflates a lot of different
12	issues. Stand your ground laws are a very
13	kind of narrow technical/legal point.
14	Self-defense justifications are more broad and
15	affirmative defense are also more broad.
16	Gun regulations and restrictions which
	a whole other sort of debate that's,
18	beyond the scope of this hearing. You know, stand
19	your ground laws are very narrow and very
20	technical. The only difference in stand your ground
21	jurisdictions versus non-stand your ground
22	jurisdictions is what do you have to do if you're
23	being attacked and it's possible to retreat
24	If it's not possible to retreat, like in

1	9
2	the Zimmerman/Martin case then it's only about
3	whether, Zimmerman committed the
4	attack or whether he reasonably believed that his
5	life was in danger, these sorts of considerations
6	are concomitant to traditional self-defense
7	considerations, not stand your ground laws in
8	particular.
9	On the immunity point. For civil
10	liability, well I think the laws there haven't
11	really changed. If you're engaged in reckless or
12	willfully gross negligent behavior you can be
13	liable even if you're not intending to hurt
14	somebody else.
15	But if you're acting reasonably or,
16	exercising your right to
17	self-defense, then, no, you shouldn't have
18	liability. So the question the familiar
19	question under tort law that exists in both stand
20	your ground and non-stand your ground
21	jurisdictions, again so if tort law needs to be
22	changed somehow or recodified that's a separate
23	issue from, the stand your ground law
24	and its operation.
25	And as to shooters shouldn't be pursuing

2 or aggressors who should lose the right to stand your 3 ground, absolutely, I agree with that. And I think that most if not all states have that in 4 5 their stand your ground laws. And that's why the 911 operator told Zimmerman not to pursue. 6 And that, as John was saying, is one of 7 the major differences between people who lawfully 8 -- citizens, private citizens who lawfully carry 9 guns and the police -- the police have to engage 10 11 and citizens do not. 12 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: I'm sorry, you 13 might have said it and I missed it, but did you 14 answer my question about whether you were troubled 15 that he had an access to a gun? 16 MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: Oh, Zimmerman? 17 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Yes. 18 MR. JOHN LOTT: I can answer that --19 MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: I'm sorry? 20 MR. JOHN LOTT: I can answer that. MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: -- I 21 22 don't know the full facts of his -- you know, I 23 understand that he had some alcohol issues in the 24 past. I don't know if he had committed any 25 felonies or done anything that was -- rose to the

1	9
2	level of being deprived of a particular civil
3	right to armed self-defense. You know, I'm you
4	know, given what's what's happened since maybe
5	there is more history to that. But in the
6	abstract, you know, I guess, no.
7	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: So and
8	perhaps Mr. Lott would like to, I think, correct
9	your understanding of what the Florida law says on
10	civil liability. Unless the people that have been
11	testifying all morning are wrong in how they
12	characterized it to us.
13	MR. JOHN LOTT: Yeah, well I'm not a
14	lawyer so I'll let Ilya speak for himself on that.
15	I I can answer the empirical
16	questions that you raised. You know, to me the
17	issue of Zimmerman getting a permit or not, you
18	know, obviously Florida has given out what is
19	it, like 2.6 million concealed handgun permits
20	or permits to 2.6 million people since they first
21	started being issued on October 1, 1987.
22	Right now there's like 1.4 million
23	people who actively have permits. The average
24	person who's had permits over that time has had a
25	permit for something like 12 and a half years. So

2 you've -- 2.6 million people for all of those 3 years. Florida, their website for example, has 4 detailed data on revocations over time. If you look at firearms revocations between January 1, 5 2008 and the end of 2011, they had 4 firearm 6 revocations. But, revocations for any type of 7 firearms related violation. That comes to 8 revocation rate of about 1/10,000th of 1 percent 9 in terms of the permits that were there. 10 11 If you look at the entire period of time 12 from 1987 on there was 168 revocations. You're 13 talking about something that's akin to about a 14 thousandth of a percent. 15 So the bottom line to me -- and most of those revocations were for things that had 16 17 absolutely nothing to do with violence. Most of 18 them were people accidently carrying a permit 19 concealed handgun into a gun-free zone. Or people 20 forgetting to have their permit with them when 21 they would be stopped by police or something. 22 And, so the issue here is are there --23 is there a safety problem in terms of people with 24 permits somehow getting permits improperly, is it 25 something that you can even measure.

1	g
2	If you look at firearms revocation rates
3	for Floridians it's actually
4	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: I I actually
5	just wanted to know whether you're troubled or
6	not, I don't need the whole
7	MR. JOHN LOTT: No, I'm not troubled in
8	general because if you look at the way the
9	Florida's system's working it seems to work
10	incredibly well. I mean
11	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Well, 4
12	revocations out of 2,000 and whatever and there's
13	no problem, okay.
14	MR. JOHN LOTT: Million. So the the
15	rate that permit holders in Florida are involved
16	in crimes with their permit concealed handgun is
17	1/7th the rate that police officers end up getting
18	into trouble for firearms related violations.
19	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Ah
20	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Could he answer
21	the data question
22	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Yeah, would you
23	please.
24	MR. JOHN LOTT: Yeah, I'm sorry. The
25	data question, look more data's great. Okay. I

2 use data all the time on stuff. I don't mind 3 having data. The only thing I would ask is that 4 if you're going to have data it needs to be more 5 than just justifiable homicide and race. COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Right. 6 So you would support tying federal funding to trying to 7 get better data, is the question? 8 MR. JOHN LOTT: I'll leave that up to 9 10 the politicians on how to -- what's the best way to try and go and do that. I'm just saying, sure 11 12 there's a benefit from having more data in terms 13 of being able to study things. 14 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner 15 Heriot, then Commissioner Achtenberg. And do any of the commissioners on the phone want to ask a 16 17 question? 18 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Yes, Kirsanow 19 would like one question. 20 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. 21 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Kladney would 22 like a question. 23 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. So 24 Commissioner Heriot you're next, followed by 25 Commissioners' Achtenberg, Kirsanow, and Kladney.

