The exception under the FAA is the Eighth Circuit in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1984), which concluded that preliminary injunctive relief under the FAA is simply unavailable, because the "judicial inquiry requisite to determine the propriety of injunctive relief necessarily would inject the court into the merits of issues more appropriately left to the arbitrator." Id. at 1292; see also Peabody Coalsales Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 36 F.3d 46 (8th Cir. 1994).

2. The Hovey case underscores the difficult conflict raised by interim judicial remedies: they can preempt the arbitrator's authority to decide a case and cause delay, cost, complexity, and formality through intervening litigation process, but without such protection an arbitrator's award may be worthless. See II Macneil Treatise §25.1. Such relief generally takes the form of an injunctive order, e.g., requiring that a discontinued franchise or distributorship remain in effect until an arbitration award, Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984); Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1980), or that a former employee not solicit customers pending arbitration, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano, 999 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1993); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dutton, 844 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1988); or that a party be required to post some form of security by attachment, lien, or bond, The Anaconda v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 42, 64 S.Ct. 863 (1944) (attachment - see also 9 U.S.C. § 8); Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1990) (injunction bond); see II Macneil Treatise §25.4.3. In a judicial proceeding for preliminary relief, the court does not have the benefit of the arbitrator's determination of disputed issues or interpretation of the contract. Another problem for a court is that in determining the propriety of an injunction, order, writ for attachment or other security, the court must make an assessment of hardships upon the parties and the probability of success on the merits. Such determinations fly in the face of the underlying