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remand the matter back to the arbitrators. The revised | alternative is based on the Minnesota version of the UAA. Minn. | Stat. Ann. §572.16; see also 710 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9; Ky. | Rev. Stat. 417.130. |
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| | 2. Section 20 serves an important purpose in light of the | arbitration doctrine of functus officio which is "a general | rule in common law arbitration that when arbitrators have | executed their awards and declared their decision they are | functus officio and have no power to proceed further." Mercury | Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. | 1951); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local | Union 1547 v. City of Ketchikan, Alaska, 805 P.2d 340 (Alaska | 1991); Chaco Energy Co. v. Thercol Energy Co., 97 N.M. 127, | 637 P.2d 558 (1981). Under this doctrine when arbitrators | finalize an award and deliver it to the parties, they can no | longer act on the matter. See 1 Domke on Commercial | Arbitration §§22:01, 32:01 (Gabriel M. Wilner, ed. 1996) | [hereinafter Domke]. Indeed because of the functus officio | doctrine there is some question whether, in the absence of an | authorizing statute, a court can remand an arbitration | decision to the arbitrators who initially heard the matter. 1 | Domke §35:03. |
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| | 3. The grounds in Section 20(a) and (d) are essentially the | same as those in UAA Section 9, which provides the parties | with a limited opportunity to request modification or | correction of an arbitration award either (1) when there is an | error as described in Section 24(a)(1) for miscalculation or | mistakes in descriptions or in Section 24(a)(3) for awards | imperfect in form or (2) "for the purpose of clarifying the | award." Chaco Energy Co. v. Thercol Energy Co., 97 N.M. 127, | 637 P.2d 558 (1981) (finding an amended arbitration award for | purposes other than those enumerated in statute is void). |
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| Section 20(a)(2) and (d)(2) include an additional ground for | modification or correction that is based on FAA Section | 10(a)(4) where an arbitrator's award is either so imperfectly | executed or incomplete that it is questionable whether the | arbitrators ruled on a submitted issue. See, e.g., Flexible | Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96 (7th | Cir. 1996); Americas Ins. Co. v. Seagull Compania Naviera, | S.A., 774 F.2d 64 (2nd Cir. 1986). |
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| | 4. The benefit of a provision such as Section 20 is evident | in a comparison with the FAA, which has no similar provision. | Under the FAA, there is no statutory authority for parties to | request arbitrators to correct or modify evident errors. | Furthermore the FAA has only a limited exception in FAA | Section 10(a)(5) for a | court to order a rehearing before the arbitrators when an | award is vacated and the time within which the agreement | required the award to be issued has not expired. This lack of | a statutory basis both for arbitrators to clarify a matter | and, in |
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