1		9
2	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Thank you,	
3	Mr. Chairman. I actually have just a quick	
4	question for Dr. Lott.	
5	The previous panel, Dr. Roman,	
6	criticized an aspect of your work and I just	
7	wanted to give you a chance to comment on that.	
8	MR. JOHN LOTT: Sure. And I appreciate	
9	that. Look, there are multiple things that John	
10	brought up. One of the things that he was	
11	brought up was the superiority of using the	
12	justifiable homicide data for the United States as	
13	a whole versus the Tampa Bay Tribune data that was	
14	there, saying that it was, you know, an arbitrary	
15	quote "selective sample" that had been done for	
16	the Tampa Bay Tribune.	
17	The Tampa Bay Tribune article is	
18	essentially the universe of stand your ground	
19	cases. It's not a sample. It has all the cases	
20	there. The problem that you have, if you want to	
21	talk about real sample issues, that's what the	
22	justifiable homicides in some years you have 14	
23	percent of the police jurisdictions in the country	
24	reporting justifiable homicide rate data. And	
25	there's even massive problems as Bill was talking	

about earlier in response to questions from 2 3 Commissioner Heriot, with regard to the fact that they don't go back and correct these things systematically. There's all sorts of errors even in that small percent that you have there. And so the question is, what places report? Why did they report it? What are the errors in their data that's there? 9

4

5

6

7

8

10 But here's -- here's the big problem and Commissioner Castro when you read that quote and 11 12 as the end of it there it actually gets the 13 opposite results, if you have a copy of his paper and I don't know if for some reason it didn't get 14 up there. If you look at Table III of his 15 16 reports, what he has is, he has a column for the rate of justifiable homicides for black-on-white, 17 18 white-on-black, for non-stand your ground states, 19 and for stand your ground states. If you look at 20 the coefficients for the non-stand your ground 21 states essentially, when a white kills a black he 22 has a coefficient of like 41, and the coefficient 23 of 7 for blacks killing whites. So it's a ratio 24 of about 5.4 to 1. So it's saying whites who kill 25 blacks are 5.4 times more likely to be found

1 9 justified in terms of the homicides than blacks. 2 3 But then if you look at the stand your ground states the ratio of the coefficients 4 actually falls to 4. So rather than exacerbating 5 it, he simply doesn't -- didn't read his 6 coefficients correctly. 7 8 And so -- also when he talks about 10 to 9 1, his regressions actually show 4 to 1 difference 10 for stand your ground rather than the 10 to 1 that 11 he was saying. And the problem that you have 12 there is that when you bring up the type of things 13 that Commissioner -- a commissioner earlier was asking him about the 3 to 1 differences just in 14 15 terms of whether the person was armed. You pretty 16 much can explain away the differences even just 17 for one of the factors that are there. And so -- and he also doesn't take into 18 19 account whether all of the things that are 20 statistically different in the right way and makes mistakes there in that too. 21 22 So his results actually showed the 23 opposite of what he was claiming. Rather than the 24 stand your ground laws exacerbating it, it 25 actually reduces the difference in the coefficient

2 between black and whites that are there. 3 And, you know, there are other issues 4 we've been talking about with the general issues 5 about justifiable homicide data. He does not attempt to account for any of the changes that are 6 occurring over time in the data. He doesn't 7 adjust it for the different places that are 8 reporting over time. Lists -- he takes the data 9 as if he doesn't understand any of the problems in 10 11 the underlying data. 12 I'll just give you one other trivial 13 example. As I mentioned, over time more states 14 are reporting the data. You have more 15 jurisdictions reporting the data. Well, if stand your ground states tend to be adopting the, you 16 17 know, relatively later in the period compared to 18 the other states that are there just by having the 19 time trend in there you're going to end up having 20 them have higher rates of justifiable homicide 21 than the earlier ones would be. And, you know, 22 that's just a simple example of the types of 23 biases that you create in there if you don't try 24 to de-trend these things in terms of things like 25 the number of places that are reporting.

1	9
2	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: And just let me
3	add for the record since Dr. Roman's not here
4	right now we're going to ask him to supplement his
5	response based on what you've explained today
6	MR. JOHN LOTT: I wish we could have
7	debated on here. I've been emailing your staff
8	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Well, we're going
9	to well, this is not a debate, this is a
10	hearing. But maybe one day we'll have a debate
11	and you all could come in and we'll sell popcorn,
12	but we're going to ask Dr. Roman to have the
13	opportunity to present us with data along the
14	lines of responding to what you said that way we
15	have a complete record when we evaluate the data.
16	Commissioner Achtenberg.
17	COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: Thank you,
18	Mr. Chairman. Mr. LaBahn I'm curious, does the
19	Prosecutors Association typically take the kind of
20	definitive position that you've taken with regard
21	to stand your ground laws based on bad data, bad
22	facts, and the fact that, you know, there's really
23	not a departure here from the common law, at least
24	according to some lawyers.
25	I mean, I was quite frankly, quite

2 intrigued by the position of the Prosecutors 3 Association, understanding as I do that you're not 4 part of the group of typical suspects, you know, to be taking the position that you're taking. 5 I'm wondering how you could explain to 6 us how it is that your organization came to take 7 this position? 8 And then, secondly, could you talk to 9 10 the commission about what it is you think the commission might be in a position to do about 11 12 something that you seem to see as egregious as 13 your prior testimony indicates. 14 MR. DAVID LABAHN: Okay. Thank you. So 15 first the question of taking legislative positions based upon bad data or -- or something in that way 16 17 and also my organization itself. 18 First, on behalf of APA, The Association 19 of Prosecuting Attorneys, our National 20 Association, we do not have a position on stand 21 your ground laws. We have the Statement of 22 Principles that is attached to my materials, but 23 we do not either support or oppose, because as I 24 said in my testimony, a lot of the states have 25 implemented the laws, there's a separation of

