3. Section 21(c) preserves the traditional, broad right of arbitrators to fashion remedies. See III Macneil Treatise Ch. 36; Michael Hoellering, Remedies in Arbitration, Arbitration and the Law (1984) (annotating federal and state decisions). Generally their authority to structure relief is defined and circumscribed not by legal principle or precedent but by broad concepts of equity and justice. See, e.g., David Co. v. Jim Miller Constr., Inc., 444 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 1989); SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 793, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1976). This is why Section 21(c) allows an arbitrator to order broad relief even that beyond the limits of courts which are circumscribed by principles of law and equity. The language in UAA Section 12(a) [RUAA Section 23(a)] stating that "the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm [an] award" has been moved to this section on remedies. The purpose of including this language in the UAA was to insure that arbitrators have a great deal of creativity in fashioning remedies; broad remedial discretion is a positive aspect of arbitration. Just as in UAA Section 12(a), this language in Section 21(c) means that arbitrators issuing remedies will not be confined to limitations under principles of law and equity (unless the law or the parties' agreement specifically confines them).

4. Section 21(d) is based upon UAA Section 10 that allows arbitrators, unless the agreement provides to the contrary, to determine in the award payment of expenses, including the arbitrator's expenses and fees. The most significant change is that UAA Section 10 prohibits an arbitrator from awarding attorney's fees; Section 21(b) specifically allows for an arbitrator to make such an award.