LD 1218
pg. 64
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LR 468
Item 1

 
A.2d 704 (1995) (enforcing under UAA preliminary orders issued
by arbitrator regarding sale and proceeds of property); see also
III Macneil Treatise § 34.2.1.2.

 
As a general proposition, courts are very hesitant to review
interlocutory orders of an arbitrator. The Ninth Circuit in
Aerojet-General Corporation v. American Arbitration
Association, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973) stated that
"judicial review prior to the rendition of a final arbitration
award should be indulged, if at all, only in the most extreme
cases." The court concluded that a more lax rule would
frustrate a basic purpose of arbitration of providing for a
speedy disposition without the expense and delay of a court
proceeding. In Harleyville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Adair, 421
Pa. 141, 145, 218 A.2d 791, 794 (Pa. 1966), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that to allow challenges to an arbitrator's
interlocutory rulings would be "unthinkable." Massachusetts
also rejected the appeal of an interlocutory order in
Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 457, 258 N.E.2d
561, 564 (Mass. 1970), noting that to allow a court to review
an arbitrator's interlocutory order "would tend to render the
proceedings neither one thing nor the other, but transform
them into a hybrid, part judicial and part arbitrational."
Thus Section 18 requires a court to enforce the preaward
ruling unless the ruling should be vacated under the standards
for confirming, modifying, or vacating awards under Sections
23 and 24.

 
Courts have considered more closely substantive challenges to
preaward rulings of arbitrators on grounds of privilege or
confidentiality. In Hull Municipal Lighting Plant v.
Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co., 414 Mass. 609,
609 N.E.2d 460 (1993), the defendant refused to turn over
certain documents to the plaintiff, despite an arbitral
subpoena requiring such, because the defendant claimed that
portions of the documents contained attorney-client and work-
product privileges. After the supervisor of public records had
decided issues arising under the public records law, the court
concluded that because the matters fell under Massachusetts
public records law, the question of privilege was within the
discretion of the judge and not the arbitrator. See also World
Commerce Corp. v. Minerals & Chem. Philipp Corp., 15 A.D. 432,
224 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1962) (holding that court and not arbitrator
decides whether documents of non-party to arbitration are
protected as confidential); Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v.
Soper, 105 Misc. 2d 230, 431 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1980) (vacating
award of arbitrator who incorrectly determined privilege of
patient's confidential records); DiMania v. New York State
Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 87 Misc. 2d 736, 386 N.Y.S.2d 590
(1976) (overruling decision of
arbitrator regarding client's privilege of confidentiality);
compare Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 337,


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