1 9 2 powers, once legislature passes this, the 3 Executive Branch needs to enforce it. As it relates specifically for instance 4 here in Florida. Florida to Florida prosecutors 5 -- the State Association opposed the legislation 6 7 and the legislature went ahead and passed it 8 anyway. And the majority of the states that have 9 passed legislation back then, generally law 10 enforcement has been opposed to it. The reason 11 why, it isn't necessarily based on data, it is --12 an example, what happened here -- this is 13 legislation searching for a problem, instead of 14 legislation addressing an issue or a problem. 15 Having --16 Even hearing that California is a stand 17 your ground state surprises me immensely. I was a 10 year prosecutor there in that state, I 18 19 prosecuted plenty of homicides and lots of 20 violence, especially in Southern California. 21 I then spent 10 years at the State 22 Association. I was running the California 23 District Attorneys Association when the proponents 24 of this legislation -- it was 2006, they brought 25 it to Sacramento and they tried to put the bill

in. We laughed at it. We laughed that you're going to have criminal immunity and civil immunity for taking somebody else's life. We thought it was almost funny that -- you've got to be kidding me.

2

3

4

5

6

So to hear it's a stand your ground 7 state, I would submit to you it's not. 8 What 9 happened in California, it went to its very first 10 committee, which was the judicial committee and the judicial committee it never even got a motion 11 12 because the trial lawyers had control of that and 13 you're going to give civil immunity to -- the 14 legislation was over.

15 What we instead would say is, and I 16 would ask this committee is, this isn't is an 17 entire legislative package, it's not as narrow. 18 You could have changed the Florida law or it could 19 have been done by just putting in a duty to 20 retreat or wiping out that duty to retreat.

21 But that's instead not what this was. 22 This is an entire package including the -- and 23 we've talked about subjective versus objective. 24 In the world of a prosecutor that's a huge change. 25 That's not a minor little detail. In fact we've

1 9 got to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 The 3 -- any place that the individual has a right to be, that's a vast expansion when you take Castle, 4 which had been the home or even some of them even 5 look at home, a place of employment, and some have 6 even extended it to cars. 7 8 But then when you legislatively say 9 "anyplace that you have a right to be," that's, 10 again, a very vast expansion and a very big 11 concern as it relates to how is this going to 12 actually end up in the courts. 13 The presumption. The presumption of 14 reasonableness in your own home. You don't need 15 to have any sort of reasonable fear under this 16 legislation and this draft. It was -- it was 17 instead said if it's in the house you can shoot anybody no matter what you feel about them. If 18 19 they don't have a right to be in your home you can 20 shoot them dead. That presumption is 21 extraordinary, you know? 22 And then, finally, as we just discussed 23 the immunity. Just as when you are working to 24 -supplement your record, I would ask that you look 25 at the entirety of the Florida legislation and see

2 whether or not it's as has been suggested here 3 that they just added duty to retreat or whether 4 they added the four pieces. And that's what we've been doing on behalf of the Association is we have 5 been tracking -- we've been working with various 6 states on what does their legislation mean. 7 And it's all up to each State Association whether they 8 9 support it or oppose it or even the individual --10 But we have specific columns, if you go to our website, of the states that have done the 11 12 expansion, and on the four points which states did 13 which expansion. 14 And that's why we start our research at 15 2005, because I would submit to you prior to 2005 16 the concepts that have been talked about today, 17 especially these immunity provisions, presumptions 18 and such, didn't exist before this legislative 19 piece came forward. 20 So that is the reason why we did it. We 21 would -- and always on behalf of prosecutors I'm 22 now working in Washington, we're always ready to 23 come to the table. There are plenty of problems 24 within our justice system. We like to have the 25 data behind it. We like to know what the problem

1	
2	is.
3	And, especially, on behalf of
4	prosecutors we're trying to make things safer.
5	And that's why we continually come to the table to
6	try to make the justice system work better. Not
7	easier, not faster, but better. And work on
8	legislative reforms.
9	This has never been one that we have
10	seen to be a problem, and hence need to work on a
11	reform.
12	ILYA SHAPIRO: Can I clarify something?
13	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Sure.
14	ILYA SHAPIRO: Mr. LaBahn said that he
15	was surprised that I classified California as a
16	stand your ground state. As I think I was
17	explicit, a lot of the stand your ground states
18	are common law stand your ground states.
19	And among the 31 or so states that you
20	count as that I count as stand your ground
21	states, there's a lot of variation in the
22	legislative package or what the common law
23	protects or what have you. So I don't remember
24	the California specifics right now, but whether
25	it's, you know, just protecting in your car or

2 place of employment, like Mr. LaBahn said, those 3 31 states include protections beyond the home. 4 That's what basically works as stand your ground, and that's why this innovation in the law which as 5 I said isn't an innovation it's 150 years old, is 6 just pushing the normal Castle Doctrine in the 7 home which certainly doesn't --8 COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: So you're 9 10 talking about an expansion of the places from whence one can claim the stand your ground 11 12 defense. Is that what you're talking about in terms of California? 13 14 Do we have the subjective standard? Do 15 we have immunity? COMMISSIONER YAKI: It's -- it's -- a --16 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Go ahead. 17 18 Commissioner Yaki, go ahead, please. COMMISSIONER YAKI: I need -- I need to 19 20 -- with all due respect to Mr. Shapiro that --21 he's wrong. It's not -- California is not a stand 22 your ground state. There are -- there are 23 instances in -- there are some very vague jury 24 instructions that talk about the fact that if 25 you're being -- if someone's trying to kill you,

1	9
2	you don't have to sit there and be killed, but it
3	doesn't it's not a situation that that
4	imposes the same kind of immunity from liability.
5	They're all different they're all different
6	this is where this is where in some ways we're
7	conflating the idea of self-defense with stand
8	your ground. It is not a stand your ground state.
9	It is like many other states, a
10	self-defense state, but California Supreme Court
11	has never opined to this day the extent to which
12	that extends beyond beyond the home.
13	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner
14	MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: I've never sorry.
15	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: No, go ahead.
16	MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: I've I've never
17	claimed that California is a stand your ground
18	state, if we're defining stand your ground as
19	accepting the package legislation modeled after
20	Florida. That's certainly not what I intended to
21	mean.
22	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner
23	Achtenberg, I'm sorry, I cut you off.
24	COMMISSIONER ACHTENBERG: No, that's
25	fine Mr. Chairman. That clarification is

