LD 986
pg. 67
Page 66 of 77 An Act To Enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act Amendments of 1996 an... Page 68 of 77
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LR 467
Item 1

 
if certain quite limited conditions are met. First, the tribunal
must have all the prerequisites for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction required for rendition of an original support
order. Second, one of the restricted fact situations described
in Subsection (a) must be present. This section, which is a
counterpart to Section 205(a), establishes the conditions under
which the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the issuing
tribunal is released.

 
Under Subsection (a)(1), before a tribunal in a new forum may
modify the controlling order three specific criteria must be
satisfied. First, the individual parties affected by the
controlling order and the child must no longer reside in the
issuing State. Second, the party seeking modification must
register the order in a new forum, almost invariably the State
of residence of the other party. A colloquial (but easily
understood) description of this requirement is that the
modification movant must "play an away game on the other
party's home field." This rule applies to either obligor or
obligee, depending on which of those parties seeks to modify.
Proof of the fact that neither individual party nor the child
continues to reside in the issuing State may be made directly
in the registering State; no purpose would be served by
requiring the petitioner to return to the original issuing
State for a document to confirm the fact that none of the
relevant persons still lives there. Third, the forum must have
personal jurisdiction over the parties. This is supplied by
the movant submitting to the personal jurisdiction of the
forum by seeking affirmative relief, almost always coupled
with the fact that the respondent resides in the forum. On
rare occasion, the personal jurisdiction over the respondent
may be supplied by other factors, see Section 201 and the
comment thereto, supra.

 
The policies underlying the change affected by Subsection
(a)(1) contemplate that the issuing State no longer has an
interest in exercising its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
to modify its order. This restriction attempts to achieve a
rough justice between the parties in the majority of cases by
preventing a litigant from choosing to seek modification in a
local tribunal to the marked disadvantage of the other party.
For example, an obligor visiting the children at the residence
of the obligee cannot be validly served with citation
accompanied by a motion to modify the support order. Even
though such personal service of the obligor in the obligee's
home State is consistent with the jurisdictional requisites of
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), the motion to
modify does not fulfill the requirement of being brought by "a
[petitioner] who is a nonresident of this State ." In short,
the obligee is required
to register the existing order and seek modification of that
order in a State that has personal jurisdiction over the
obligor other than the


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