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dominant, undisputed rule of law. However, the language employed | | by the various circuits to describe and apply this ground in the | | commercial arbitration milieu reflects two distinct, different | | thresholds for vacatur being used by those courts. First, the | | Tenth Circuit in Seymour and the Eighth Circuit in PaineWebber, | | Inc. v. Argon, 49 F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 1995) contemplate that an | | award can be vacated when it "explicitly" conflicts with, | | violates, or is contrary to the subject public policy. The | | judicial inquiry under this variant of the "public policy" | | ground obliges the court to delve into the merits of the | | arbitration award in order to ascertain whether the arbitrator's | | analysis and application of the parties' contract or relevant | | law "violates" or "conflicts" with the subject public policy. |
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| | | Second, the Eleventh Circuit in Brown v. Rauscher Pierce | | Refnses, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1994) and the Second | | Circuit in Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d | | 1108 (2d Cir. 1980) trigger vacatur only when a court | | concludes that implementation of the arbitral result | | (typically, effectuation of the remedy directed by the | | arbitrator) compels one of the parties to violate a well- | | defined and dominant public policy, a determination which does | | not require a reviewing court to evaluate the merits of the | | arbitration award. Instead, the court need only ascertain | | whether confirmation of, or refusal to vacate an arbitration | | award, and a judicial order directing compliance with its | | terms, will place one or both of the parties to the award in | | violation of the subject public policy. If it would, the award | | must be vacated. If it does not, vacatur is not warranted. For | | a full discussion of the evolution and application of the | | public policy exception in the labor arbitration sphere, see | | Stephen L. Hayford and Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor | | Contract and External Law: Revisiting the Arbitrator's Scope | | of Authority, 1993 J. Disp. Resol. 249. |
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| | | 4. States have rarely addressed "manifest disregard of the | | law" or "public policy" as grounds for vacatur. See, e.g., | | Schoonmacher v. Cummings and Lockwood of Connecticut, 252 | | Conn. 416, 747 A.2d 1017 (2000) (stating that court determines | | that public policy of facilitating clients' access to an | | attorney of their choice requires a court to conduct de novo | | review of arbitration decisions involving non-competition | | agreements among attorneys); State of Connecticut v. AFSCME, | | Council 4, 252 Conn. 467, 747 A.2d 480 (2000) (concluding that | | arbitration award reinstating employee for admittedly making | | harassing phone calls to a legislator which conduct violated | | state law should be overturned as a violation of clearly | | expressed public policy). |
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| | | One area in which state courts have considered it appropriate | | to review the awards of arbitrators on public-policy grounds | | is family law and, in particular, statutes or case law | | requiring |
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