2	sufficient.
3	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay.
4	Commissioner Kirsanow.
5	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: I think that
6	Commissioner Kladney had his hand up first.
7	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. You have
8	very good eyesight Commissioner Kirsanow.
9	(Laughter).
10	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Such courtesy, I
11	have to tell you.
12	I'd like to ask. I think it's
13	Mr. LaBahn, from the prosecutors office and
14	anybody else on the panel. I just want to get
15	this clear, when we refer to the Florida statute,
16	and I'd like to refer to the Florida statute
17	because I think from the testimony that I've heard
18	there's like like every state there's little
19	changes to statutes all over that are similar
20	in nature, but they aren't exactly the same, but
21	so it's my understanding that the stand your
22	ground law allows an eggshell shooter to walk away
23	from a shooting because their psychological
24	perception of the world and individuals for the
25	shooting, whatever it was, regardless of what

1 9 society believes to be a reasonable threat. 2 3 Is that correct? MR. DAVID LABAHN: Yes. Especially if 4 you are describing that eggshell, and because it's 5 a subjective standard there still is a reasonable 6 7 -- does that person reasonably believe that an 8 eggshell person who believes that they're under 9 imminent danger has the right to use deadly force. 10 MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: And can I just --11 can I expand --12 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Yes, in a second. 13 Let me just ask -- add one more question there. And then a police officer who is not 14 15 elected by the people makes a decision as to 16 whether an arrest takes place or not? 17 MR. DAVID LABAHN: Yes. Again, specifically in the Florida statute, which hasn't 18 19 been addressed here, but it's extraordinary. The 20 Florida statute flat out says that -- and it gets 21 it backwards. It says that -- let me find the 22 exact language. "As using this subsection -- and it's 23 776.032 No.1. "As used in this subsection, the 24 25 term criminal prosecution includes arresting,

2 detaining, custody, and charging or prosecuting 3 the defendant." And then in Number 2 it comes forward Δ 5 referencing Number 1. It says, "A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for 6 investigating the use of force as described in 7 subsection 1, but the agency may not arrest the 8 person for using force unless it determines that 9 there is probable cause that the force that was 10 11 used was unlawful." 12 And then 3, which was talked about, 13 there's attorney fees and court costs and 14 everything else if that arresting -- if that 15 agency makes a mistake. 16 This turns the law enforcement agency, 17 and as you said, the officer, yes, it makes that 18 patrol officer almost judge/jury and it's not 19 their job. They ought to be investigating the 20 shooting, not getting to the point of a probable cause determination, especially right after the 21 22 shooting itself. 23 And that's why you have situations like 24 was seen on TV with George Zimmerman, they -- they 25 had initially taken him into custody, and then

1	
2	they took his cuffs off and had him walk home
3	or let him go home.
4	It puts the agency in a very strange
5	position. And they really ought not to be making
6	that decision, especially at the time of the
7	shooting. It ought to be properly investigated
8	and then submitted. That's the way the process
9	should go and it really should never be the patrol
10	officers trying to make some sort of decision at
11	the scene. "Do we arrest him, not arrest him, do
12	we have probable cause, or not have probable
13	cause?"
14	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Miss Burke, you
15	had something that you wanted to add?
16	MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: Yes, I did just
17	want to draw attention to the fact that 776.012 is
18	the reasonable expectation that you you know,
19	you believe that your life is in danger.
20	But, 776.013, which is a presumption of
21	fear in the home goes even even went a step
22	further under Florida's stand your ground law, in
23	that if you are in your home and you shoot and
24	kill someone you're presumed to have a fear. So
25	you don't actually have to be afraid at all.

2	There is a legal presumption created which then
3	the state would have to overcome.
4	So that just takes things a step
5	farther. And certainly much farther than any
6	common law definition of self-defense.
7	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner
8	Kladney, are you done?
9	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I am,
10	Mr. Chairman.
11	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. Now it's
12	your turn Commissioner Kirsanow.
13	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thanks,
14	Mr. Chair. I would also like to thank all of the
15	panelists this has been very informative.
16	I'm willing to be persuaded that stand
17	your ground is a bad idea. And I've got a great
18	deal of interest in and respect for Mr. LaBahn's
19	perspective for example. Although, those of us
20	who are in the first lines of defense for our
21	families and neighborhoods like mine I'm not quite
22	yet persuaded that standing alone, stand your
23	ground is a bad idea. But that's not the
24	that's not the commissions charge, it's whether
25	stand your ground results in discriminatory

1 9 treatment of those involved in the confrontation 2 3 or of an equal protection violation. So I've got a couple of questions for 4 Mr. Shapiro. First, Mr. Shapiro, are you aware of 5 any evidence that any quote - unquote "stand your 6 ground legislation" that's been enacted has been 7 8 done so with any discriminatory intent? 9 MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: I'm not. 10 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Are you aware of 11 any stand your ground legislation that is not 12 (inaudible) neutral? 13 MR. ILYA SHAPIRO: I am not. 14 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: And Mr. Lott you 15 talked about coefficients with respect to -- I 16 can't recall whose data it was. I think it was 17 Mr. Roman. Do you know whether or not the Tampa Bay 18 19 Tribune data or any other data show whether or not 20 or were just aggregated by, for example, the 21 effective concealed carry laws, use of drugs by 22 the attacker, whether the attacker had a weapon or 23 the type of weapon that he had or any other things 24 that may have had a bearing on a one-to-one correlation in black to white statistics in this 25

issue?

