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sophistication. For this reason, a very broad provision in a | partnership agreement in effect negating any duty of loyalty, such | as a provision giving a managing partner complete discretion to | manage the business with no liability except for acts and omissions | that constitute willful misconduct, will not likely be enforced. | See, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 189 Ill. App. 3d 403, 136 Ill. Dec. | 780, 545 N.E.2d 304 (1989). On the other hand, it is clear that | the remaining partners can "consent" to a particular conflicting | interest transaction or other breach of duty, after the fact, | provided there is full disclosure. |
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| | RUPA attempts to provide a standard that partners can rely | upon in drafting exculpatory agreements. It is not necessary | that the agreement be restricted to a particular transaction. | That would require bargaining over every transaction or | opportunity, which would be excessively burdensome. The | agreement may be drafted in terms of types or categories of | activities or transactions, but it should be reasonably specific. |
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| | A provision in a real estate partnership agreement authorizing | a partner who is a real estate agent to retain commissions on | partnership property bought and sold by that partner would be an | example of a "type or category" of activity that is not | manifestly unreasonable and thus should be enforceable under the | Act. Likewise, a provision authorizing that partner to buy or | sell real property for his own account without prior disclosure | to the other partners or without first offering it to the | partnership would be enforceable as a valid category of | partnership activity. |
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| | Ultimately, the courts must decide the outer limits of | validity of such agreements, and context may be significant. It | is intended that the risk of judicial refusal to enforce | manifestly unreasonable exculpatory clauses will discourage sharp | practices while accommodating the legitimate needs of the parties | in structuring their relationship. |
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| | 5. Subsection (b)(3)(i) permits the partners, in their | partnership agreement, to identify specific types or categories | of partnership activities that do not violate the duty of | loyalty. A modification of the statutory standard must not, | however, be manifestly unreasonable. This is intended to | discourage overreaching by a partner with superior bargaining | power since the courts may refuse to enforce an overly broad | exculpatory clause. See, e.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., | 377 F.2d 846, 850 (3d Cir. 1967) (limitation prohibits | unconscionable agreements); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Shell Oil | Co., 919 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1990) (apply limitation | deferentially to agreements of sophisticated parties). |
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