Section 1 defines "reasonable degree of force" in the context of the use of physical force by a parent, foster parent, guardian or other similar person responsible for the long-term general care and welfare of a person, as limited to applying physical force to a person that at most results in transient pain or minor temporary marks on that person. As enacted, the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A, section 106, subsection 1-A reflects current Maine case law respecting use of physical force by a parent to prevent or punish a child's misconduct. See State v. York, 2001 ME 30, 766 A.2d 570. In section 2, in light of this new Title 17-A, section 106, subsection 1-A definition, the reference to subsection 1 is removed from Title 17-A, section 106, subsection 4. The word "purposeful" is replaced with the equivalent word "intentional" in Title 17-A, section 106, subsection 4 to reflect Maine Criminal Code language usage. See Title 17-A, section 2, subsection 15.

Section 3 amends the law regarding the use of physical force in law enforcement in 3 ways. First, it adds the word "unlawful" to the law to specify that a law enforcement officer or private person may use force upon another when the law enforcement officer or private person reasonably believes that there exists an imminent use of "unlawful" force by another. The addition of "unlawful" makes this law consistent with other use of force provisions in Chapter 5 of the Maine Criminal Code. Second, this section strikes an outdated reference to the Maine Correctional Institution - Warren. Third, the section makes the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17- A, section 107 gender neutral in conformance with drafting standards.

Section 4 adds the phrase "in fact" before the word "communicates" in the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A, section 210, subsection 1 to clarify that no culpable mental state need be proved. The addition mirrors Maine case law. See State v. Porter, 384 A.2d 429, 433-434 (Me. 1978).

Sections 5 and 6 repeal the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A, section 451, subsection 3-A and section 452, subsection 2-A. Each subsection was intended to continue in effect the traditional "2 witness" rule as set forth in State v. Farrington, 411 A.2d 396, 401 (Me. 1980). See State v. Anthoine, 2002 ME 22, ¶8, 789 A.2d 1277, 1279, n.2. However, neither section of law accurately expresses the rule or any exception to the rule. Both provisions are deleted in favor of allowing State v. Farrington and subsequent cases to speak to the rule and any exception to it.