2

MR. JOHN LOTT: Well, the Tampa Bay 3 4 Tribune data had very detailed data on whether a 5 weapon was present, what type of weapons were present, who initiated the attack, what types of 6 data was available, whether you had witnesses, 7 forensic information that was there, what property 8 it occurred on, when it occurred, what time it 9 occurred. It has very detailed information on 10 those things. 11 12 You know, with regard to the Roman stuff, I'll just mention the coefficients. I 13 14 reproduced his table -- in fact, I just have a 15 screen shot in my report, so if you want to look 16 at it you can see it in my report. 17 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you. 18 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Any other 19 commissioner -- Commissioner Timmons-Goodson, go 20 ahead. 21 COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Thank you 22 very much, Mr. Chair. 23 As I sat here it occurred to me, I was 24 wondering if any of our witnesses would care to 25 offer any thoughts on how they see implicit bias

1 2 as it relates to these stand your ground laws. 3 MR. DAVID LABAHN: I'll -- I'll go first on that. That's why I'm most troubled by the 4 subjective standard is the implicit bias is going 5 to play into that -- I'm going to say every time. 6 7 It is -- what that person is perceiving, and 8 let's go with the Jordan case, because that's the 9 verdict that came back, and ultimately even with 10 stand your ground, after a second trial, the jury 11 came back and said, "No, we don't think that it 12 was imminent or reasonable." But it was -- the conversation -- it was a white older male shooter 13 14 and young black victim. And the fact that there 15 were 4 in the minivan when they were playing the music. The -- the -- the shooter was in there 16 first. The van comes in, they're playing loud 17 music. He calls it rap music, thug music, I think 18 19 there's different things that this panel has said. 20 And he asked the person to please turn the music 21 down. And they initially did. And then they 22 turned the music back up. And that's when now 23 things started to escalate. Again he asked them 24 to turn the music back down. This time they did 25 not. He started yelling at him. And Jordan

Davis, the ultimate decedent got out of the van and basically -- and did cuss at him or used some sort of words toward him. And at that point Dunn opened fire killing Jordan and also opened fire into the van.

2

3

4

5

6

I submit to you that I have no idea 7 about Dunn and his background. But whether it's 8 implicit or explicit, but we'll go with the 9 10 implicit bias -- you have an age difference, you 11 have a different taste in music, and you 12 absolutely have a different amount of respect 13 towards the individuals. No respect to an older 14 individual and also the willingness to use particular language and get closer in an 15 16 individuals face.

17 I bring that up because I do a 18 tremendous amount of basketball coaching and a lot 19 of young people don't have the same sort of space 20 that -- I'm an older white guy, I like my space a 21 little bit. And so a lot of my players will get 22 very much into my face. They're not getting into 23 my face in any sort of an aggressive manner, it's 24 just they feel more comfortable getting up closer. 25 That's your implicit versus explicit.

1		9
2	But for someone who's not comfortable with that,	
3	and that different sort of cultural feeling they	
4	can feel that that's an aggressive movement toward	
5	them. And because here we're talking about the	
6	use of deadly force that likely can take	
7	somebody's life.	
8	So the more different the individuals	
9	are the more likely that this provision will come	
10	into place. And that's why when you look at the	
11	shootings that have got a lot of attention there	
12	has been both a racial and an age difference.	
13	COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Thank	
14	you.	
15	Mr. Lott.	
16	MR. JOHN LOTT: Yeah, with regard to the	
17	implicitness or explicitness you can look at the	
18	data rather than an anecdotal story. And because	
19	the Tribune data has the age, has the many other	
20	differences there with regard to the individuals.	
21	All the differences that were just raised are in	
22	essentially in the Tribune data set.	
23	So you can control for those to see	
24	whether they make a difference. And in fact, ever	1
25	after you control for those things you find no	

2 statistically significant difference in terms of 3 the way -- the sentence depends upon either the 4 race of the victims or the race of the person who fired the gun. 5 COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: Are you 6 saying that you can control for implicit bias --7 MR. JOHN LOTT: Well, it should be -- if 8 there's implicit bias it should be observed in the 9 final outcomes, right? It should be observed in 10 terms of whether or not somebody's less likely to 11 12 end up with punishment than another person. If 13 he's saying that there's implicit bias because an 14 older white male is going to be given deference in 15 this case, then it should affect the probability 16 that that older white male's going to end up facing a penalty or not. 17 COMMISSIONER TIMMONS-GOODSON: 18 19 Mr. LaBahn it looked like you wanted to say 20 something. MR. DAVID LABAHN: Yes, if -- if I may. 21 22 I was not suggesting that older white males are in 23 any way always going to be bias towards young 24 black males. Instead what was going on in my mind 25 and I think we heard this statistic was 34 percent

1 9 of the cases where the age difference, when the 2 3 individual was older and you had the racial difference, that 34 percent of those cases in fact 4 were deemed to be justified. That's where I 5 suggest is -- the implicit bias comes in when you 6 7 move it from being an objective standard, would a 8 reasonable person in the same or similar 9 circumstances have acted in that way. To the 10 subjective standard is, what did that individual 11 believe. That -- once you've got a subjective 12 standard now the implicit biases weigh in on that 13 decision to take another life. MR. JOHN LOTT: The reason --14 15 MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: Could I --16 MR. JOHN LOTT: -- the reason why you 17 don't take a statistic just like that by itself is there's so many other things that differ across 18 19 these cases. Whether it's somebody's armed, who 20 initiated it, other aspects, you know, whether 21 it's black-on-white or white-on-black. Those are 22 the reasons why you use the whole data set to try 23 to control for those other factors. 24 And I'm saying, when you control for 25 them the data set's publically available or you can

2	run your own regressions on it.
3	When you use all of the data that's
4	available on the Tampa Bay Tribune data set there
5	you don't find any statistically significant
6	difference in the outcome. You may think by just
7	looking at one average there, you can infer
8	something there, but you're leaving out a huge
9	number of other factors that the Tampa Bay data
10	set records.
11	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner Yaki,
12	and then Commissioner Heriot.
13	COMMISSIONER YAKI: I'll let
14	Commissioner Heriot go first.
15	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay.
16	Commissioner Heriot, go ahead.
17	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Oh, okay. I'm not
18	sure where all of this subjective versus objective
19	stuff is coming from in the statute. I'm looking
20	at the Florida statute here and it says, "A person
21	is justified in using or threatening to use force,
22	except deadly force against another let me get
23	to the point "to the extent the person
24	reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary
25	to defend himself or herself."

