The analysis for the parties as holders appears quite |
different at first examination from traditional communications |
privileges because mediations involve parties whose interests |
appear to be adverse. However, the law of attorney-client |
privilege has considerable experience with situations in which |
multiple-client interests may conflict, and those experiences |
support the analogy of the mediation privilege to the |
attorney-client privilege. For example, the attorney-client |
privilege has been recognized in the context of a joint |
defense in which interests of the clients may conflict in part |
and yet one may prevent later disclosure by another. See |
Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App.3d 683, 256 Cal. |
Rptr. 425 (1989); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 |
(7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979); Visual |
Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC, 508 So.2d 437 (Fla. App. |
1987); but see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuller, 695 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. |
App. 1985) (refusing to apply the joint defense doctrine to |
parties who were not directly adverse); see generally Patricia |
Welles, A Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in Joint |
Defense, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 321 (1981). Similarly, the |
attorney-client privilege applies in the insurance context, in |
which an insurer generally has the right to control the |
defense of an action brought against the insured, when the |
insurer may be liable for some or all of the liability |
associated with an adverse verdict. Desriusseaux v. Val-Roc |
Truck Corp., 230 A.D.2d 704 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. 1996); Paul R. |
Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, 4:30- |
4:38 (2d ed. 1999). |