LD 1295
pg. 15
Page 14 of 67 An Act To Enact the Uniform Mediation Act Page 16 of 67
Download Bill Text
LR 464
Item 1

 
Sections 4-6. It is similar to the general rule, as reflected in
Uniform Rule of Evidence 801, which defines a "statement" as "an
oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct of an individual
who intends it as an assertion." Most generic mediation
privileges cover communications but do not cover conduct that is
not intended as an assertion. Ark. Code Ann. Section 16-7-206
(1993); Cal. Evid. Code Section 1119 (West 1997); Fla. Stat.
Ann. Section 44.102 (1999); Iowa Code Ann. Section 679C.3
(1998); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 60-452a (1964) (assertive
representations); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, Section 23C (1985);
Mont. Code Ann. Section 26-1-813 (1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section
25-2914 (1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 25-2914 (1997)
(assertive representations); N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-38.1(1) (1995);
N.J. Rev. Stat. Section 2A:23A-9 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
Section 2317.023 (West 1996); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, Section 1805
(1983); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 36.220 (1997); 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. Section 5949 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws Section 9-19-44
(1992); S.D. Codified Laws Section 19-13-32 (1998); Va. Code
Ann. Section 8.01-576.10 (1994); Wash. Rev. Code Section
5.60.070 (1993); Wis. Stat. Section 904.085(4)(a) (1997); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. Section 1-43-103 (1991). The mere fact that a person
attended the mediation - in other words, the physical presence
of a person - is not a communication. By contrast, nonverbal
conduct such as nodding in response to a question would be a
"communication" because it is meant as an assertion, however
nonverbal conduct such as smoking a cigarette during the
mediation session typically would not be a "communication"
because it was not meant by the actor as an assertion.

 
A mediator's mental impressions and observations about the
mediation present a more complicated question, with important
practical implications. See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68
F.Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999). As discussed below, the
mediation privilege is modeled after, and draws heavily upon,
the attorney-client privilege, a strong privilege that is
supported by well-developed case law. Courts are to be
expected to look to that well developed body of law in
construing this Act. In this regard, mental impressions that
are based even in part on mediation communications would
generally be protected by privilege.

 
More specifically, communications include both statements and
conduct meant to inform, because the purpose of the privilege
is to promote candid mediation communications. U.S. v.
Robinson, 121 F.3d 911, 975 (5th Cir., 1997). By analogy to
the attorney-client privilege, silence in response to a
question may be a communication, if it is meant to inform.
U.S. v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 n.2 (7th Cir., 1991).
Further, conduct meant to explain or communicate a fact, such
as the re-enactment of an
accident, is a communication. See Weinstein's Federal Evidence
503.14 (2000). Similarly, a client's revelation of a hidden
scar to an


Page 14 of 67 Top of Page Page 16 of 67