1	9
2	Where's the part about subjective? Can
3	you direct me to that?
4	MR. DAVID LABAHN: Sure. It is it is
5	that is a subjective standard, that it's the
6	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Reasonableness is
7	a subjective standard?
8	MR. DAVID LABAHN: It's a
9	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Let's not talk
10	over one another, please, everybody. Let the
11	witness speak.
12	MR. DAVID LABAHN: And that's what
13	the courts have inferred. This is that the
14	person reasonably believes
15	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: That's nonsense.
16	MR. DAVID LABAHN: that is a
17	subjective standard not an objective standard.
18	The Beard Case was talked about earlier
19	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: In what universe
20	is that that a subjective standard? I mean,
21	that's nutty, it's got to be reasonable. How do
22	you determine reasonableness it's always with
23	reference to what a reasonable person would do.
24	MR. DAVID LABAHN: No, no, no, it's not
25	a reasonable person standard. It is a person's

2 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: I beg to differ --3 MR. DAVID LABAHN: -- there is -- very 4 significant difference between a person who 5 reasonably believes and a reasonable person believes. And the statute is what the person 6 believes, not what a reasonable person is. I will 7 quote you the language out of Beard so you can see 8 the difference. The Beard --9 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: I'm a torts 10 11 professor. You know, this is what I do for a 12 living, is I talk about what's the reasonable 13 person standard. You know, you're talking to the 14 wrong person. And if you think this is going to 15 be a question of --16 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: -- could you just 17 let him respond. 18 COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Clearly not. UNKNOWN PHONE SPEAKER: Let him answer 19 20 the question. 21 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Mr. LaBahn, go 22 ahead. 23 MR. DAVID LABAHN: I -- I -- I don't 24 know if I can come back, because when it is a 25 reasonable person standard it says reasonable

1	9
2	person. It doesn't say person who reasonably
3	believes. It's been very clear. There hasn't
4	been any question. You can look at the
5	Zimmerman
6	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: There is now.
7	MR. DAVID LABAHN: yeah, you can look
8	at the Zimmerman case, this was intended to be and
9	is, a subjective standard not an objective
10	standard. If it was an objective standard you
11	would not have the prosecutors have so much
12	difficulty with it. And if this panel comes back
13	and says "objective standard is preferred," that
14	would be a great assist.
15	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner Yaki
16	and then Commissioner Narasaki.
17	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Yeah, I'm a little
18	troubled by I was even troubled by Mr. Roman's
19	criticism of the Tampa Bay and by the way, it's
20	the Tampa Bay Times not the Tribune, I think that
21	they would be upset that their that they were
22	part of a different news organization.
23	The data that they have is actually data
24	that I find very useful because it goes into a lot
25	of subsets and hard data, charging sheets,

2 et cetera that I think are not necessarily those 3 that are reported as part of the normal databases 4 that are collected by the federal government. In fact it's one where I believe that we 5 have the ability to go even further and use that 6 kind of model for research in terms of other 7 jurisdictions as well. 8 I think it's important to put that in 9 10 there because one of my issues with regard to trying to take the notion of implicit bias and 11 12 simply apply it at one part of the stage, is that 13 when you look at how the stand your ground statute 14 is formulated implicit bias can be there at any 15 particular stage. It can be at the moment that a 16 person decides that someone is a threat to them. 17 It can be there the moment when the investigating 18 officer upon hearing the persons assertion of 19 stand your ground, makes a decision right then and 20 there, "Well, it was a -- it was a -- "This person 21 talking to me is white, the person attacking was 22 black," not that he's a racist, but there could be 23 right then and there a decision, "Okay, I'm going 24 to let this person go and worry -- and then decide 25 later on whether or not there's probable cause."

1 9 2 And going to the point where the judge makes a 3 decision at an immunity hearing. It can be at any different locale, and I think that's why we need 4 to look at the data in all sorts of areas to 5 determine whether or not there is that kind of 6 thing there. But that's just a statement about 7 8 that. 9 My question was actually for -- for 10 Ms. Burke. And it goes to -- could -- should we 11 -- would we even be talking about the impact of 12 stand your ground if it were not for the correlation between stand your ground laws and the 13 14 status of gun laws in the states in which it 15 exists? MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: Right -- I mean, 16 17 stand your ground -- stand your ground clearly has grown up around a time when the gun laws are 18 19 becoming more lax. Guns are becoming more 20 available. There's no longer -- for a person to 21 carry a concealed weapon. There's no longer a 22 necessity to show that you have fear. That you 23 need that be armed on a public street. 24 It used to be if you needed a concealed 25 weapon that you could apply for a permit. That

2 you would go to your sheriff, your police officer, 3 they would know you from the community, and they 4 would make a determination of high moral character of a non-dangerous personality, and the fact that 5 you needed a gun, perhaps you were being stalked, 6 perhaps you worked in a very dangerous 7 neighborhood and moved cash at night. There was 8 9 all sorts of reasons that a reasonable society 10 would say "this person needs to be armed for their self-defense." And that situation was working 11 12 very well.

But, at the behest of the gun lobby Here and those laws have been relaxed in a historic sweep throughout our country. And at this point there is really no telling how many people walk around now with concealed weapons on them at all times.

And implicit bias then becomes a deadly bias, I think, because suddenly a fear that maybe would have made you uncomfortable and scared and you'd get in your car and leave, now people are holstered up and they feel the right to if anybody disrespects them to, you know, shoot them.

And the issue of civil liability and the fact that this law protects people from negligent

1 9 shooting is another travesty because, you know, I 2 3 thought it was a very interesting discussion with the prior panel about the 15 year old in the car 4 behind the thugs who was shot and killed and had 5 no recourse -- her family had no recourse to bring 6 7 a suit against anyone. 8 One of the panelist's said, "Well, 9 that's how it should be. You know, someone acting 10 in self-defense isn't going to have insurance for 11 that." But, in fact, we see concealed carry 12 insurance as a new product. You carry your gun 13 with you everywhere, so the websites say, you know, you're more likely to be involved in an 14 15 incident and need legal representation. So for 16 \$14 a month now you can have insurance against just exactly that kind of shooting, right, of 17 spraying a crowd and then saying, "Gosh, I was 18 terrified." 19 20 So, in answer to your question, I think 21 you'd have to see them arm in arm. 22 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Mr. Lott and then 23 Commissioner Narasaki. 24 MR. JOHN LOTT: Yeah, thanks. Just as a 25 response to Miss Burke. We have data

2 cross-states. We have data in terms of the 3 different rules, the types of rules that she's looking at. Let's them look to see what revocation 4 rates differ. And in fact there's no 5 statistically significant difference in terms of 6 revocation rates for the states that have the 7 types of rules that she's having or the states 8 that are more liberal. 9 MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: Mr. Lott -- I 10 mean, Mr. Zimmerman's gun has not been revoked. 11 12 His license has not been revoked so I would 13 question the viability and the inappropriateness 14 of the revocation laws. COMMISSIONER CASTRO: And I've got to 15 16 believe that the revocation procedures, processes 17 and resources vary state by state, so they may not 18 even have folks who are regularly investigating in 19 some of these states as revocations. So I don't 20 know how that can be a distinction point, but --21 Commissioner Narasaki. 22 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Yes, thank you. 23 I actually find it that it doesn't necessarily 24 prove that the system is working if there aren't 25 any revocations. I actually believe that proves

1 9 2 that perhaps it's not working. It's like when my 90 year old grandmother in California got her 3 drivers license renewed without an exam. That 4 did not make me feel any better about the driver's 5 6 in California and getting on the road. 7 So I have a question about -- well, 8 first, on the issue of reasonable amount versus 9 reasonable belief. You know, Professor Cynthia 10 Lee's written a book about the extent to which a 11 reasonable man-standard still has some 12 subjectivity, right? Depending on what group is 13 deciding what a reasonable man would do. But, it 14 has more objectivity than saying, "Well, putting 15 myself in the position of someone who's an older 16 white man, not used to being around minorities, 17 feeling threatened and disrespected, I might say, you know, I wouldn't feel threatened, but I could 18 19 see that that guy might reasonably feel 20 threatened. That to me is a very different 21 standard, and in fact rewards people for being 22 biased, and I'm concerned about that. I don't 23 think that's something that should be rewarded. 24 What I am interested in understanding is 25 that, in the issue of implicit bias, it's not just

2 how the justice system treats you, but it's also 3 the question of when are you going to get shot. 4 Right? And that's the irrevocable fact that in a 5 split second your bias allows you to shoot someone and then the legal system either treats that --6 7 treats everybody fairly or not fairly after what happened. So I think that's maybe where we're 8 sort of parting ways, Mr. Lott. 9 I do want to know though, do you believe 10 11 that there's implicit bias? Do you believe that 12 there's bias in the system that would cause you 13 any kind of concern, if in fact implicit bias 14 exists? Or is it just that you're trying to argue that the data doesn't prove that in fact it's 15 16 resulted in any inequity? MR. JOHN LOTT: I'm happy to accept that 17 18 there's surely biases that people have in many 19 different ways. I'm just saying in this 20 particular case we have a very useful data set 21 that we can go and look at to see whether it 22 effects the final outcome. 23 I want to talk for a minute in terms of 24 your example with your grandmother getting the 25 driver's license. What we would do then is we

1	g
2	would look to see what happens to accidents, we
3	could look at accident rates for people who are 75
4	to 80. Okay? We can do the exact same thing
5	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Her 85 year old
6	sister ran into a police and she did not get her
7	license revoked either.
8	MR. JOHN LOTT: No but, even if you
9	don't look at revocations, you can look at things
10	like murders. You can look at accidents. You can
11	look at what happens in murder rates or accidents
12	in other states based upon the types of rules.
13	And in fact what you find is that the
14	states that have easier rules for getting permits
15	actually have bigger drops in murder rates because
16	you have more people being issued permits.
17	And so it's the exact opposite if you
18	the ultimate thing that you care about then
19	when you were talking about what happens with
20	stand your ground laws somebody gets shot well,
21	let's look to see what happens to all murders.
22	When you look at that and you control for the gun
23	control laws that Miss Burke says needs to be
24	accounted for there you see drops there in
25	murder rates you have fewer lives lost. And I

2 agree that's a very important bottom line. 3 So it's not just looking at revocations, 4 I agree revocations are just one possible way of 5 looking at it, but you need to look at other factors and I look at all of those different 6 things. 7 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Can I just ask 8 you for a clarification on that because we have 9 thousands of pages that the great commission staff 10 11 have pulled together for us to prepare for this 12 hearing, and I really want to thank the staff for 13 the incredible job that they've done so far, but 14 in my reading I recall repeatedly seeing that in fact in stand your ground places murder went up, 15 am I wrong? Am I confused? 16 17 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: No, you're right. COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: So I'm confused 18 19 by what you're arguing. 20 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: I'm sorry, 21 Miss Burke did you want to respond? 22 MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: -- 8 percent --23 MR. JOHN LOTT: Well, can't I just 24 respond --25 MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: -- I think it was

the --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

MR. JOHN LOTT: The Texas A & M study. And what I tried to do -- oops, there it is. What I tried to do was just go through and tried to explain to you kind of what happened with the Texas A & M study -- there's also a Georgia study, but both of them are very similar.

9 Texas A & M really looked at only laws 10 between 2005 and 2010, no explanation for why they 11 didn't look at other periods. A very narrow 12 window in terms of crimes -- rates that they 13 looked at. They didn't control for any other 14 types of laws that Mrs. Burke -- Miss Burke was 15 just making argument needed to be accounted for 16 because it would affect the rate and the possible problems that would occur. There's -- it's really 17 18 amazing cherry picking that goes on --

COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: But -- but,
 homicides either went up or down.

21 MR. JOHN LOTT: No, but -- the point is 22 -- let me give you an example. They not only look 23 at stand your ground laws, it's been a misnomer 24 they also look -- have in there Castle Doctrine 25 states. So someplace like Illinois for example,

2 which clearly has a Castle Doctrine type state 3 rules. But, Chicago, during that period of time 4 that they were looking it was basically impossible 5 for people to get handguns, you know, except if you were a very wealthy individual. So what 6 impact -- what's the point of testing whether or 7 not the Castle Doctrine had an impact there. 8 Or in Boston, Massachusetts where even former police 9 10 officers can't even get a permit to own a handgun 11 12 MS. BURKE: I think it's disingenuous. 13 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Okay. Mr. Lott, 14 let Miss Burke speak and then Commissioner Yaki is 15 going to have the last question. MS. ELIZABETH BURKE: I think it's 16 17 disingenuous to ask this commission to believe 18 that in Chicago there were only wealthy people 19 having handguns even though there was a ban on 20 handguns in the state. So, you know, the murder 21 rate -- many studies have shown that the murder 22 rate goes up as all these laws become more lax. 23 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Commissioner Yaki, 24 you have the last question. 25 COMMISSIONER YAKI: I was just going to

1 9 2 say that, let's get away from Mr. Roman's data and 3 let's go back to Mr. Krouse from the Congressional Research Service and his slides which showed that 4 -- that overall there's been an uptick in the 5 homicide rates starting around 2005. And then --6 and that certainly beginning in 2005 there's a 7 8 very big uptick in terms of justifiable homicides. 9 And now -- I just want to say this one thing which 10 is, what Mr. Lott said actually kind of goes to 11 the point that I was trying to make with 12 Miss Burke which is, you can -- you can -- and, you know, people say -- I noticed that Mr. Shapiro 13 14 liked it -- liked to say that, "Then Senator 15 Barack Obama voted to expand the Castle Doctrine 16 in Illinois." But then again Illinois has very tough gun laws. But we're talking about, when we 17 18 look at some of the states where you have not so 19 tough gun laws, where you have the Florida models 20 stand your ground law, and you have the data --21 the data that Mr. Roman and others have, and the 22 Tampa Bay Times have, that's where we have --23 that's where we see the disparity. That's sort of 24 the -- that's sort of the cocktail that I'm 25 concerned about. That is -- that is, quite

2 frankly, the basis of this hearing is that when 3 you have those elements present adding -- and then 4 you add to that bias, implicit bias, explicit bias 5 you start to see this -- this problem, this tend, and that's what this hearing and this data is all 6 about. And that's all that I wanted to say. 7 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you. We 8 have now reached the appointed time to conclude 9 this brief -- did you want to say something very 10 11 quickly? 12 MR. DAVID LABAHN: May I just --13 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Yeah, go ahead, 14 you'll have the last word then I'll close. 15 MR. DAVID LABAHN: Well, thank you, 16 Mr. Chair. 17 COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Sure. 18 MR. DAVID LABAHN: I wanted to address 19 the implicit bias question because it's too bad 20 that Mr. Sullivan was unable to attend. 21 He is Special Counsel to the Brooklyn 22 District Attorney. One of the things that he is 23 doing with the Brooklyn D.A.'s Office is training 24 all of the prosecutors on implicit bias. 25 We have done that. On behalf of APA, at

1	9
2	one of our national conferences we've trained on
3	that. On behalf of APA we've been involved in two
4	now, racial justice summits of especially
5	within our role of prosecutors within the system,
6	how can we make sure that we're doing no harm.
7	So I wanted to directly address and say,
8	that on behalf of prosecutors we recognize
9	implicit bias exists, it's how can we counteract
10	it, and make sure that certain other things are
11	fair. So thank you, sir.
12	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: Thank you. And
13	thanks to each of you and to all of the panelists
14	today. This information is going to be very
15	helpful to us as we prepare our report.
16	I also want to acknowledge and ask all
17	of our staff that are here and especially the
18	staff that have been involved in putting this
19	together over the last several months to please
20	stand and be acknowledged, we really appreciate
21	your work.
22	(Applause.)
23	COMMISSIONER CASTRO: This could not
24	have happened without all of you and we really do
25	appreciate that.

Lastly, the record for this briefing is going to remain open for the next 30 days. Ιf panalists or members of the public would like to submit materials they can mail them to the: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Office of Federal Civil Rights Evaluation, 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, Suite 1150, Washington, D.C., 20425 or via e-mail to publiccomments@usccr.gov. The exact time is now 3:35 p.m. and this meeting of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission is now adjourned. Thank you. (Hearing was adjourned at 3:35 p.m.) (Meeting was concluded. This is the end of volume III)

1	9
2	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	
4	
5	STATE OF FLORIDA
6	COUNTY OF POLK
7	
8	I, Kathy Wescott, Certified Shorthand
9	Reporter, do hereby certify that I was authorized to
10	and did report in Stenotypy and electronically the
11	foregoing proceedings and evidence in the captioned
12	case and that the foregoing pages constitute a true and
13	correct transcription of my recordings thereof.
14	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed
15	my hand this 28th day of October, 2014, at Lakeland,
16	Polk County, Florida.
17	
18	Kathy Wescott, CSR
19	Court Reporter
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

Jeffrey Smith Swanville

Examining the Race Effects of Stand Your Ground Laws Briefing before The United States Commission on Civil Rights Held in Orlando, FL Briefing Report

I submit the US civil Rights commission report on the adverse effects of stand your ground laws, currently under consideration by your committee, registering my opposition to any such laws. I am opposed to LD 1138 not only for the reason stated in the USCCR report which was transmitted to the White House in February 2020, but also in general opposition to any law which will create a potential vigilante empowerment of gun owners, regardless of race. I am no longer a gun owner, but I do carry an expert rating with the NRA. I hope you will carefully consider, in the current atmosphere of tragic and preventable gun deaths at the hands of gun owners and official users alike, any brain is a terrible thing to waste.